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Abstract
The evolution of wireless networks and mobile device technologies has increased concerns
about performance and security of mobile systems. We propose a new secured application-
level architecture for a two-party mobile payment transaction that is carried out between a
resource-limited mobile device and a resource-rich computer server over wireless networks.
As an example of such transactions, the mobile banking transaction is focused on through-
out this thesis. The proposed architecture, namely SA2pMP, employs a lightweight cryp-
tography scheme (combining both a Public-key cryptography algorithm (ECDSA) and a
Symmetric-key cryptography algorithm (AES)), a multi-factor authentication mechanism,
and a transaction log strategy. The proposed architecture is designed to satisfy the four
properties of confidentiality, authentication, integrity and non-repudiation that are required
by any secure system. The architecture can be implemented on a Java ME enabled mobile
device. The security API library can be reused in implementing other two-party mobile
applications. The present study shows that SA2pMP is a unique lightweight security archi-
tecture providing comprehensive security for two-party mobile payment transactions. In
addition, simulations demonstrate that SA2pMP can be installed in resource-limited mobile
devices as a downloadable software application. The main contribution of the thesis is to
suggest a design for a security architecture for two-party mobile payment transactions, for
example, mobile banking. It suggests a four-layer model of mobile payment participants,
based on Karnouskos (2004). This model clarifies how participants are involved in a mo-
bile payment transaction. In addition, an improved model is suggested to guide security
aspects of system design, which is based on an Onion Layer Framework (Wei, C.Liu, &
Koong, 2006).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
With the development of computer technologies and wireless communications, more peo-
ple are carrying mobile devices. Such devices are rapidly becoming both cheaper and more
powerful. A single mobile device can now be employed not only as a cell phone, but also
as a GPS, a camera, a music and video player, a text messenger and an Internet connection
device (Wilcox, 2005). However, security concerns have so far hindered mobile devices
from playing larger roles in financial transactions. The goal of this research is to design
and demonstrate a new and secure approach to support payment transactions over a mobile
device.
1.1 Motivation
Mobile networking applications allow customers to gain network access anytime and al-
most anywhere. “The number of people worldwide who possess mobile devices is hurtling
toward the two billion mark, and the amount continues to grow, and grow rapidly. It will
exceed the number of people who hold bank accounts. It will also exceed the number
of people who carry credit cards.” (Global Information Inc., 2005) Service providers will
compete in this marketplace by offering lower prices but, more importantly, more and better
services, including promising opportunities in financial services.
Within financial services, the mobile payment is the fundamental transaction and can
be defined as any payment transaction which involves a mobile device (Deans, 2004). With
the growing prevalence of electronic commerce, mobile commerce, and the widespread
use of mobile devices, mobile payments have already been predicted to have a bright future
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in becoming a successful mobile service (Ondrus & Pigneur, 2005). “Eventually, mobile
device-based payment transactions will surpass card-based payment transaction.” (Bruene,
2007). Ultimately, mobile payments will allow users to pay anyone, anywhere at anytime
for any purpose.
1.2 Current Limitations
Security is always a challenge. According to the Unisys Security Index 2008 1, seventy one
percent of the 13,296 consumers surveyed in fourteen countries would not consider online
banking or shopping via mobile devices due to security concerns. Less than ten percent
of respondents currently employ mobile devices to perform money transfers, credit-card
transactions or deposits (Sacco, 2008). Secure strategies are essential to convince mobile
users and financial service providers to make use of mobile payment transactions.
Designing a security architecture to protect mobile payment transactions requires trade-
offs between security and practicality. A monetary transaction needs comprehensive pro-
tection for confidentiality, authentication, integrity and non-repudiation (Park & Song,
2001), which normally requires considerable computational resources. Unfortunately, mo-
bile devices have relatively limited computational resources (less memory, lower CPU
speed and an inconvenient I/O interface) compared to PCs (Lai, P.Lin, & Huang, 2006).
Therefore, designing a security architecture suitable for resource-limited mobile devices
and wireless networks is an important challenge to the success of mobile payment.
Currently several research projects, as well as products on the global level, aim to sup-
port emerging two-party mobile payment solutions (e.g., VISA and MasterCard, 1997;
Janson, 2007; Itani & Kayssi, 2004; Lam et al., 2003). Hardware and software providers
1The Unisys Security Index provides a recurring, statistical measure of consumer concern about four areas
of security: national, financial, Internet and personal safety. (http://www.unisyssecurityindex.com/)
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for the mobile market, as well as mobile network operators (MNO) and financial service
providers, have attempted to specify guidelines for such systems (Karnouskos & Vilmos,
2004). However, no technique has yet been widely accepted for practical implementation.
One may argue that with improving technology it will soon be possible to transplant
heavyweight security architectures simply from PC applications to mobile devices. How-
ever, current top-end devices cost around $300 (MobileMentalism.com, 2009) which is
too expensive for many people, especially those from economically underdeveloped ar-
eas. Some software providers and cryptography scientists are taking a different approach,
looking for lightweight security strategies capable of running with limited computational
resources. These strategies are able to contribute security protection for payment transac-
tions; meanwhile, due to savings on computational resources, the strategies can be imple-
mented in most middle-end, or even low-end, mobile devices. These lightweight architec-
tures can be adapted to top-end mobile devices as well. The key problem of this approach
is how to balance security with practicality on mobile devices. Once this problem is solved,
the popularity of the technology will lead to a lower cost in building the architecture, and
may also contribute to forming a large global consumer market.
Another problem facing current two-party mobile payment systems lies in the mobile
service technologies employed in payment transactions. The existing mobile payment sys-
tems are mostly based on the Short Messaging Service (SMS) or the Wireless Application
Protocol (WAP) (Kuwayama, 2008). However, SMS and WAP have technical limitations
that make security architectures very difficult (refer to Subsections 2.2.1, 2.2.2). Although
SMS and WAP are likely to dominate mobile payments, the downloadable applications,
with their own verifiable security, offer the greatest promise for the future (Bhise, 2009).
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1.3 Problem Statement
The objective of this thesis is to design and demonstrate a new security architecture for
two-party mobile payment transactions, carried out over resource-limited mobile devices
and wireless networks. In existing research focusing on security for mobile payment trans-
actions, there is no solution with an appropriate balance between security and practicality.
Some approaches are transplanted from PC-based security strategies, offering good security
protection, but are too computationally complex and too time-consuming to be applied to
resource-limited mobile devices. Other research offers more computationally lightweight
approaches; these solutions generally perform well on resource-limited mobile devices but
fail to provide comprehensive security for payment transactions. This thesis contributes a
solution offering a good balance between security issues and practical implementations.
A new security architecture is proposed to provide comprehensive security by satisfying
the four key requirements of confidentiality, authentication, integrity and non-repudiation
for two-party mobile payment transactions; meanwhile, it offers acceptable performance on
resource-limited mobile devices. The proposed architecture is computationally lightweight
and compatible with a wide range of mobile devices. The proposed architecture can also
be implemented as a downloadable application, which avoids limitations existing in SMS-
or WAP-based approaches.
1.4 Research Scope
The research aims to provide an application layer architecture for ensuring security during
a mobile payment transaction. A mobile payment transaction that has only two participants
is defined as a two-party mobile payment transaction. In this work a two-party mobile
4
payment transaction model is employed, in which payment transactions are carried out
between a resource-limited mobile device and a resource-rich business computer server
via a wide-ranging wireless network (Itani & Kayssi, 2004). Two-party mobile payment
transactions, as defined here, have a wide range of applications, such as mobile banking
or mobile stock trading. The mobile device is recognized as a resource-limited handheld
device, with wireless network connectivity, Internet function, lower-speed CPU and the
ability to run Java applications. The business server processing usually has none of these
limitations. Mobile Phone Networks are employed in this research to provide wide-range
wireless networks, such as the General Packet Radio Service (GPRS). In this thesis a mobile
banking scenario is used to demonstrate the architecture. The architecture is provided in
the form of an application package based on the Java ME platform, as Java ME is the
predominant mobile service technology and has been supported by a wide range of mobile
device operating systems for a number of years (Riggs & Vandenbrink, 2001).
1.5 Research Contributions
The thesis attempts to offer guidance in matters of designing an application architecture for
two-party mobile payment transactions over resource-limited mobile devices. The main
contribution is designing a practical security architecture on the application layer. The
proposed security architecture is for two-party mobile payment transactions, referred to as
SA2pMP. It employs a lightweight cryptography scheme combining a public-key cryptog-
raphy algorithm (ECDSA) and a Symmetric-key cryptography algorithm (AES), a multi-
factor authentication mechanism and a distributed transaction log strategy. SA2pMP sat-
isfies comprehensive security requirements (confidentiality, authentication, integrity and
non-repudiation) for a two-party payment transaction, and is suitable for the current resource-
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limited environment of mobile devices and wireless networks.
The simulation demonstrates that the proposed architecture can be practically imple-
mented in a resource-limited mobile device. The proposed architecture employs a Java ME
based downloadable software application that can be easily installed in a wide range of
mobile devices without any hardware upgrading.
The thesis also contributes to the literature on security models. A Four-layer model
of mobile payment participants based on Karnouskos (Karnouskos, 2004) clarifies how
participants are involved in mobile payment transactions. An improved research model
based on Onion Layer Framework (Wei et al., 2006) is proposed.
1.6 System Development
To measure the practicality of the proposed architecture (SA2pMP), a two-party mobile
payment system (mobile banking) was simulated on an IBM IntelliStation M Pro PC, with
Pentium 4 CPU 2.80 GHz and 2 GB RAM. The operating system was Windows XP Pro-
fessional SP3.
Three Java ME enabled mobile device emulators, Nokia S60 Emulator (Nokia, 2009),
Sony Ericsson Emulator (Sony Ericsson, n.d.), and Sun WTK 2.5.2 CLDC simulator (Sun
Microsystems, 2009), were employed for simulation. A Java EE application based on
the Apache HTTP Server 2.2, cooperating with Tomcat 5.0, was developed as a banking
business service. MySQL Server 5.1 was used as the database server.
The program was developed using NetBeans IDE 6.02 and Eclipse SDK 3.4.13. The
implementation of cryptography algorithms was aided by the third party cryptography API
2http://www.netbeans.org/
3http://www.eclipse.org/
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provider referred to as Bouncy Castle4.
The evaluation considered both the time delay and the code size. The evaluation on
the time delay shows whether the architecture performs efficiently enough to be accepted
by the public, while the evaluation on the code size determines if the architecture can
be implemented in limited storage in mobile devices. The detailed evaluation shows that
SA2pMP can be feasibly implemented on a Java ME enabled mobile device for secure
two-party mobile transactions such as mobile payments.
1.7 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 In this chapter, background knowledge is introduced. Since the development
of wireless network technologies leads the appearance and development of mobile pay-
ment transactions, wireless network technologies are introduced first, with a focus on the
mobile phone network. Several mobile service technologies are then introduced, including
SMS, WAP, and Java ME. Mobile service technologies provide the customer with options
in building mobile payment systems. In the next an overview of mobile payments and
mobile payment models is introduced. Since a mobile payment requires a mobile device,
a description of the current status of mobile devices is provided. Several operating sys-
tems for mobile devices are introduced as well. A section is provided especially for Java
ME since the proposed architecture is based on Java ME. This section provides a rela-
tively comprehensive introduction to Java ME, including the Connected Limited Device
Configuration (CLDC), the Mobile Information Device Profile (MIDP), the MIDlet, and
4http://www.bouncycastle.org
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the Record Management System (RMS). This is followed by the topic of security. As
a strong authentication strategy is necessary for a payment system, related background
knowledge of authentication is introduced. Both Single-Factor Authentication (SFA) and
Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) are described. Finally, background knowledge of cryp-
tography is introduced, including basic cryptography concepts, Symmetric-key cryptogra-
phy, and Public-key cryptography. Some cryptography algorithms that can be employed in
the proposed security architecture are also described, as is a comparison of these two cat-
egories. Since the proposed architecture is implemented with the software, the advantages
and limitations of software encryption are explained.
Chapter 3 This chapter analyzes security requirements and describes how the proposed
architecture is designed to provide comprehensive security for two-party mobile transac-
tions, with a focus on mobile payment transactions. A description of the scope and limita-
tions of this research is included. In the context of the system design, the mobile devices,
the two-party mobile payments, the wireless networks, and the application layer are clearly
defined. To clarify how participants are related to a mobile payment, a Four-layer model of
mobile payment participants is proposed. The security requirements which the architecture
needs to fulfill are then outlined. Based on an Onion Layer Framework (Wei et al., 2006)
and the security objectives (Merz, 2002), a security map is proposed to guide the present
research. The results of the requirement analysis are explained in this chapter. The tech-
nical solutions for system design are recommended from four perspectives: cryptography,
protection of authentication, protection of non-repudiation, and the proposed implementa-
tion.
Chapter 4 In this chapter a new Security Architecture for Two-party Mobile Payment
(SA2pMP) is presented. This begins with a description of a detailed network module.
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There are three main security strategies involved in the SA2pMP security architecture: a
lightweight cryptography scheme, a multi-factor authentication strategy, and a distributed
transaction log strategy. Corresponding to these strategies, a key management strategy
is proposed to protect two pairs of keys for the cryptography algorithms. As the mobile
banking transaction is a typical two-party mobile payment, SA2pMP is explained in the
context of a mobile bank. For the readers’ convenience, the beginning of this chapter
describes the notations for this thesis.
Chapter 5 This chapter presents how the proposed architecture is simulated on PCs.
The business scenario for implementing SA2pMP is a mobile banking transaction consist-
ing of money transfer. The hardware and software environment for system simulation is
described, followed by an introduction to the specific implementation. The specific eval-
uations on the time delay and the code size are also explained. Based on evaluations on
both the time delay and the code size, SA2pMP is demonstrated to have practical applica-
tions in Java ME enabled CLDC-1.1 mobile devices, although some visual or multi-modal
feedback needs to be considered for some applications.
Chapter 6 This chapter provides comparisons between SA2pMP and related work in
terms of security and practicality. A J2ME application-layer security architecture (JASA)
proposed by Itani and Kayssi (2004), a lightweight security mechanism (LSM) proposed by
Lam et al. (2003), the iKP protocols proposed by Janson (2007) and Bellare et al. (2000),
and SET (VISA and MasterCard, 1997) are first introduced as the comparable candidates,
followed by their advantages and limitations. Comparisons are made based on the archi-
tecture design, time delay and code size for measuring the security and practicality of the
architecture. Based on the comparison, the security and practicality advantages of SA2pMP
in protecting two-party mobile payment transactions over resource-limited mobile devices
9
are presented.
Chapter 7 This chapter is a conclusion with suggestions for areas of future work.
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Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter background information is provided for wireless network technologies in
Section 2.1, mobile service technologies in Section 2.2, mobile payment in Section 2.3
and the current state of mobile devices in Section 2.4. A description of Java ME is pro-
vided in Section 2.5, followed by an introduction of authentication in Section 2.6. Finally,
cryptography is introduced in Section 2.7.
2.1 Wireless Network Technologies
The focus of this work is on transactions over wireless networks, which are normally pro-
vided by mobile network operators. Wireless networks are categorized as low-power, local-
area systems or high-power, wide-area systems (Pahlavan & Levesque, 2005). Wireless
local area networks (WLANs) are low-power, local-area systems. In contrast, high-power,
wide-areas systems are intended to serve large numbers of users who require portability
and mobility over wide areas. The mobile phone network (MPN) is the best example of the
high-power, wide-areas systems.
The wireless local area network (WLAN) is a wireless alternative to a computer local
area network (LAN) designed to provide coverage in a small area, such as a building,
home, or office. The main attraction is the flexibility and mobility supported by a WLAN.
Compared to MPN where a frequency (channel) is allocated, users in a WLAN have to
share frequencies (Ferro & Potorti, 2005).
Not constrained to voice data, data communication over MPN has visibly developed.
Since a MPN covers a wider area than a WLAN, mobile payment transactions with a MPN
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can provide more convenience, mobility and portability than over a WLAN; therefore,
MPN is viewed as more suitable to support mobile transactions than WLAN.
Today MPN are based on either the Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM)
or its derivative standards (such as GPRS), or on the Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA).
A more specific introduction to MPNs is provided in the following.
2.1.1 Mobile Phone Network
Mobile applications need a wireless communication network. As one of two major types
of wireless networks, the mobile phone network (MPN) is believed to have a much higher
penetration than WLAN (Parson & Schaeffler, 2001).
MPN is a radio network consisting of a number of cells, each of which is served by one
or more fixed transmitters (Parson & Schaeffler, 2001). A mobile telephone or any other
mobile device that connects to an MPN will be recognized as a mobile station. A MPN
covers a wider area than a WLAN.
MPNs have evolved through several generations of mobile technologies, from first-
generation (1G) to second-generation (2G / 2.5G), and third-generation (3G). For example,
a large majority of Rogers’1 customers use the services on second-generation (2G / 2.5G)
MPNs. Some of the mainstream standards for second-generation technology are the Global
System for Mobile Communication (GSM), the Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA),
and the General Packet Radio System (GPRS). These commonly used standards support
mobile payment transactions in different levels.
1http://www.rogers.com
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Global System for Mobile Communication
The Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) is a second generation standard for
mobile communication developed by the European Telecommunications Standards Insti-
tute (ETSI) with final ownership belonging to the Third Generation Partnership Project
(3GPP) (Vyas & O’Grady, 2001). In GSM, the user is provided not only with a fre-
quency band over which to transmit but also a time interval during the communication.
GSM is the most widespread mobile standard currently utilized in Europe and the Asia-
Pacific region. Several companies have adopted GSM in the United States. In Canada, two
main carriers, Microcell (Fido)2 and Rogers Wireless (around 2001) operate with GSM
(CanadianContent, n.d.).
GSM is able to provide users several services as follows (Scourias, 2003):
• Telecommunication services: Currently the most basic telecommunication service
supported by GSM is the mobile telephone.
• Data Services:
– Internet Services: GSM users can send and receive data at rates up to 9.6 Kbps;
– Short Message Service: SMS is a bidirectional service for short alphanumeric
(up to 160 bytes) messages;
– Fax: Sending and receiving fax messages using a GSM phone and a laptop
computer;
– Secure LAN Access: Securing access to emails, faxes and file transfer to a cor-
porate LAN.
• Supplementary Services: Such services include call forwarding, call barring, caller
identification and multiparty conversation (Vyas & O’Grady, 2001).
2http://www.microcell.ca
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GSM is limited in its low data transmission speed and low bandwidth of data services.
Other limitations include the fact that the charge for using GSM is based on the on-line
duration and reconnection is required for each session. These limitations make it diffi-
cult to use GSM as the main stream network environment for real-time mobile payment
transactions.
General Packet Radio Service
In contrast to GSM, the General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) charges only for data re-
ceived and has much more stable connectivity (McKitterick & Dowling, 2003). GPRS is
classified as a 2.5G technology, which means a technology between 2G and 3G. It is an ex-
tended service of the GSM network that offers the ability of surfing Internet using a phone
at a slightly higher speed than GSM. GPRS Internet surfing speeds range from 9.6 Kbps to
171.2 Kbps (McKitterick & Dowling, 2003). GPRS can be considered as an overlay net-
work on the GSM networks, adding the extra network elements on the GSM infrastructure.
A phone with support capacities and a subscription from a supporting network operator is
required to operate with GPRS.
The benefit of higher speed and more stable connectivity makes GPRS more suitable
for operating mobile applications in real time. GPRS applications include Internet access,
email, fax, unified messaging, and Short Messaging Service (SMS). The design of the
proposed architecture can be considered to run on a GPRS network environment. For more
details about GPRS, refer to Sanders, Thorens, Reisky, Rulik, and Deylitz (2003).
14
Code Division Multiple Access
As a competitor to GSM, Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) is a proprietary stan-
dard for mobile communication3. CDMA was originally proposed by Qualcomm4, and
subsequently developed by Ericsson5. CDMA is a wide-band, spread spectrum technology,
which means a signal is transmitted on a bandwidth considerably larger than the frequency
content of the original information (Vyas & O’Grady, 2001). CDMA allows each user in
each cell to transmit on the same frequency channel and at the same time (Glisic & Leppa-
nen, 1997). A unique code is assigned to all conversation. CDMA has been the dominant
network standard for North America and parts of Asia. For example, some of largest mo-
bile carriers in Canada provide CDMA, such as Bell Mobility6, TELUS Mobility7, and
SaskTel8.
A CDMA call starts with a standard rate of 9.6 Kbps, which is then spread to a trans-
mitted rate of about 1.23 Mbps (McKitterick & Dowling, 2003). That means CDMA has
a higher speed than GSM in 2G technology. The benefit of higher speed makes CDMA an
option for running the proposed architecture.
Third Generation and Fourth Generation
Companies are introducing the third generation technology as 3G, a generic term for a
significant step in mobile technology development. The formal standard for 3G is the In-
ternational Mobile Telecommunications 2000 (IMT-2000) in the International Telecommu-
nication Union (ITU) family. The three optional modes for the 3G standard are Wideband
3GSM is an open standard
4http://www.qualcomm.com/
5http://www.sonyericsson.com
6http://www.bell.ca
7http://www.telus.ca
8http://www.sasktel.com/
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Code Division Multiple Access (W-CDMA)9 (Europe and the Asian GSM countries), Code
Division Multiple Access (CDMA) (North America), and Time Division Duplex/Code Di-
vision Multiple Access (TDD/CDMA) (China) (McKitterick & Dowling, 2003). It is ex-
pected that IMT-2000 will provide higher transmission rates for 3G: a minimum speed of
2 Mbps for stationary or walking users, and 348 Kbps in a moving vehicle10 (ITU, 2005).
3G means not only an optimized voice service, but also well suited data communication.
With 3G, users get a better support on data communication, such as Internet, electronic
commerce, and multimedia communications.
1G, 2G, and 3G systems are likely to co-exist for some time. Following the paradigm
of generational changes, the fourth generation (4G) was foreseen to emerge between 2010
and 2015 as an ultra-high-speed broadband wireless network (Bohlin et al., 2004). A very
high-speed wireless access of 100 Mbps to 1 Gbps is expected to be provided by 4G mobile
communications systems (Adachi, Garg, Takaoka, & Takeda, 2005).
Higher transaction speed provides users better support for data communication. No
doubt, more mobile applications such as mobile commerce or multimedia communications
will move toward business success with the development of wireless network technologies.
We can assume that a mobile architecture designed for the previous generation can also
applied to present or future generations. The proposed architecture in this thesis is able
to run with good performance in 3G or 4G network environments, although it is designed
primarily for the current GPRS.
Different wireless network technologies support different mobile service technologies.
The different mobile service technologies are able to fulfill the requirement for mobile
payment applications at different levels. The following provides an introduction to mobile
9W-CDMA is also referred to as Universal Mobile Telephone System (UMTS).
10Second-generation systems only provide speeds ranging from 9.6 Kbps to 28.8 Kbps.
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service technologies.
2.2 Mobile Service Technologies
Generational updates for wireless networks enable users to experience various mobile ser-
vices or applications. Some mobile services or applications offer the opportunity to carry
out various types of mobile transactions. This section introduces some popular mobile
service technologies, including SMS, WAP, and Java ME.
2.2.1 Short Messaging Service
Short Messaging Service (SMS) is a part of the GSM standard and responsible for sending
and receiving short text messages with a limited length to and from mobile phones. It is
also presented on most other digital cellular networks such as CDMA and tends to operate
in a similar fashion on each network. SMS enables two-way short messages to be sent
between GSM subscribers. Using gateways, it is also possible to interchange messages
with other systems such as Internet email and the Web.
Currently, SMS is one of the most common and affordable messaging tools for cus-
tomers. It is not necessary to install any additional software. The banks and other financial
sectors can easily send real-time messages to customers. SMS has already been employed
in banks to provide mobile services (GoMoNews, 2009a, 2009b; Kuwayama, 2008).
However, SMS has some limitations. SMS limits alphanumeric messages to 160 char-
acters and does not offer a secured environment (Mobile Marketing Association, 2009).
These limitations mean that SMS can only serve part of the banking business such as ad-
vertising or client alerts, but for business requiring high security SMS has poor performance
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as it does not provide a secured environment.
2.2.2 Wireless Application Protocol
The Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) was developed by the WAP Forum11, which
has over 500 members. In June 1997, Unwired Planet12, along with Ericsson13, Nokia14,
and Motorola15 announced the formation of the WAP Forum (Mann, Sbihli, & NetLibrary,
Inc, 2002). WAP-2.0, as a re-engineering of WAP, was released in 2002. (More detailed
information about WAP can be found on each of the founder companies’ websites.)
WAP is an open standard for applications over wireless networks. It specifies a series
of protocols covering all the protocol layers from the transport to the presentation levels.
WAP provides a mechanism for displaying Internet information on a mobile phone or any
wireless device by translating Internet information into a format which can be displayed
in a resource-limited mobile device (Vyas & O’Grady, 2001). To access Internet content
the mobile device needs to be WAP-enabled, and Internet content should be described in
Wireless Markup Language (WML) format. A WAP gateway is also essential between the
client mobile device and the WML host server, with the goal to translate the WAP request.
WML is a mobile equivalent to HTML for web pages.
WAP enabled devices can be handheld digital wireless devices such as mobile phones,
pagers, two-way radios, smart phones, and communicators. WAP can work with most
wireless networks such as GSM, CDMA, and GPRS. It can also be built on any operating
system including PalmOS, EPOC, Windows CE, and JavaOS (WAP Forum, 2002).
11http://www.wapforum.org/what/technical.htm
12http://www.phone.com
13http://www.ericsson.com/se/
14http://www.nokia.com
15http://www.motorola.com
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Although WAP is designed for handheld wireless devices ranging from low-end to high-
end, it has some technical limitations. Limited to simple layout of text, images, and input
controls, WAP has not provided the expected support for multimedia. Second, WAP is
an application which transmits a request to the server. When network connections are
dropped, developers have no control over the alert message. Thirdly, a WAP application
works only when the phone is connected to WML server, since the WAP browser relies on
a WML server to provide the WAP content. These limitations make it inappropriate for
implementing a security architecture on mobile devices.
2.2.3 Java ME
The Java Platform, Micro Edition (Java ME) was developed specifically for small mobile
devices ranging from smart cards to personal digital assistants (PDAs). Categorized as a
mobile service technology, Java ME has the benefit of being cross-platform, and is currently
the standard for all mobile devices. For these reasons, Java ME is employed to construct
the proposed architecture (see section 2.5 for details).
2.3 Mobile Payment
This thesis aims to provide an architecture for securing two-party mobile payment transac-
tions. However, the proposed architecture is suggested to extend to other two-party mobile
transaction applications. In this section an introduction focusing primarily on mobile pay-
ment transactions is provided with an overview of mobile payment, followed by an intro-
duction to some popular mobile payment models. Finally, some existing mobile payment
protocols are presented.
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2.3.1 Mobile Payment Overview
A mobile payment can be defined as any payment transaction which involves a mobile
device (Deans, 2004). With the growing prevalence of electronic commerce, mobile com-
merce and the widespread use of mobile devices, mobile payments have already been pre-
dicted to have a bright future in becoming a successful mobile service (Ondrus & Pigneur,
2005).
In the financial industry, the number of people worldwide who possess hand-held de-
vices is beyond two billion, and the number continues to grow rapidly, exceeding the num-
ber of people with bank accounts and credit cards (Global Information Inc., 2005). Based
on a survey provided by Aite Group LLC. in March 2007, among twenty-two of the top 100
U.S. deposit institutions, over ninety percent of banks, consider client convenience to be a
top driver behind the adoption of mobile banking capabilities (Aite Group, 2007). Mobile
devices are playing an increasing role in consumers’ lives, and banks already recognize
the benefits of deploying mobile banking solutions, which increase their own competitive
capabilities. According to TowerGroup Inc.16, the number of people using their phones for
banking activities will be driven up to more than 53 million by 2013 (American Banker,
2009).
Although many observers are projecting that cell phones and PDAs will soon replace
wallets and pocketbooks (FSTC Press Releases, 2007), the mobile payment application
has not been as successful as anticipated. This can be partially explained by the youth of
the market and a lack of standards (Ondrus & Pigneur, 2005). Mobile payment system
designers are confronting a large challenge related to security.
In a general mobile payment service, both practicality and security are important fac-
tors. Therefore, an acceptable mobile payment platform should balance the requirements
16TowerGroup Inc. is an independent research firm owned by MasterCard Inc.
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coming from both sides. Unfortunately there is currently no widely accepted protocol or
architecture for mobile payments.
2.3.2 Mobile Payment Models
Gao et al. (2005) Model
Existing mobile payment systems can be classified into two types (Gao, Cai, Patel, & Shim,
2005). The first type of mobile payment system is mobile point of sale (POS) system that
enables customers to purchase products on vending machines with their mobile devices.
The second type is account-based payment systems which can be mobile phone-based,
smart card, or credit card mobile payment systems, which is the focus of this research.
Karnouskos Model
Figure 2.1 depicts the parties involved in mobile payments (Karnouskos, 2004).
According to Karnouskos Model, the client receives the service of mobile devices from
the merchant. In most cases, the client pays the merchant for this service. The merchant
acts as an intermediary between the client and the service providers.
The transaction between the service provider and the client involves the other players.
The mobile network operators are in charge of the wireless network. They have a large
client base and influence all parties involved in a mobile payment. However, they cannot
be fully responsible for the mobile payment system, as they have limited experience in
payment services. The financial sector has the required experience with an understanding
of the complexities of financial transactions (Laukkanen & Lauronen, 2005). The main
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Figure 2.1: The major mobile payment players (Karnouskos, 2004).
players in the financial sector include banks, credit card companies, and other financial
institutions (For example, PayPal17) (Herzberg, 2003).
The device manufacturers produce the mobile phones that are used by the customers.
They control the technology and capabilities of the end-device, which affects the imple-
mentation and deployment of the mobile payment services (Karnouskos, 2004). Device
manufacturers collaborate in defining mobile device capabilities, leading to the develop-
ment of devices such as mobile devices and PDAs (Herzberg, 2003).
Another player involved in mobile payment is the software provider. They contribute
to the implementation of a mobile payment infrastructure by producing standard compliant
software that will connect the different parts of the mobile payment process (Karnouskos,
2004). The government, the last player, is not directly involved with mobile payment but
sets standards and regulations for the other players in mobile payments (Karnouskos, 2004).
17http://www.paypal.com
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According to (Karnouskos, 2004), to ensure that mobile payments are successful and
to maintain the efficiency of the services, all players must cooperate and stay open-minded
to the development of new technologies and models.
This work aims to design a security architecture for two-party mobile payments which
can be extended to ensure security for other two-party mobile transactions, rather than to
provide a transaction model for mobile payment; however, it is indispensable for the work
to clarify the transaction model between several parties involved in a mobile payment.
Although Karnouskos summarized the related parties in a mobile payment, they do not
clarify how these different participants are related to a mobile payment, and on which level
each participant is involved. This limitation leads this work to extend the model suggested
by Karnouskos (2004) to a Four-layer model of mobile payment participants. The Four-
layer model can be used to analyze the transaction relationship between the participants
involved in a payment transaction; meanwhile, it can also be employed to demonstrate
that this work on two-party mobile transactions can be extended to research on multi-party
mobile transactions, especially on mobile payment transactions.
The detail of the Four-layer model can be found in 3.1.2.
2.4 Mobile Devices
In a mobile application via wireless networks, a mobile device plays a vital role on the
client’s side of the transaction. In this section, an overview of mobile devices is provided,
followed by a introduction of popular mobile operating systems running in mobile devices.
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2.4.1 Mobile Devices’ Overview
A mobile device is a wireless communication tool that offers users advanced computing
capabilities which are often same as a PC functionality (Nambiar, Lu, & Liang, 2004).
Normally a mobile device is the size of pocket, making it easy to carry.
Electronic commerce is used to share business information, maintain business relation-
ships, and conduct business transactions via telecommunications networks (Zwass, 1996).
A major factor that defines an electronic commerce system as being mobile is the support of
mobile devices as a transaction platform for end users (Lam et al., 2003). In order to attain
high penetration into mobile commerce, end user convenience is a major concern. Mo-
bile devices such as pocket PCs and smart phones are attractive options for the following
reasons (Ginevan, 2002):
• low-cost,
• low battery consumption,
• highly portable,
• wireless capability,
• reasonable computing and display capability for simple transactions, and
• instantaneous power up (no lengthy boot up latency).
Today a large number of different mobile devices exist, but most differences are ad-
dressed by the integration of Java Virtual Machines (JVM). The Java Platform, Micro
Edition (Java ME) allows a fast deployment of applications that “compile once and run
anywhere” (Tillich & Großschadl, 2004). Hence, most of today’s devices conform to Java
ME.
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In this research, it is assumed that the mobile device is a Java-ME enabled phone. The
specific definition of mobile device in this research is given in subsection 3.1.1.
2.4.2 Mobile Operating Systems
A mobile operating system is an operating system for a mobile device, which provides a
software platform to run application programs. Although most mobile operating systems
have been in the alliance supporting Java, they have some differences in performance in
running Java applications. The proposed architecture in this research is built on mobile
devices with Java ME. The typical mobile operating systems include Symbian, Windows
Mobile, Palm, Linux, Android, iPhone OS and BlackBerry OS.
Symbian OS
Symbian OS is a proprietary operating system for mobile devices. It is associated with
libraries, user interface frameworks, and reference implementations of common tools for
programming. Originally it was produced by Symbian Ltd. owned by Nokia, Sony Erics-
son18, Panasonic19, and Samsung20. In 2009, the Symbian Foundation was established to
create an open and complete mobile software platform and to make it available at no charge
to users (Symbian Foundation, 2009).
There are multiple platforms based upon Symbian OS that provide a software develop-
ment kit (SDK) for application developers wishing to work on a Symbian OS device. The
main ones are UIQ (User Interface Quartz) and Nokia S60. Java ME applications for Sym-
18http://www.sonyericsson.com/
19http://www.panasonic.com/
20http://www.samsung.com/
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bian OS are developed using standard techniques and tools such as the Sun Java Wireless
Tool kits (formerly the J2ME Wireless Tool kits). They are packaged as a Java Archive
(JAR) (and possibly with a Java Application Descriptor (JAD)) files. Since Symbian OS
offers good support for Java ME, a Nokia S60 emulator running with Symbian OS was
employed in the simulation to demonstrate the practicality of the proposed architecture in
this research.
See Symbian Foundation (2009) for further details regarding Symbian OS.
Windows Mobile OS
Windows Mobile is a lighter version operating system combined with a suite of basic appli-
cations for mobile devices based on the Microsoft Win32 API. Devices that run Windows
Mobile include Pocket PCs, Smartphone, and on-board computers for certain automobiles.
It is designed to be similar to Windows desktop versions. Additionally, third-party software
development is available for Windows Mobile. Windows Mobile 6.5 is the current version
with version 7 planned for release in the Spring 2010 (Chapman, 2009).
Windows Mobile operating system supports third party software development. Devel-
opers can choose several options to deploy a mobile application on Windows Mobile. The
development of the application normally uses Visual C++ and works with the .NET Com-
pact Framework. Microsoft21 usually releases Windows Mobile Software development kits
(SDKs) which work in collaboration with their Visual Studio development environment.
Windows Mobile also includes a Java Virtual Machine to support Java applications.
Microsoft licenses Windows Mobile to a large number of mobile computer or PDA
21http://www.microsoft.com
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manufacturers that are mostly from the PC industry, such as HP22, Cisco23,Philips24, and
LG25. However, Windows Mobile has faced problems of simplicity, robustness, synchro-
nization and memory requirements (McKitterick & Dowling, 2003). As Windows Mobile
supports Java applications, the proposed architecture is able to be implemented in Windows
Mobile.
For more details see Microsoft Corporation (2009).
Palm
Palm OS is a proprietary, embedded operating system initially developed for PDAs by Palm
Computing, Inc. in 1996. It has been implemented on a wide range of mobile devices, such
as Smartphone, handheld gaming facilities, and GPS devices. Since 2007 Palm OS has also
been referred to as Garnet OS (ACCESS Press Release, 2007).
Palm OS is designed for ease of use with a touch screen-based graphical user interface.
It is provided with a suite of basic applications for personal information management. Palm
OS Garnet applications are primarily coded in C/C++. A Java Virtual Machine (JVM) was
previously available for the Palm OS platform; however in 2008 Palm Inc. announced
that JVM would no longer be supported by Palm OS. Many successful applications can be
installed on a Palm OS device. Especially in the US, the Palm OS has a particularly wide
acceptance (McKitterick & Dowling, 2003).
Refer to Palm official website26 for details.
22http://www.hp.com
23http://www.cisco.com
24http://www.philips.com
25http://www.lg.com
26http://www.palm.com
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Linux
Linux is a Unix-like computer operating system. Linux is one of the most popular exam-
ples of free software and open source development, available for free to modify, use, and
redistribute. Linux is used as an operating system for a wide variety of computer hardware,
including desktop computers, supercomputers, video game systems and embedded devices
such as mobile devices.
ABI Research27 indicates that more than 127 million devices will be enabled with a
commercial Linux OS by 2012, up from 8.1 million in 2007 (ABI Research, 2007). Further-
more, device shipments which incorporate Linux as a real-time operating system (RTOS)
replacement are set to grow to more than 76 million units in 2012, up from nearly zero in
2007. Linux is currently rated as a low-cost for money, license-free solution for commer-
cial smart mobile phones, and for real-time operating system replacement in middle-tier
devices (ABI Research, 2008). On mobile phones, Linux distributions support many pro-
gramming languages, including C, C++, Java, and FORTRAN. The proposed architecture
in this research can be applied to Linux-based mobile devices.
Android
Android is a set of software including an operating system, a middleware and key mobile
applications for mobile devices (Open Handset Alliance, n.d.). It was initiated by Google28
and later developed by Open Handset Alliance29. Open Handset Alliance is a group of
hardware and software developers, including Google, NTT DoCoMo30, Sprint Nextel31,
27ABI Research is a market intelligence company specializing in global connectivity and emerging tech-
nology.
28http://www.google.com
29For more details about the Open Handset Alliance, refer to http://www.openhandsetalliance.com/
30http://www.nttdocomo.com/
31Sprint Nextel is a telecommunications company, based in Kansas, USA
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and HTC32, whose goal is to create a more open cell phone environment.
As an operating system, Android is lightweight with full features. Android allows de-
velopers to program in the Java language, to control the device via Google-developed Java
libraries, and to run on the Linux 2.6 Kernel. One of the more exciting and compelling fea-
tures of Android is that third-party applications are executed with the same system priority
as those that are bundled with the core system in Android (DiMarzio, 2008). Android pro-
vides developers not only software development toolkits and a well-formed library, but also
a right to access to anything that the operating system can access. An adequate Java support
has the ability to enable the implementation of the proposed architecture in Android mobile
devices.
Refer to the Android Official website33 for details .
iPhone OS
The iPhone OS, also referred to as OS X iPhone, is the operating system developed by
Apple Inc. for the iPhone and iPod Touch. On March 17, 2009, Apple presented the
blueprint for iPhone OS 3.0 (Apple Inc., 2009).
The iPhone SDK was released on March 6th, 2008. It allows developers to develop
applications for the iPhone and iPod Touch, as well as test them in an “iPhone simulator”;
however, an iPhone Developer Program fee is charged for loading an application. Apple
has not announced that they will enable Java to run on iPhone. Although Sun Microsystems
announced plans to release a Java Virtual Machine (JVM) for the iPhone OS, based on the
Java Platform, Micro Edition (Java ME), which would enable Java applications to run on
the iPhone and iPod Touch (Krill, 2008), it is clear that running Java on the iPhone is not
32www.htc.com/
33http://www.android.com/about/
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included in the iPhone SDK agreement. However, future support for Java ME on the iPhone
looks promising. This will enable the implementation of the proposed architecture on the
iPhone.
Refer to Apple inc. official website34 for details.
BlackBerry OS
BlackBerry OS, for BlackBerry smartphones, is the proprietary software platform of the
Canadian wireless device company, Research In Motion (RIM), for their BlackBerry Smart-
phones. The BlackBerry is primarily known for its ability to send and receive e-mail, al-
though it has other functions such as a phone, camera, and media player, and includes
maps, organizer, applications, games, and Internet (Research In Motion Limited, n.d.). The
BlackBerry OS supports MIDP-2.0 and WAP 1.2.
Since the BlackBerry OS supports a Java ME based application, it provides its Java API
for third-party developers, and allows them to build software applications. It supports the
proposed architecture. However, any application using certain restricted functions requires
a digital signature in order to guarantee an authorship of the application.
For more details, refer to BlackBerry35 and RIM36 official websites.
2.5 Java ME
Java is a programming language or a platform which was originally developed by Sun
Microsystems. Java applications are compiled into byte-code and are executed on a Java
34http://www.apple.com/
35http://www.blackberry.com
36http://www.rim.com
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virtual machine (JVM). One of the advantages of a virtual machine is that the same code
can be executed in all environments where one is located. This advantage is referred to as
cross-platform. Java ME is the abbreviation of Java Platform, Micro Edition. Since the
security architecture implemented in Java ME is proposed in this research, it is necessary
to give a more detailed introduction to Java ME. Additionally, as the Record Management
System (RMS) will be used, an overview of RMS is also provided.
2.5.1 Java ME: An Overview
Java Platform, Micro Edition (Java ME), is a collection of technologies and specifications
that create a platform fitting the requirements for mobile devices such as consumer prod-
ucts, embedded devices, and advanced mobile devices (Sun Microsystems, n.d.-a).
Java ME technology was originally created in order to deal with the constraints asso-
ciated with building applications for small devices. For this purpose Sun Microsystems37
defined the basics for Java ME technology to fit such a limited environment and make it
possible to create Java applications to run on small devices with limited memory, display
and power capacity.
Java ME platform is a collection of technologies and specifications that can be com-
bined to construct a complete Java runtime environment specifically to fit the requirements
of a particular device or market. This offers a flexibility and co-existence for all players in
the system to seamlessly cooperate to offer the most appealing experience for the end-user.
The Java ME technology is based on three elements:
1. a configuration which provides the most basic set of libraries and virtual machine
capabilities for a broad range of devices,
37http://www.sun.com/
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2. a profile which is a set of APIs that support a narrower range of devices, and
3. an optional package which is a set of technology-specific APIs.
A Java ME application environment includes both a configuration such as the Con-
nected Limited Device Configuration (CLDC) and a profile such as the Mobile Information
Device Profile (MIDP). In addition, optional packages provide capability in specific areas
of functionality, such as wireless messaging and multimedia capture and playback. CLDC
and MIDP is introduced in the following two subsections.
2.5.2 Connected Limited Device Configuration
The Connected Limited Device Configuration (CLDC), for small devices, specifies a frame-
work for Java ME applications targeted at devices with very limited resources, such as mo-
bile phones. A more capable configuration is called the Connected Device Profile (CDC),
which was developed under Java Community Process (JCP)38.
The JCP is an open organization inclusive of active members and non-member public
participants. It was established in 1998, and is responsible for the development of Java
technology and the approval of Java technical specifications.
Based on the CLDC definition, mobile devices are normally equipped with the follow-
ing capabilities (Java Community Process, n.d.-b):
• a 16-bit/32-bit processor,
• processor speeds starting from 8-32 MHz,
• at least 160 KB of non-volatile memory allocated for the CLDC libraries and virtual
machine,
38http://www.jcp.org
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• low power consumption, usually operating on battery power, and
• connectivity to some kind of network, often with a wireless, limited (9600 bps or
less) bandwidth.
CLDC provides the basic set of libraries and virtual-machine features which are in every
implementation of a Java ME environment. Combined with some profiles, such as MIDP,
CLDC gives developers a reliable Java platform for developing applications for mobile
devices.
2.5.3 Mobile Information Device Profile
The Mobile Information Device Profile (MIDP) is another key element of Java ME. It
specifies a profile for the use of Java ME on mobile devices. It defines a platform for
dynamically and securely deploying optimized, graphical, networked applications.
MIDP-2.0 is backwardly compatible with MIDP 1.0, with the same target of small,
high-volume wireless devices and with the same objective to maintain a tight control on
growth in core APIs (Java Community Process, n.d.-a). MIDP focuses on mobile com-
merce and service-based applications. MIDP-2.0 has more advanced benefits of (Sun Mi-
crosystems, n.d.-c):
• rich user interface capabilities,
• multimedia and game functionality,
• extensive connectivity,
• over-the-air provisioning, and
• end-to-end security.
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MIDP occupies the layer above CLDC, and define a standard Java runtime environment
for most mobile devices.
2.5.4 MIDlets
A MIDlet is a Java application, running on MIDP compliant devices (Debbabi, Talhi, &
Zhioua, 2007). Programmers writing a MIDlet are restricted to CLDC APIs, MIDP APIs
and optional packages. A MIDlet consists of at least one Java class which is derived from
the abstract class javax.microedition.midlet.MIDlet.
A group of MIDlets can be collected into one MIDlet suite. The MIDlet suite is pack-
aged and implemented into a mobile device as a single entry that can only be removed as
a group. MIDlets in the same MIDlet suite share static and runtime resources. Normally
a MIDlet suite is packaged in a Java Archive (JAR) file. The package information is pro-
vided in a Java Application Descriptor (JAD) file. A MIDlet is designed for simulating a
two-party mobile payment transaction to evaluate the proposed architecture.
2.5.5 Record Management System
MIDP specification requires that a platform provides persistent storage via nonvolatile
memory. The storage can be viewed as a simple record-oriented database, referred to as
the record management system (RMS) (S. Ghosh, 2002). RMS in MIDP manages several
Record Stores, which are simply flat files containing binary data. Every piece of data in a
record has an associated numeric record ID that is characteristic to each record store. Each
record store has a name that must be unique within MIDlet suite that created it. MIDlets
can access only record stores created by themselves or others in the same suite. When a
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MIDlet suite is removed from a device, all its associated record stores are deleted.
The javax.microedition.rms package contains a RecordStore class that provides rudi-
mentary access to data in a record store. Record store implementation ensures no corrup-
tion of data will occur with multiple accesses. The record store is time-stamped to mark
the last modification time, and maintains a version which is an integer that is incremented
for each operation that modifies the contents of the record store. Each record in a record
store is an array of bytes and has a unique integer identifier. The RMS APIs (Mahmoud,
2000; Giguere, 2004):
1. allow MIDlets to manipulate (add and remove) records within a record store,
2. allow MIDlets in the same application to share records, and
3. support to prohibit sharing records between different applications (in MIDP-2.0).
RMS is a good choice of designers wanting to store persistent data in mobile devices.
In the proposed architecture, RMS is an option for storing the encryption key in the key
management strategy. Refer to Subsection 4.1.6 for design details.
2.6 Authentication
A mobile transaction system, particularly for banking payments, requires an advanced se-
curity architecture which implements a strong strategy to protect authentication. In this
section, an introduction to authentication is provided. Authentication is defined, followed
by an introduction to single-factor authentication (SFA) and multi-factor authentication
(MFA).
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2.6.1 Authentication: Definition
In computer security, authentication is used to ensure that the communicating entity is who
they are claiming to be (Stallings, 2006). According to the Federal Information Processing
Standards (FIPS) 200, authentication verifies “the identity of a user, process, or device,
often as a prerequisite to allowing access to resources in an information system” (NIST,
2006).
Authentication is regularly confused with the related term of authorization. The dif-
ference between authentication and authorization is that authentication is the process of
verifying one’s identity while authorization is the process of verifying that a known entity
has the authority to perform certain operations. Based on authentication, systems or users
are offered different levels of authority (Krawetz, 2006).
Authentication can be accomplished by using any combination of three kinds of factors
(Maiwarld, 2004; Schneider, n.d.):
• something you have: ID card, security token, software token, phone, or cell phone,
• something you know: a password, pass phrase, or personal identification number
(PIN), or
• something you are: fingerprint or retinal pattern, DNA sequence (there are assorted
definitions for what is sufficient), signature or voice recognition, unique bio-electric
signals, or another biometric identifier.
A broad range of authentication methods and properties is shown in Table 2.1.
Categorization based on how many authentication factor(s) be employed, authentication
strategies can be divided into single-factor authentication and multi-factor authentication.
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Table 2.1: Authentication methods and their properties.
Method Examples Properties
What you know ID,PIN, Shared, Forgotten
Password Easy to guess
What you have Cards, Badges, Lost
Keys Shared,Duplicated,
What you know and have PIN for ATM Shared, Weak PIN
Something unique Fingerprint, face, Not possible to share
voiceprint Repudiation unlikely;
Forging difficult;
Cannot be lost or stolen
2.6.2 Single-factor Authentication
Single-factor authentication (SFA) is a traditional security process that requires one of the
elements (something you have, something you know, or something you are) (Maiwarld,
2004) before granting access rights to the user.
Offering a password is the most basic method for single-factor authentication. Like the
Password Authentication Protocol (PAP), it offers a basic access strategy for logging onto a
network (Hassell, 2002). A table of usernames and passwords is stored on a server. When
users log on, their usernames and passwords are sent to the server for verification. SFA
security relies on the diligence of users, who should take additional precautions, such as
creating a strong password and protecting it from access by others. However, SFA security
has its limitations. “Something you have” can be stolen, while “Something you know”
can be guessed, shared or lost to other methods. “Something you are” is commonly the
strongest method; however, the implementation is costly and there is still the possibility of
access being compromised (EDS.com, n.d.).
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2.6.3 Multi-factor Authentication
For applications that require greater security, it is advisable to implement multi-factor au-
thentication (MFA), which is sometimes referred to as a strong authentication.
In U.S. Government National Information Assurance Glossary (The United States Fed-
eral Government, 2006), strong authentication is defined as a “layered authentication ap-
proach relying on two or more authenticators to establish the identity of an originator or
receiver of information.” This means that a system with a strong authentication property
must require multiple factors for user authentication and use advanced technology to verify
a user’s identity. Financial sectors such as banks hold high risk systems.
Given the limitations of single-factor authentication, the logical alternative is two-factor
authentication, in which two of the elements are applied. An example is a system that is
employed to authenticate the automated teller machine (ATM) users (Firesmith, 2003). The
system combines a card (what you have) with a personal identification number (what you
know).
Requiring more than one factor significantly enhances security because single-factor
authentication by itself may not be sufficient to perform authentication that can be relied on.
Accordingly, properly designed and implemented multi-factor authentication methods are
more reliable. To offer secured and reliable services to their customers, financial systems,
such as payment systems, should employ multi-factor strategy for authentication.
2.7 Cryptography
Cryptography is the art and science of securing messages so unintended audiences cannot
read, understand, or alter the message (Tipton & Krause, 2003). A security architecture
38
must have a cryptography implementation, as cryptography helps provide confidentiality,
integrity and even non-repudiation. The goal for proposing the architecture is to design
a mobile payment security architecture which is able to be implemented practically on
resource-limited mobile devices and is compatible on wireless networks. The employment
of cryptography strategy contributes to sufficient security required by a monetary architec-
ture but often imposes computational requirements that cannot be met by resource-limited
environments. In this section basic cryptography concepts are introduced, followed by
Symmetric-key cryptography and Public-key cryptography. The representative algorithms
are introduced in these subsections. Symmetric-key cryptography and Public-key cryptog-
raphy are compared and finally the advantages in software implementation of cryptography
is analyzed.
2.7.1 Basic Cryptography Concepts
The fundamental objective of cryptography is to enable two parties to communicate over
an insecure channel while ensuring that a third party cannot understand what is being said
(Stinson, 2002). Modern cryptography concerns the construction of information systems
that are robust against malicious attempts to make these systems divert from their pre-
scribed functionality (Goldreich, 2005).
A pair of transformations exists in cryptography: encryption and decryption. Encryp-
tion converts a meaningful chunk of data (plaintext) to a meaningless chunk of data (ci-
phertext), which is unreadable to anybody except those possessing knowledge of the data
or its key, while decryption transforms the ciphertext back into the plaintext. Plaintext has
a wide range of meanings, such as a stream of bits, a text file, or a digitized voice or image
(Schneier, 1994). In this research, Plaintext is a text message.
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A cryptography algorithm is a mathematical function which is used to perform en-
cryption and decryption. It can be implemented in software, or hardware, or both. The
cryptography algorithm used between communication parties should be the same. A com-
munication party is someone who sends, receives, or manipulates data. In a two-party com-
munication, a sender is the transmitter of data, who encrypts the plaintext and sends out the
ciphertext. A receiver is the intended recipient of information, who decrypts the ciphertext
and recovers the plaintext. The intruder, a third party who tries to recover the plaintext, is
one of the two most publicized threats to security (the other is viruses) (Stallings, 2006).
Most cryptographic systems incorporate random number algorithms. A random number
is seeded with a key, which is used by cryptography algorithms to vary the ciphertext. This
means that plaintext encrypted with different keys generates different ciphertexts (Krawetz,
2006). Without the correct key, the intruder cannot recover the plaintext.
Commonly, two forms of cryptography are in use: Symmetric-key cryptography and
Public-key cryptography. Subsection 2.7.2 provides an introduction to Symmetric-key
cryptography and subsection 2.7.3 gives a survey of Public-key cryptography.
2.7.2 Symmetric-key Cryptography
Symmetric-key cryptography works on the basis that the same key is shared between the
sender and the receiver. Alice (a sender) and Bob (a receiver) are used as an example to
describe a two-party communication with the Symmetric-key encryption:
1. Alice and Bob share a secret key.
2. Alice encrypts the plaintext with the key, and sends the ciphertext to Bob.
3. Bob decrypts the ciphertext using the same key.
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The two primary types of Symmetric-key cryptography are stream ciphers and block
ciphers. A block cipher transforms a block of plaintext with a fixed size into a block
of ciphertext with equal length. A block size is typically of 64 or 128 bits (Stallings,
2006). The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is an example of block ciphers. A
stream cipher operates on data stream. It encrypts a digital data stream one bit or one byte
at a time. The Rivest Cipher #4 (RC4) is a stream cipher (Krawetz, 2006). The byte-by-
byte encoding method of stream ciphers is not suitable for software implementation. It
also affects significantly the throughput of hardware implementations. As a result, current
stream ciphers have been designed to support a certain length of plaintext to be encrypted
at a time.
Schneier (1994) outlines the advantages and disadvantages of block ciphers and stream
ciphers. The primary benefit of block ciphers is that the security is stronger in principle,
whereas stream ciphers are more easily analyzed mathematically and therefore less secure.
The main limitation of block ciphers is that the software and hardware implementations are
more complicated than stream ciphers. Because of the security concerns, block ciphers are
considered in the present study.
The main problem with Symmetric-key cryptography is that the sender and receiver
have to share the same secret key. If they are in separate physical locations, they must
trust a courier, or a phone system, or some other transmission medium to protect the secret
key. Anyone who overhears or intercepts the secret key in transition can read, modify, or
falsify messages encrypted with that key. Key management is in charge of the generation,
transmission and storage of keys. Because all keys in a Symmetric-key cryptography al-
gorithm must be kept secret, it is essential to also provide secure key management for a
Symmetric-key cryptography approach. Refer to (Stallings, 2006) for further information.
AES is a well-known Symmetric-key cryptography algorithm, and is described in detail
in the following subsection.
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Advanced Encryption Standard
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), a typical symmetric-key cryptography algo-
rithm, was published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in
2001. It was intended to replace the Data Encryption Standard (DES), including Triple
DES as the approved standard for a wide range of applications and platforms (Stallings,
2006). AES was originally published as Rijndael algorithm (Daemen & Rijmen, 1999,
2006), and is named after its developers, Belgian researchers Rijmen and Daemen.
AES is a symmetric block cipher algorithm, with a fixed block size of 128 bits and a
cipher key size of 128, 192, or 256 bits. AES performs four operations on a 128-bit block
of data for a certain number of repetitions. The four operations are SubBytes, ShiftRows,
MixColumns, and AddRoundKey. The number of these repetitions depends on key size.
For example, an AES algorithm is implemented to encrypt plaintext block size of 128 bits,
with cipher key size of 256 bits, then 14 rounds of these four operations are required. Every
state of AES operation can be pictured as a 4 x 4 matrix of bytes. All the intermediate
results of the 128-bit block, as well as the input and the output block, are called states. At
each stage of the transformation, the block of data is transformed from its current state to
the new state according to the different operations.
SubBytes is a simple “table lookup” operation. It uses a substitution table (S-box) to
perform a byte-by-byte substitution of the block. S-box is a 16 x 16 matrix of bytes, which
contains a permutation of all possible 256 8-bit values. InvSubBytes is the inverse operation
of SubBytes.
ShiftRows is the forward shift row transformation. Each row of the state is shifted left
over a different number. Figure 2.2 depicts that the first row of state performed a 0-byte
circular left shift. The second row performed a 1-byte circular left shift. For the third row,
a 2-byte circular left shift is performed, and a 3-byte circular left shift is performed for the
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fourth row of state. The inverse operation of ShiftRows, InvShiftRows shifts to the right on
decryption.
Figure 2.2: AES Shiftrows Transformation (Stallings, 2006).
MixColumns operates on each column individually. Each byte of a column is mapped
into a new value. Each column is treated as a polynomial over GF(28), and is multiplied
modulo (x4+1) by the constant polynomial
a(x) = {03}x3+{01}x2+{01}x+{02} (2.1)
The inverse operation of MixColumns, InvMixColumns operation is a multiplication of
each column with
b(x) = a−1(x) mod (x4+1) = {0B}x3+{0D}x2+{09}x+{OE} (2.2)
AddRoundKey performs a logical XOR of the 128 bits of state with the 128 bits of the
round key. The inverse operation of AddRoundKey is to forward another AddRoundKey
transformation, as the XOR operation is its own inverse.
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The AES algorithm is required to be royalty-free for use worldwide and offers security
of a sufficient level to protect data for the next 20 to 30 years. AES is simple for the design
purpose, and supports a cipher key size varying from 128 bits to 256 bits. Although the
number of rounds is fixed in the specifications, this can be modified as a parameter in case
of security problems (Daemen & Rijmen, 1999). AES can be implemented on a Smart
Card using a short count of code and cycles (Sanchez-Avila & Sanchez-Reillol, 2001).
When comparing speed and reliability in implementations, it has better performance in both
software and hardware than the other symmetric algorithms such as MARS (submitted by
IBM Research), RC6 (submitted by RSA Security), and Twofish (Schneier). (Dray, 2000;
IBM MARS Team, n.d.; Rivest, Robshaw, Sidney, & Yin, n.d.; Schneier et al., 1998).
AES also has other advantages mentioned below. The proposed architecture employs
AES as part of its cryptography solutions. (Refer to Subsection 3.4.1 for details.)
2.7.3 Public-key Cryptography
The concept of Public-key cryptography was proposed in 1976 by Diffie and Hellman
(Diffie & Hellman, 1976) in order to solve the key management problems. In their tech-
nique, each party gets a pair of keys, one of them is referred to as the public key and the
other as the private key. Each party’s public key is published while the private key remains
secret. It is not necessary to share the secret key between the sender and receiver. All
communications involve only public keys and no private key is ever transmitted. It is no
longer necessary to trust some communication channels to be secure against eavesdropping
or betrayal. The only requirement is that public keys are associated with their users in a
trusted manner (for instance, in a trusted database).
In Public-key cryptography the two-party communication encryption works as follows:
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1. Alice gets Bob’s public key from the database.
2. Alice encrypts her message using Bob’s public key and sends it to Bob.
3. Bob then decrypts Alice’s message using his private key.
The public key is not always used for encryption. The private key can also be employed
to create ciphertext. In this scenario, anybody holding the public key can decode the ci-
phertext. This approach is commonly referred to as a digital signature. The sender cannot
falsely claim that they did not encode a plaintext, and all receivers know that the plaintext
is authentic (Krawetz, 2006).
A comprehensive approach therefore involves a sender who may use private and public
keys for encoding a message. The receiver’s public key ensures message confidentiality,
and the sender’s private key signs the encryption, which ensures non-repudiation. (Refer to
section 3.2 for information about confidentiality and non-repudiation.)
The digital signature is one application of Public-key cryptography, employing the pri-
vate key to encrypt a message or message digest, while making use of the public key to
decrypt the ciphertext. The following provides an introduction to digital signatures.
Digital Signature
A digital signature is not only used to protect data integrity but also used to achieve au-
thentication and non-repudiation (Stallings, 2006). A digital signature mechanism can be
employed to authenticate the identity of the sender of a message, and sometimes to ensure
that the original content of the message that has been sent is unchanged. Digital signatures
can protect the two parties against each other, because there is no complete trust between
sender and receiver. The digital signature approach is analogous to a handwriting signature
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on a paper document (Stallings, 2006).
A digital signature uses a private key to encrypt the messages and a public key to decrypt
messages. By comparing the signature with the original message it is possible to see that
the message has not been changed and that it has been signed using a particular key-pair.
In digital signature schemes, three main properties are required:
• verification of the sender at the time of the signature,
• authentication of the content at the time of the signature, and
• verifiability by third parties to resolve disputes between sender and receiver.
Bob and Alice can again be used to illustrate this concept. Alice is supposed to send
a message to Bob. Alice has to provide Bob the assurance that the message is unchanged
from what she sent and that it is really from Alice. To do so, Alice uses her private-key
of a key pair to encrypt the message to produce a digital signature. Alice then sends the
message along with this digital signature. As discussed in 2.7.3, most digital signature
implementation in practice only signs the message digest, not the entire message.
Since Alice’s public-key is the only key that can decrypt that message, Bob constitutes
a successful decryption with Alice’s Public-key making a digital signature verification,
which means that Alice’s private key did encrypt the message. In practice, the message
digest which Bob makes the hash value A from the received message is compared with the
hash value B decrypted from the digital signature with Alice’s public-key. If these two hash
values match each other, the received message is successfully verified. In other words, the
message Bob received is unchanged from what Alice sent and the message Bob received
is really from Alice. Figure 2.7.3 illustrates the digital signature signing and verification
process.
A digital signature includes three process steps: a key generation process, a signature
signing process, and a signature verifying process.
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Figure 2.3: Digital Signature (Stallings, 2006).
• A key generation algorithm selects a private key uniformly at random from a set of
possible private keys. The algorithm outputs the private key and a corresponding
public key.
• A signing algorithm produces a digital signature for the given message (or a message
digest) by a private key.
• A signature verifying algorithm outputs a Boolean value representing accept or reject,
with the input values of a given message (or a message digest), a public key, and a
digital signature.
Some public-key cryptography algorithms are suitable for digital signature and/or en-
cryption/decryption. Table 2.2 indicates the applications supported by the Digital Signa-
ture Algorithm (DSA), the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman algorithm (RSA) and the Elliptic Curve
Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) discussed in this chapter.
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Table 2.2: Applications for DSA, RSA, and ECDSA.
Algorithm Encrypt/Decrypt Digital Signature
DSA X
√
RSA
√ √
ECDSA X
√
Although the digital signature application is the only application for the public-key
cryptography algorithms considered in the present research, there are options for various
digital signature algorithms that can be implemented in the architecture. In the following
paragraphs, typical digital signature algorithms (DSA, RSA, and ECDSA) are introduced.
Because of the benefit of shorter key size and higher security level, ECDSA is employed in
the cryptography solutions of the proposed architecture. (The cryptography solutions are
described in detail in subsection 3.4.1.)
Digital Signature Algorithm In 1991, the National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy (NIST) published the Digital Signature Standard (DSS) in Federal Information Pro-
cessing Standard FIPS 186 (Stallings, 2006). An expanded version of DSS was published
as FIPS 186-2 in 2000 (see (NIST, 2000)). The DSS makes use of SHA to present a digital
signature technique, which is the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA). Unlike RSA, DSA
only provide digital signature function used for encryption or key exchange.
DSA is based on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms. The schemes on which
DSA is based are originally presented by ElGamal (1985)) and Schnorr (1991). Stallings
(2006) and NIST (2000) provides further details of DSA.
The Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm The Rivest-Shamir-Adleman algorithm (RSA)
is for Public-key cryptography. It was the first algorithm for digital signature and encryp-
tion/decryption. RSA has been widely employed in electronic commerce protocols. The
transaction in an electronic commerce is considered secure if given sufficiently long keys
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and up-to-date implementations.
RSA was publicly developed in 1977 by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman at MIT and then
published in 1978 (Rivest, Shamir, & Adleman, 1978). The security of RSA relies on the
fact that it is hard to factorize a product of two large prime numbers. RSA can be used to
implement digital signatures. The Security Division of EMC39 has published two different
signature schemes, RSASSA-PKCS1-v1 5 and RSASSA-PSS, in the PKCS#1 specifica-
tion (RSA Laboratories, 2002). RSASSA-PSS is the recommended algorithm as its encod-
ing uses a random value, therefore, it is more robust against attacks (RSA Laboratories,
2002).
RSA is a block cipher in which the plaintext and the ciphertext are integers between 0
and n−1 for some number n (Stallings, 2006). A typical size for the number n is 1024 bits.
The security of RSA with a key size of 1024 bits is equivalent to a symmetric setting of 80
bits (Barker, Barker, Burr, Polk, & Smid, 2007).
Refer to (Stallings, 2006; RSA Laboratories, 2002; Rivest et al., 1978) for further in-
formation of RSA.
ECDSA Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is an approach to Public-key cryptography
based on the algebraic structure of elliptic curves over finite fields (Koblitz, 1987). Com-
pared to RSA, ECC appears to provide equal security using much smaller key size (approx-
imately one-eighth the key size), thus reducing processing overhead (Stallings, 2006). For
example, a 160-bit ECC key provides the same level of security as a 1024-bit RSA key,
and 224-bit ECC is equivalent to 2048-bit RSA (Chang, Eberle, Gupta, & Gura, n.d.). This
means ECC offers faster computations, lower power consumption and memory, and band-
width savings. These properties are useful for mobile devices which are typically limited
in the CPU resources, power and network connectivity. Thus, ECC is theoretically more
39http://www.emc.com
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suitable for securing mobile banking than RSA.
Elliptic curves used in cryptography are defined over two kinds of fields:
• prime curves: GF(p), p is a large prime number
• binary curves: GF(2m), 2m element are binary polynomials
Elliptic Curve DSA (ECDSA) is one approach to realize the Digital Signature Algo-
rithm (DSA). ECDSA was first proposed by Vanstone (1992), in response to NIST’s request
for public comments on the proposal for DSS. It was accepted in 1998 as an ISO (Inter-
national Standards Organization) standard (ISO 14888-3), accepted in 1999 as an ANSI
(American National Standards Institute) standard (ANSI X9.62), and accepted in 2000 as
an IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) standard (IEEE 1363-2000) and
a FIPS standard (FIPS 186-2) (Johnson, Menezes, & Vanstone, 2001).
Good overviews of elliptic curve cryptography can be further found in Koblitz, Menezes,
and Vanstone (2000) and Lopez and Dahab (2000a).
Hash Function
Hash functions are employed in conjunction with Public-key cryptography algorithms to
produce digital signatures. In the following an introduction to hash functions is provided.
When implementing a digital signature, it is unusual to encrypt a whole message for
security and performance reasons. The proposed architecture employs a hash function to
create a message digest, which is used to generate the digital signature for the message.
A hash function works on a message with an arbitrary length, and returns a fixed-size
hash value (Delfs & Knebl, 2002). This hash value is sometimes called message digest or
digital fingerprint. The ideal cryptography hash function has four characteristics:
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• it should be simple to calculate the message digest for any given message,
• it should be computationally impractical to find a message with a given message
digest,
• it should be computationally impractical to alter a message without modifying its
message digest, and
• it should be computationally impractical to find two different messages with the same
message digest.
Hash functions are widely used currently. The message digest can be used in creating
digital signature schemes. For security and performance reasons, most digital signature al-
gorithms specify only to sign the digest of the message, not the entire message. In addition,
a hash function can be used to control the integrity of a message. Determining whether
any changes have been made to a message (or a file), for example, can be accomplished by
comparing message digests calculated before, and after, transmission or any other event.
Secure Hash Algorithm The Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) is the most widely used
hash function. It was developed by NIST and published as FIPS 180 in 1993. In 1995,
a revised version was published as FIPS 180-1. This revised version is generally called
SHA-1 or Secure Hash Standard in the standards document. Currently the updated Secure
Hash Standard is FIPS 180-3, which was published in October 2008 (NIST, 2008).
SHA-1 is the most established of the SHA hash functions, and has been employed in
widely used security applications and protocols. SHA-1 calculates a condensed representa-
tion of a message. When a message of any length < 264 bits is input, the SHA-1 produces
a 160-bit message digest (NIST, 1995).
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2.7.4 A Comparison of Symmetric-key and Public-key
The two commonly used categories are Symmetric-key cryptography and Public-key cryp-
tography. Each of them has its own advantages and limitations. In this subsection, a brief
comparison of these two cryptography categories is provided.
The main advantage of Public-key cryptography is increased security: only the private
key needs to remain secret (Mollin, 2003). In contrast, a Symmetric-key cryptography
system has to transmit the secret keys (either manually or via a communication channel);
therefore, it is possible for an intruder to discover the secret keys during their transmission.
A disadvantage of using Public-key cryptography for encryption is efficiency. There
are many popular Symmetric-key encryption algorithms significantly faster than any ex-
isting Public-key encryption algorithms such as DES. The trade-off process between oper-
ation speed and security level must be evaluated, particularly for resource-limited mobile
devices. The good news is that Public-key cryptography computation capabilities and op-
eration speed are increasing significantly with the development of mobile device manufac-
turing technology.
It is not necessary to choose between Public-key and Symmetric-key cryptography. A
hybrid of Public-key and Symmetric-key cryptography combines the benefits of both. One
type of hybrid cryptography involves a symmetric key algorithm being used to hide the ob-
ject while a public key mechanism is used to manage the keys of this symmetric algorithm
(Tipton & Krause, 2007). It is a good combination for implementing Public-key cryptog-
raphy along with Symmetric-key cryptography on the systems that make use of mobile
devices. In the proposed architecture, both Public-key and Symmetric-key cryptography
algorithms are employed.
As the present research is proposed on a software application level architecture, it is
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necessary to explain the rationale for software implementation for cryptography.
2.7.5 Software Encryption
In this subsection an argument for the benefits of software encryption is explained.
It is necessary to consider hardware or software when an encryption is implemented or
integrated in an electronic commerce. Each cryptography algorithm, which can be imple-
mented in either hardware or software, has its related costs and benefits.
Generally, hardware encryption has better performance than software encryption. Un-
fortunately, there are several problems with implementing cryptography algorithms in hard-
ware. One problem is that cryptography hardware is not ubiquitous, cheap, or readily ex-
portable (Nahum, O’Malley, Orman, & Schroeppel, 1995). It is impractical to add more
than one piece of cryptography hardware to a given network facility, such as a mobile
device or a network server.
The software encryption is currently becoming prevalent in business applications. Any
encryption algorithm can be implemented in software. The advantages of software imple-
mentations relate to cost and portability. The software implementations can be inexpen-
sively implemented and copied on many computational facilities. Furthermore, regarding
mobile devices, almost all manufacturers support the standard of Java ME technology run-
ning on their products. The popularity of Java ME, the adoption of the security and Trust
Services API (Sun Microsystems, n.d.-b), and some third party security software develop-
ment kits (SDKs) contribute a good basis for software encryption.
This chapter provided background knowledge related to mobile transaction security.
The next chapter analyzes security requirements and explains the model for designing ar-
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chitecture to provide comprehensive security for two-party mobile payment transactions.
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Chapter 3
System Analysis
This chapter analyzes security requirements and describes how the proposed architecture is
designed to provide a comprehensive security for two-party mobile payment transactions.
Constraints and limitations of the present research are described in section 3.1, basic secu-
rity objectives which the proposed architecture is to protect are introduced in section 3.2,
and the security map model based on an Onion Layer framework is explained in section
3.3. Finally the strategy and solutions employed in the proposed architecture are suggested
in section 3.4.
3.1 Research Constraints
In this section, mobile devices, the payment type and the wireless network environment are
defined, followed by an explanation of the reason for the proposed architecture focusing on
the application layer security.
3.1.1 Mobile Devices
In this research, mobile devices are recognized as handheld devices with capabilities such
as General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) connectivity, Internet browsing, and basic compu-
tation. Smart phones or Personal Data Assistants (PDAs) are examples of mobile devices
in the present research. Another characteristic of mobile devices in this research is that
they are Java enabled. (Refer to section 2.4 for background knowledge of mobile devices.)
Based on MIDP-2.0 and CLDC-1.1, a suitable mobile device is assumed to possess a mini-
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mum base memory of 192 KB and a 16/32 bit processor with a speed ranging from 8 to 32
MHz.
A mobile device is often viewed as a part of the identity of an individual (Roussos,
Peterson, & Patel, 2003). In this research we treat a mobile device in a similar way as,
for example, a credit card; that is, each person has their own credit card and would not
normally share it with anyone. It is assumed that the same situation will hold true for a
mobile device. In such a way a mobile device can be considered in a sense to be a suitable
personal identifier.
3.1.2 Two-party mobile payments
A mobile payment can be defined as any payment transaction which involves a mobile
device (Deans, 2004). Although much research on mobile payments places emphasis on
three parties or more (Peiro et al., 1998; Ham et al., 2002), the transaction between two
parties is the basic payment transaction. Therefore, the model on which the present research
focuses is the two-party mobile payment transaction.
Mobile Payment Participant Layers
Karnouskos (2004) outline a mobile payment model in which a group of payment partic-
ipants are involved. (Refer to Section 2.3 for details.) Although this model summarizes
a mobile payment in relation to several different participants, it does not clarify how the
various participants are related to a mobile payment, and on what level of involvement a
participant is related to a mobile payment.
To address this limitation these participants are categorized into four layers based on
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how they are related to a mobile payment. These four layers include the direct payment
layer, the network layer, the technical component layer and the supervision layer. Figure
3.1 depicts the four layers of participants involved in the mobile payment process.
Merchant
Software Provider
Government
Service Provider
Client
Device Manufacturer
Mobile
Network Operator
Direct Payment Layer
Network Layer
Technical Component Layer
Supervision Layer
Financial Sector
Figure 3.1: Four-layer structure of mobile payment participants.
• Direct Payment Layer: The client, the financial sector and the merchant are the di-
rect participants who are involved in a mobile payment. Therefore, there are three
participants in the direct payment layer.
• Network Layer: A mobile payment is based on a wireless network, which is main-
tained by the mobile network operator. The mobile network operator is located in the
network layer.
• Technical Component Layer: The software provider, the device manufacturer and the
service provider are located in the technical component layer. The software provider
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produces software components that connect different participants in the direct pay-
ment layer in a mobile payment transaction, while the device manufacturer provides
the mobile devices as the client facility component. The service provider designs
the specific payment service component for the direct payment players. The tech-
nical components assist the execution of a payment transaction. These component
providers offer a technical environment to run mobile payment transactions.
• Supervision Layer: The government is not directly involved in mobile payments
but outlines standards and ordinances for all other participants. For example, the
government may prevent the service providers from holding a monopoly, and can
regulate the device manufacturer and the software provider to ensure compatibility
between devices (Karnouskos, 2004). Therefore, the government is located in the
supervision layer.
Based on the Four-layer mobile payment participant model, the mobile payment can be
categorized according to how many participants are involved in the direct payment layer.
X-Party Mobile Payment
The intent of a payment is to transfer monetary value from the payer to the payee (Peiro
et al., 1998). The immediate participants in a payment are located in the direct payment
layer in the Four-layer structure of mobile payment participants (see Figure 3.1). The
type of payment varies based on how many participants are involved in a specific payment
transaction. Defining a mobile payment model is generally based on the combination of
the participants in the direct payment layer.
In the literature there are several models for mobile payment transactions. This research
is not aim to make a review on every mobile payment model, so only three of which are
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depicted in the thesis.
Four-party mobile payment model Peiro et al. (1998) propose a payment model which
is composed of four directly involved parties: the payer, the payee, the issuer (the payer’s
financial sector), and the acquirer (the payee’s financial sector). Figure 3.2 (A) illustrates
this four-party mobile payment model. The financial sectors may be banks, and the goal of
the payment is to transfer money from the payer to the payee.
Payer Financial Sector
Payer
Payee Financial Sector
Payee
(A) (B)
Figure 3.2: (A) Four-party mobile payment model (Peiro et al., 1998). (B) Three-party
mobile payment model (Ham et al., 2002).
Three-party mobile payment model A mobile payment model involving three parties
is specified by Ham et al. (2002). Figure 3.2 (B) illustrates this three-party mobile payment
model. The client, the merchant, and the financial sector communicate with each other,
exchanging information to conduct a payment transaction from the client to the merchant.
Two-party mobile payment model This thesis discusses a simple but special payment
model that involves only the client and the financial sector in the direct payment layer.
The model is referred to in this thesis as the two-party mobile payment model. Mobile
banking can be viewed as typical two-party mobile payments. Illustrated in Figure 3.1,
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the financial sector and the client are bonded in a broken line boundary. It shows, in a
special context (such as mobile banking), only the financial sector and the client carrying
out payment transactions with each other. Therefore, three or four participants in the direct
payment layer are combined by several two-party models. Figure 3.3 illustrates the two-
party mobile payment model.
Figure 3.3: Two-party mobile payment model.
The detailed transaction process is varied among different X-party mobile payments;
however, the similar basic characteristic among different payment models is that the infor-
mation (monetary value, order information, or real goods) exchange takes place between
two parties. Thus, the discussion of the security architecture for two-party mobile payments
will contribute to realizing the security for other mobile payment models. Meanwhile, the
study of a two-party mobile payment can be extended to any two-party mobile transactions.
Although the present research outlined in this thesis is based on the direct payment
layer in the Four-layer structure depicted in Figure 3.1, participants of the other layers need
to be considered for a full-fledged payment system. From the perspective of the network
layer, the mobile network operator is a participant in the process of mobile payments. The
proposed security architecture is implemented for a mobile bank scenario in this research.
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A mobile payment is one of the most characteristic mobile transactions focusing on
service in the financial field. The transaction model in mobile payments can be extended
and employed in other mobile transaction application areas, such as mobile stocks and
mobile games. Although this research targets a mobile payment transaction, the proposed
architecture is expected to serve in other mobile transaction applications.
3.1.3 Wireless Networks
In mobile payment transactions, mobile devices communicate with the payment service of
the financial section via wireless networks. Presently there are two common channels that
can be recognized as wireless networks, which include the wireless local area network and
the mobile phone network (Varshney & Vetter, 2000). Background on this area is given in
section 2.1.
The mobile phone network (MPN) is a radio network which consists of a number of
cells. Each cell is served by one or more fixed transmitters (Parson & Schaeffler, 2001).
A mobile telephone or any other mobile device that connects to a mobile phone network
is recognized as a mobile station. The mobile phone network is designed to cover a wider
area. At present, the HTTP(s) applications requiring Internet access can be operated on the
mobile phone network.
Considering the typical mobile payment user, the mobile phone network is believed
to have a much higher penetration compared to the WLAN (Parson & Schaeffler, 2001).
Therefore, the current research targets the more popularly used mobile phone network.
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3.1.4 Application Layer
The current mobile payment network environment is depicted in a three-layer network
model (see in Figure 3.4). The bottom layer is a physical infrastructure layer, which sup-
ports mobile payment transactions with hardware facilities. The middle layer is a protocol
layer, which covers current network protocols such as HTTP or WAP. A business applica-
tion layer occupies the top layer, which contains the software application solutions.
Figure 3.4: The Three-layer network model for mobile payments.
This research aims to protect security for two-party mobile payments on the application
layer. Generally, to provide security for two-party transactions, the solution implementation
is able to reside on the application layer (Itani & Kayssi, 2004), where the architecture in
this thesis is proposed. The security architecture of the application layer is independent of
the security protocols of the other lower layers, and the application handles all the security-
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related functions.
Another benefit in proposing the security architecture on the application layer is that
the proposed architecture enables mobile payment systems to make use of current network
infrastructures (such as network gateways and hardware facilities) and protocols (such as
HTTP and WAP) rather than modifying them.
3.2 Security Objectives
In the scope of this research as defined above, the security objectives which an advanced
security system must fulfill are discussed in this section.
In order for payment transactions over mobile networks to gain public trust, a secure
commercial information exchange is necessary. Four properties are essential for a secured
transaction: confidentiality, authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation (Park & Song,
2001). Adopted from Merz (2002), Table 3.1 describes security objectives and some en-
abling technologies.
Table 3.1: The security properties (Merz, 2002).
security objectives Definition Technology
Confidentiality Property ensuring that transaction Encryption
information can not be viewed by
unauthorized persons
Authentication Property ensuring that the transaction Possession
information actually originates from the Knowledge
presumed transaction partner Property
Integrity Property ensuring that the transaction Digital Signatures
information remains intact during
transmission and can not be altered
Non-repudiation Property ensuring that nobody is able Digital Signature
to claim that the transaction on his/her
behalf was made without their knowledge
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The information in the table is explained as follows:
• Confidentiality: Confidential information must be protected from viewing by an
unauthorized party. A system providing confidentiality removes the risks from an
eavesdropper or attacker. For example, if a short message is sent in plain text, any-
body who can intercept the message may read it, whereas an encrypted short message
ensures that the message cannot be read. Confidentiality ensures that the operation
remain private (Krawetz, 2006).
• Authentication: Authentication ensures two parties gain the right to access a system
to take part in a transaction. The purpose is to prevent anyone impersonating anyone
else. For a network communication system it is important to ensure authentication as
the two parties are not directly connected.
• Integrity: The information and systems must be guaranteed against corruption by
outside parties. With integrity the transaction information persists intact and non-
altered during transmission. A system with a high level of integrity should be difficult
to tamper with or to alter.
• Non-repudiation: The user must not be able to deny the performed transaction and
must provide proof in case that this situation occurs. Non-repudiation ensures that
the originator cannot falsely refuse or deny a transaction. Non-repudiation is an
indispensable security requirement for systems in electronic business and mobile
commerce where disputes of transactions can occur.
The goal of this research is to enable an architecture that fulfills these four security
requirements. The next section explains how to choose technologies and solutions to fulfill
these requirements.
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3.3 System Analysis based on Security Map
This section explains how the choice of technical solutions is made. Since a secured pay-
ment system needs to fulfill at least four security requirements, it is important to find a
series of components furnishing the system with that security protection. Many researchers
make use of an “Onion Layer” model to analyze a security system. One of the Onion Layer
models is the Onion Ring framework proposed by Wei et al. (2006). Adopting the Onion
Ring framework, this thesis proposes a security map to guide the research activity and sys-
tem design. The Onion Layer Framework is described in Subsection 3.3.1; the proposed
security map and how the security map works are described in Subsection 3.3.2.
3.3.1 Onion Layer Framework
The Onion Ring Framework, an Onion Ring m-commerce security framework, is based on
VAX/OS architecture which is a popular operating system with a multi layered architecture
(Wei et al., 2006). This five-layer framework is proposed for analyzing and improving
mobile commerce security requirements and performance. It is employed as a perspective
in building the security map in the research, and provides several starting points in order to
reach proper solutions for security. The Onion Ring offers a good security performance by
coordinating and pairing access authority to increasing levels of accountability (Wei et al.,
2006). Figure 3.5 depicts an Onion Layer m-commerce security framework adopted from
Wei et al. (2006). The five layers include the security of mobile devices, language, wireless
communication access control, access management, and transactions.
According to Wei et al. (2006):
• The mobile device security layer is used to implement a security strategy for all mo-
bile communication devices. A mobile device has limitations such as being suscepti-
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Figure 3.5: An Onion Layer Framework for m-commerce security (Wei et al., 2006).
ble to power outages, and having narrow bandwidth and low computational capacity.
This research aims to find solutions that can be used to heighten security enforcement
in this layer. As a mobile device is always utilized as a front-end facility involved
in securing payment transactions, it is vital to design authentication strategies, se-
cured channels, user-friendly payment schemes and receipt delivery in development
of mobile devices (Thanh, 2000).
• The language security layer concerns the programming language used. A secure
programming language in m-commerce requires and ensures that all programming
codes have restricted access to operations that can affect the environment (Wei et al.,
2006). Java is classified as a secure language as it is an object-oriented programming
language which permits libraries to offer secure interfaces to incoming code. In
addition, Java has a byte-code verifier which can be used in checking a program at
load time.
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• The wireless communication access control security layer is intended to restrain mo-
bile devices from accessing wireless communication channels. Currently, some tech-
nologies have been employed to enhance security in this layer. Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL) over Global System for Mobile (GSM) mentioned by Vihinen (2004) is a good
example of security protection in this layer. The HTTP combined with SSL as Hy-
pertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPs) also provides a security strategy in this
layer.
• The access management security layer can restrict resource access, audit mobile pay-
ment actions, and provide non-repudiation of transactions. A variety of technologies
that can support security functions can be utilized in this layer. Multiple authentica-
tion strategy system is one candidate choice.
• Transaction security concerns application level transaction security. At the applica-
tion level much progress can be made toward achieving transaction security by offer-
ing users authentication, logging the transaction information, and generating digital
confirmation.
The Onion Layer Framework provides programmers or system architects a starting
point to design a secured system or architecture. Some security technologies and solutions
are also suggested in the Onion Layer framework.
3.3.2 Security Map
In this subsection, a security map is proposed on the basis of the Onion Layer framework
in order to find proper technologies and solutions that are employed in designing the archi-
tecture in the present research.
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Illustrated in Figure 3.6, the X-axis parameterizes the Onion Layer framework dis-
cussed in Subsection 3.3.1, the Y-axis represents the four security objectives explained in
Section 3.2, and each black spot on the grid represents a security component.
Confidentiality
Authentication
Integrity
Non-repudiation
Device TransactionLanguage Communication Access
X-axis
Onion Ring Framework
Y
-a
x
is
 S
e
c
u
rity
 O
b
je
c
tiv
e
s
Figure 3.6: Security Map.
• Onion Layer Framework: Presently there are various security technologies. To
choose these security technologies, the five layers in the Onion Layer is used as
the starting-point. In Figure 3.6, the X-axis represents the five layers outlined in the
Onion Layer framework.
• Security Objectives: The present research goal is to enable the proposed architecture
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protect the four objective security properties described in section 3.2. The Y-axis in
Figure 3.6 represents four objective security requirements. A secured architecture
should be able to meet these security requirements. The Y-axis represents the four
security properties.
• Security component: A potential secured technology employed in a secured system is
denoted as a black spot. Each spot is placed at a cross point in the security map. The
process of placing a spot at the cross point identifies a process looking for the suit-
able security technology for that requirement in a system. For example, researchers
are looking for technologies to fulfill the security requirement on non-repudiation.
The process on the security map is to place big back spots on the line signed by non-
repudiation in the Y-axis. In the X-axis, there are five fields which are considered
to be candidate solutions. In the access management security layer, as a public-key
cryptography solution (digital signature) ensures non-repudiation, a spot is placed on
the cross point of the non-repudiation line and the access line. In the same way, writ-
ing a log in the transaction security layer can be employed to meet the requirement of
non-repudiation, and so a dot can be placed on the cross point of the non-repudiation
line and the transaction line.
When the proper solutions for building a system are chosen, it is necessary to consider
the actual running environment of the system. A payment transaction system runs in a
computational environment, which includes several computational resources, such as mo-
bile device CPU, memory, and the bandwidth of wireless networks. A proper design needs
to consider these environmental factors. Since the proposed architecture is implemented for
financial transactions over mobile devices, which are resource-limited facilities, designing
a lightweight architecture that will run efficiently and feasibly is the goal of the present
research.
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As illustrated in Figure 3.6, the research activity can be viewed as a process of mapping
secure solutions on the security map to meet the objective security requirements. Secure
technologies are chosen from the collection mentioned in the Onion Layer framework (X-
axis). The potential secured technologies can be utilized to meet one or more security ob-
jectives (Y-axis). The chosen technologies or solutions (security components) are restricted
by the particular resource environment. The most appropriate technologies are combined
to build the proposed architecture.
3.4 Analysis Result
This section describes the result of system analysis based on the security map.
Linck, Pousttchi, and Wiedemann (2006) details a number of concerns from clients re-
garding security in mobile payments. Table 3.2 is a summary of security objectives coming
from these concerns, and technologies recommended for addressing them. The third col-
umn describes the specific solutions proposed in the architecture for addressing each of the
concerns. The fourth column describes which layer the solution belongs to.
As depicted in Table 3.2, the proposed architecture employs a combination of partic-
ular security solutions to provide comprehensive security, which are explained from the
perspectives of cryptography solutions, authentication solutions and non-repudiation solu-
tions in the following.
3.4.1 Cryptography Solutions
The cryptography algorithm implementations need to be lightweight in function in the
resource-limited environment.
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Table 3.2: Security, Technology and Solution.
Security Technology Solution Onion Layer
Objectives Number
Authentication Possession mobile device 1⃝
Knowledge PIN 3⃝
Property userid/password 4⃝
Digital Signature 4⃝
Integrity Digital Signature ECDSA 4⃝
Non-repudiation Digital Signature 4⃝
Log Business Transaction Log 5⃝
Confidentiality Encryto/Decrypto AES 4⃝
1 Column Onion Layer Number represents the layers in Onion Layer Framework:
1⃝ mobile device security, 2⃝ language security, 3⃝ wireless communication
access control security, 4⃝ access management security, 5⃝ transaction security;
2 PIN: Personal Identification Number;
3 ECDSA: Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm;
4 AES: Advanced Encryption Standard
Digital Signature Solution
First of all, the implementation of a digital signature aims to ensure the property of in-
tegrity and non-repudiation. A digital signature also assists in providing authentication.
The experiments mentioned in Stallings (2006), Jurisic and Menezes (1997) and Chang et
al. (n.d.) demonstrate that there is a computational benefit in using Elliptic Curve Cryp-
tography (ECC) with a shorter key length than RSA. (For background knowledge of ECC,
refer to 2.7.3). According to Lopez and Dahab (2000b), Boneh and Daswani (1999) and
Z. Li, Higgins, and Clement (2001), the performance of RSA digital signature and ECDSA
with software implementation on PCs and mobile devices, indicated that ECDSA is more
suitable than other public-key cryptography algorithms for the resource-limited environ-
ment. In addition, the result mentioned by Boneh and Daswani (1999); Lopez and Dahab
(2000b) demonstrates that ECDSA (with 163 bits key) is faster than RSA (with a 1024
bit key) in overall timing. As SA2pMP aims to secure mobile payment transactions over
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mobile devices, the employment of ECDSA is an advantage.
Table 3.3: Key size (bits): the comparison between (DSA or RSA) vs ECDSA (Boneh &
Daswani, 1999; Lopez & Dahab, 2000b).
Security Bits DSA or RSA ECDSA
80 1024 160 - 223
112 2048 224 - 255
128 3072 256 - 383
Table 3.3 compares key sizes of DSA or RSA, and ECDSA. The first line in Table 3.3 is
an example. To arrive at the security level which DSA or RSA implements with a key size
of 1024 bits, ECDSA only needs a 160-to-233-bit long key for implementation. As ECDSA
has the advantage in small key size offering an equal security level when compared to RSA
and DSA, it has been chosen as the digital signature algorithm in the proposed architecture.
Data Encryption Solution
Data encryption is employed to maintain confidentiality. A symmetric-key cryptography
algorithm is employed because it is much faster than a pubic key cryptography algorithm
(refer to 2.7 for background information).
The primary advantage of public-key cryptography is its increased security and conve-
nience: private keys never need to be transmitted or revealed to anyone. In a symmetric-key
cryptography system, in contrast, the secret keys must be transmitted (either manually or
through a communication channel). A limitation of using the existing public-key cryptog-
raphy algorithms for encryption is the speed. However, there are many popular symmetric-
key encryption algorithms (such as DES and AES), which are significantly faster than any
existing public-key encryption algorithms. Choosing an encryption algorithm for resource-
limited mobile devices is a trade-off process that depends on memory size, operation effi-
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ciency, running speed, and security level. Since the digital signature is a choice made for
this research to ensure the properties of authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation in a
payment transaction, size and efficiency are given high priority. AES is then employed in
SA2pMP to realize the encryption and decryption functions. The benefit of AES in speed
allows adequate performance of the symmetric-key cryptography algorithm even in mobile
devices. The particular solution chosen for SA2pMP is AES (Refer to 2.7.2).
3.4.2 Authentication Solutions
The proposed architecture provides a strong authentication strategy by employing multiple
factors. Based on the analysis by Schneider (n.d.), human authentication factors can be
categorized as follows (Layer number is referred to Table 3.2 and Figure 3.6).
• Something you have: Mobile devices, as physical objects, are possessed by users.
The factor occupies the layer of 1⃝mobile device security in the Onion Layer Frame-
work.
• Something you know:
1. A password for transactions is offered by banks. Bank transactions need the
client account. Layer 4⃝ access management security covers the security factor
of username/password.
2. A Personal Identification Number (PIN) is offered by mobile network opera-
tors or mobile device providers. For example, the Subscriber Identifier Module
number of a given mobile device can be used as a PIN. PIN authentication is
part of the layer 3⃝ wireless communication access control security.
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• Something you are or do: This makes use of behavioral and physiological charac-
teristics of the principal (Schneider, n.d.). A digital signature can be categorized
as a behavior. The employment of digital signature occupies the layer of 4⃝ access
management security.
As described above, the proposed security strategy entails a multi-factor process which
provides strong authentication security. Subsection 4.1.4 describes details of designing
multi-factor authentication strategy.
3.4.3 Non-repudiation Solutions
A complete payment system should provide appropriate dispute management services (Peiro
et al., 1998). Mobile payment transactions need to avoid false repudiation, which can be
achieved by recording a transaction log. A distributed transaction log strategy is employed
in the proposed architecture. Further details in design is offered in subsection 4.1.5. In prac-
tice, the digital signature’s implementation also contributes to ensuring non-repudiation.
3.4.4 Implementation Proposal
As described in section 3.5, Java is a secured programming language suggested by layer
2⃝ in the Onion Layer Framework. The proposed architecture, which employs a typical
client/server (mobile device/mobile payment server) prototype, makes use of Java. The
most widely supported mechanism for Java deployment on mobile devices is Java Plat-
form, Micro Edition (Java ME) (Sun Microsystems, n.d.-a). The basic set of application
programmer interfaces (APIs) is defined in CLDC 1.0 (Sun Microsystems, 2000a) and 1.1
(Sun Microsystems, 2003). MIDP is available in version 1.0 (Sun Microsystems, 2000b)
74
and version 2.0 (Java Community Process, 2002). CLDC and MIDP compose a Java run-
time environment for Java-enabled mobile devices. The proposed architecture is imple-
mented in Java ME (CLDC and MIDP) on a mobile client, with a server support, probably
implemented in Java Platform, Enterprise Edition (Java EE).
Java ME has been selected for implementing the proposed architecture for the following
additional characteristics:
1. The client software can run on mobile devices while the client is off-line. In other
words, messages need to occupy network bandwidth only after they are processed.
This method reduces the cost and the time required for network connection.
2. Although mobile devices are still recognized as having limited power, computa-
tional ability and resources as compared with desktop computers, they are devel-
oping rapidly in all these areas. It is reasonable to believe that mobile devices will
have enough computational ability to carry out off-line transactions and handle more
complex security algorithms.
3. Java ME is a standard technology, which has the advantage of running cross-platform.
A popular group of smart mobile devices support Java ME, so an architecture based
on Java will have broad market compatibility.
This chapter offers an analysis of a combination of technologies to be employed for
building the security architecture. In the next chapter, details for the system design are
discussed.
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Chapter 4
System Design
This chapter proposes a new security architecture for Two-party Mobile Payment trans-
actions (SA2pMP). There are three main security strategies involved in SA2pMP security
architecture: a lightweight cryptography scheme, a multi-factor authentication strategy, and
a distributed transaction log strategy. Corresponding to these strategies, a key management
solution is proposed to protect two pairs of keys for cryptography algorithms. As the mo-
bile banking transaction typically involves two parties, SA2pMP is depicted in the context
of a mobile bank. Section 4.1 introduces the security architecture of SA2pMP and Section
4.2 introduces the application architecture for a mobile bank. As the proposed architecture
is designed for a specific scenario of mobile banking, the term bank is used to represent the
financial sector for convenience.
4.1 Security Architecture
This section describes the security architecture of SA2pMP. In the following, the notations
for this research is defined first, and then the network module of SA2pMP is described. The
design of the lightweight cryptography scheme, the multi-factor authentication strategy,
and the distributed transaction log strategy are introduced, followed by a description of the
key management solution.
4.1.1 Security Architecture Notations
In this subsection, general notations employed in the rest of this thesis are defined.
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• Bank: Denotes a server computer held by the financial service participant in the
transaction.
• Client: Denotes the person using a mobile device on the client side of the transaction.
• ClientDevice: Denotes the mobile device used by the client to carry out their mobile
banking transaction.
• IDC: Denotes the identity information of the client. IDC = (SIM + PHID + ACCID).
• added identi f ier: Denotes the identity information of the client, formulated by IDC.
The added identi f ier is a combination of the SIM, PHID, and ACCID.
• TimeStamp: Denotes a time stamp.
• Gateway: Denotes the wireless gateway offered by a mobile network operator.
• Session: Denotes the HTTP session set up between Bank and ClientDevice.
• X : Denotes any participant involved in a mobile payment transaction. The X may be
ClientDevice or Bank in the context of the research.
• RKS: Denotes X’s private key which is used to generate the digital signature and to
sign the data transferred in transaction.
• PKS: Denotes X’s public key which is used to verify the digital signature in the
transaction.
• [RKS,PKS]: Denotes a digital signature key pair including a private key and a public
key.
• DS: Denotes the digital signature.
• DSign: Denotes the signing process for the digital signature.
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• DVeri f y: Denotes the verification process for the digital signature.
• Veri f y: Denotes the process for verifying the transaction’s authentication.
• PWD: Denotes the password of the mobile device client Client, which is known only
to Client and is verifiable by Bank. For example, the debit card has its password.
• PHID: Denotes PHone IDentifier, such as the mobile phone serial number.
• ACCID: Denotes the Client’s bank account number, or ACCount IDentifier.
• PIN: Denotes the Client’s Personal Identifier Number in the mobile device.
• SIM: Denotes the Subscriber Identifier Module number of ClientDevice. Normally
SIM is offered by the related mobile network operator. For authentication purposes
this is considered to be a physical characteristic of ClientDevice.
• T D: Denotes the transaction data transferred in the transaction. T D is plain text.
• KE : Denotes the secret key for the symmetric-key cryptography algorithm.
• Encrypt: Denotes the encryption process in the symmetric-key cryptography algo-
rithm.
• Decrypt: Denotes a decryption process in the symmetric-key cryptography algo-
rithm.
• Yes/No: Denotes the transaction’s status: approved or rejected.
• msg: Denotes a message.
• h(msg): Denotes a one-way hash function for the message msg, such as SHA-1.
• T Log: Denotes the transaction log recording the transaction history in detail.
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4.1.2 Network Module
In this subsection, the details of the network module of SA2pMP are described in detail.
Transaction Log
Figure 4.1: The network module of SA2pMP.
There are two parties involved in a normal banking transaction, the client and the bank.
A client in a mobile banking transaction is also the mobile device holder. The mobile de-
vice communicates with the bank’s mobile server via HTTP(s). As illustrated in Figure
4.1, a mobile device connects to a network gateway through a wireless network, which
is served by a mobile network operator. For example, Rogers provides its users with data
services, which enables the mobile devices to access HTTP applications through their wire-
less networks. Wired networks connect banking systems with wireless network gateways.
Except for constraints in network bandwidth and mobile devices, the physical network in-
frastructure is transparent to the mobile banking platform. Since SA2pMP is designed for
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the application layer, it focuses on the security of the business application layer in the three
layer network model for mobile payment which is illustrated in Figure 3.4. In other words,
SA2pMP does not make any modification to the other two layers, the protocol layer and the
physical infrastructure layer .
Mobile payments are assumed to be based on wireless networks; however, communi-
cation is achieved both by wireless and wired networks. The wireless network gateway is
a “bridge” linking wireless and wired networks. SA2pMP focuses on the area in the bro-
ken line boundary in Figure 4.1. The transaction log is physically located on the wireless
network gateway, which is explained in subsection 4.1.5.
4.1.3 Lightweight Cryptography Scheme
SA2pMP employs a lightweight cryptography scheme. The symmetric-key cryptogra-
phy algorithm (AES) contributes to the encryption, while the digital signature algorithm
(ECDSA) is used to sign the digital signature for the transaction information. As illus-
trated in Figure 4.2, the plaintext message is signed before being encrypted, which can
be referred to as “Sign-and-Encrypt”. Signing and encryption are not independent of one
another. When signing and encryption are combined, the signature layer should somehow
depend on the encryption layer, so as to reveal any tampering with the encryption layer
(Davis, 2002).
Conceptually, the independent operation makes it easy for users and programmers to
layer cryptography operations and to avoid constraining application designs of the devel-
opers. However, such independent operations make it hard to fulfill the recipient’s secu-
rity expectations. For a suitable combination, the signature layer and the encryption layer
actually need to refer to each other. The recipient needs proof that the signer and the en-
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Figure 4.2: The lightweight cryptography scheme for SA2pMP.
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crypter were the same sender (Davis, 2002). In SA2pMP the digital signature layer and
the encryption layer are not independent, as these two layers are connected to each other
by employing an added identifier. The other reason to cross between the signature layer
and the encryption layer is to ensure the message is sent from the appointed client to the
appointed server.
As illustrated in Figure 4.2, the communication layer refers to an open, public wireless
network environment over which data are transferred. The public wireless network envi-
ronment is a network environment which is not secure enough for payment transactions.
During a transaction, the transaction message is transferred in this unsecured network. The
public key employed in digital signature does not need to be encrypted; the public key can
be transferred over an open wireless network. The transaction information, denoted as msg,
needs to be kept away from third party eavesdropping, so both the signature layer and the
encryption layer are employed to process msg. For these reasons, SIM, PHID, and ACCID
are combined as the added identifier, which is then signed along with the message.
After the signing process, the message is encrypted by the encryption secret key KE .
The process is described by Equation 4.1.
ClientDevice : Encrypt(DSign(msg, IDC),KE) (4.1)
In Figure 4.2, the added identifier is represented by IDC. SIM ensures that the holder of
the mobile device possesses the right to access wireless network resources; SIM, together
with PHID, assures that the sender of the message is the appointed ClientDevice. ACCID
identifies the unique character of the client for the bank and each client has a bank account.
Meanwhile, ACCID is employed to identify the banking server, as banks have the informa-
tion included in their account numbers. Equation 4.2 describes IDC. It should be noted that
the + operator in Equation 4.2 denotes simple concatenation of the strings.
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IDC = (SIM+PHID+ACCID) (4.2)
Digital Signature Layer
SA2pMP employs a digital signature to protect authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation
for a mobile banking system. A digital signature is a public-key cryptography algorithm,
which makes use of a private key to encrypt messages and a public key to decrypt them.
Normally an encryption process is referred to as a signing process for the digital signature
algorithm, while a decryption process is referred to as a verification process. (Refer to 2.7.3
for background knowledge of digital signature.)
Compared to desktop computers, mobile devices are viewed as resource-limited in com-
puting capability, CPU processor speed, memory and battery life. Factors such as the cryp-
tography’s key size and the computing efficiency need to be considered when choosing a
proper digital signature algorithm to implement in the proposed architecture. The advan-
tages of ECDSA in short key size and high-security enable it to be employed naturally in
resource-limited environments. Refer to Subsection 3.4.1 for details.
ECDSAprime192 is employed in SA2pMP. The implementation of ECDSA uses ellip-
tic curves over the prime field Zp with the key size of 192-bit. Fernandes (1999) suggests
that prime curves are best for software applications. The key size has been chosen for this
research based on recommendations by Lenstra and Verheul (1999) and JSR177 (Sun Mi-
crosystems, n.d.-b). The SHA-1 algorithm is employed for generating the message digest.
ECDSAprime192 has an equal security level to DSA with key size of 1024-bit.
83
Encryption Layer
SA2pMP utilizes a symmetric-key cryptography algorithm to ensure a secured channel and
to protect confidentiality. To encrypt a plain-text message, the symmetric-key cryptography
algorithms paralleled with the public-cryptography algorithms are chosen for the proposed
architecture. SA2pMP employs AES (with the key size of 256 bits) as the encryption algo-
rithm to protect confidentiality.
Compared to the public-key cryptography algorithms, AES has a smaller size and a
better operational speed. In the group of symmetric-key cryptography algorithms, AES
possesses obvious advantages (see 2.7.2), such as simplicity in design, variant cipher key
size, better performance in speed, and reliability in both software and hardware (Dray,
2000). For ensuring the security of the secret key, AES is a suitable implementation for
SA2pMP. (Subsection 3.4.1 explain the rationale for the choice.)
To protect the security of secret key, the strategy of Java package security or separated
hardware is suggested. The secret key security is introduced in subsection 4.1.6.
4.1.4 Multi-factor Authentication Strategy
Authentication is concerned with assuring that the communicating entity is the one that it
claims to be (Stallings, 2006). SA2pMP provides a strong authentication by a multi-factor
authentication strategy which offers four factors for protection. The numbers 1⃝ 2⃝ 3⃝ 4⃝
refer to the security layers in the security map. For details of the security layers, refer to
Table 3.2 and Figure 3.6.
• Something you have: Mobile devices, as physical objects, are possessed by users.
Currently a mobile device can be viewed as an identifier for a particular individual, in
that each individual is generally the owner of the mobile device which is not usually
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shared with others (Roussos et al., 2003). This factor lies in Layer 1⃝ of mobile
device security.
• Something you know: The PIN is offered by mobile network operators or mobile
device providers. A PIN is used to identify a particular individual, such as the Inter-
national Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI), which is used to identify valid devices
connected to mobile phone networks; a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) on a re-
movable SIM Card is used to identify a network subscriber in mobile devices. In
particular, the IMEI identifies a mobile device, while the SIM identifies an avail-
able network. PIN authentication lies in Layer 3⃝ of wireless communication access
control security.
• Something you know: Banks require a password in order for clients to participate
in banking transactions. Bank transactions are accountable. Clients have their own
username/password to access the banking service. Layer 4⃝ of access management
security covers the security factor of username and password.
• Something you are or do: Digital signature. Implementing a digital signature con-
tributes to authentication protection. The strategy of digital signature lies in Layer
4⃝ of access management security.
As described above, these four factors are independent of each other. A mobile device
acts as a physical characteristic of the client. The username/password is the property in
the banking business field, and the mobile phone number is provided by the wireless net-
work providers. A digital signature acts as an identifying characteristics of the client. All
these factors in different fields contribute to a strong authentication strategy. Meanwhile,
the solution of username and password is employed to determine the client identity. The
relationship between client and business operations provides the functions to ensure access
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control.
4.1.5 Distributed Transaction Log Strategy
Since a mobile device is considered as an access facility to Internet, the structure on the
Internet side is similar between mobile payments and Internet payments. The main addition
is the mobile network operator. Therefore, all participating entities can be synthesized into
a service chain, in which each entity contributes services (such as network or finance) to
a mobile payment transaction. Figure 4.3 depicts the service chain for the mobile banking
transaction.
As depicted in Figure 4.3, a business transaction between the client and the bank is
actually served by a service chain including the mobile network operator and the bank.
The role of the mobile network operator is essential for a mobile commerce transaction.
Based on where it stands in the service chain, the role of mobile network operator can vary
from a simple mobile network provider to an intermediary, portal or trusted third party
(Tsalgatidou & Veijalainen, 2000). In this service chain the mobile network operator tech-
nically provides a communication channel. Each communication massage is transferred
through a wireless network gateway.
Since each entity in the service chain contributes services to the business transaction, it
correspondingly profits from the service it provides. The relationship between the mobile
network operator and the bank can be referred to a relationship between “cooperator and
monitor”. The bank needs to cooperate with the mobile network operator in order to realize
a mobile banking business. Since the mobile network operator obtains other revenue (such
as network service fees) than the bank in the service chain, it can serve as a third audi-
tor party (TAP) auditing every business transaction. In other words, the mobile network
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operator can function as a monitor.
Mobile
 Network 
Operator
Client Bank
Figure 4.3: The service chain in a mobile banking transaction.
Based on the business model of “cooperator and monitor”, this thesis suggests a dis-
tributed transaction log strategy to additionally contribute to ensuring non-repudiation for
a mobile payment transaction (In the lightweight cryptography scheme of SA2pMP, the
digital signature is employed partly to provide non-repudiation. Refer to subsection 4.1.3
for more details).
The distributed transaction log strategy is a defensive security mechanism to protect
clients and banks from a false repudiation. If the client or bank refuses to admit participat-
ing in a mobile payment transaction, the transaction log can be used to judge whether, when
and how the transaction happened. The transaction log is recorded by a business transac-
tion log server. Because it is part of the business layer, the business transaction log server
is a part of SA2pMP server architecture. In other words, the business transaction log server
is a logical component of the bank server architecture. Physically the business transaction
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log server is maintained by the mobile network operator. Since this physically-distributed-
but-logically-integrated transaction log strategy utilizes the mobile network operator as a
monitor, the transaction log must be trusted not only by the bank but also by the client.
The distributed transaction log strategy focuses on the way that the transaction log is
integrated logically and distributed physically. It can be argued that logical integration
benefits bank management, while physical distribution ensures that there is more trust in
the monitor. As shown in Figure 4.1, the transaction log can be viewed as a part of mobile
banking platform, while it is physically located on the network gateway.
4.1.6 Key Management
Key management concerns secure generation, distribution, and storage of keys (RSA Lab-
oratories, 2000). Secure methods of key management are important to a secured mobile
payment system. When the key is randomly generated, impersonation of the key must be
prevented. In practice, most attacks on public key systems are aimed at key management,
rather than at the cryptography algorithm (RSA Laboratories, 2000). This means that a
secured mobile payment structure should pay particular attention to a trusted key manage-
ment strategy.
In SA2pMP, the two key pairs required are used both for the digital signature and in
encryption. Figure 4.4 illustrates the key management strategy for digital signature.
Key Generation
Digital Signature Key Generation SA2pMP employs a digital signature to ensure non-
repudiation during the transaction. Because it uses public-key cryptography, a digital sig-
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Figure 4.4: The key management strategy for the digital signature.
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nature does not share anything secret between the two partners. The digital signature al-
gorithm needs a key pair ([RKS,PKS]). The private key (RKS) is used for signing and the
public key (PKS) is used for verification. To keep the private key secret, the key pair is
generated by the mobile device on the client side of the transaction. To enable a transaction
model that is more compact and in which only two parties are involved, SA2pMP does not
make use of a trusted third party (TTP) for key generation.
When a client starts to use the mobile payment application, there is no key existing
in the system. Before processing any transactions, the key generation is initialized. A
Key Management Module (KMM) (illustrated in Figure 4.8 A) in the mobile payment
application is in charge of initializing key management functions. At this moment, the
KMM asks for the key generation, which is used to generate the key pair. This calls the
key distribution and the key store function. After the first transaction, except for when the
system asks for a renewed key pair, the KMM will not need to operate.
The KMM functions separately from the mobile payment transaction, which means the
key management can run off-line. Without communication requirements, the process of
key management does not occupy any network resources. By the time any transaction is
operating, the key management’s function should be completed. Therefore, the key man-
agement function will not compete for computational resources with the mobile payment
transaction function.
Encryption Key Generation For the symmetric key algorithm, the operations for both
encryption and decryption need two parties sharing the same secret key (KE). The encryp-
tion key is generated by the banking server. After the generation of a key pair, the structure
needs to distribute the private and the public keys separately to different key storages.
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Key Distribution
Digital Signature Key Generation As ECDSA is a public-key cryptography algorithm
which is implemented as the digital signature in the proposed architecture, it is acceptable
that the public key is transferred over the wireless network (Menezes, Oorschot, & Van-
stone, 1996). Once the key pair is generated, the public key is transferred to the Authen-
tication Server, which is a part of the bank server. The transfer operation is via HTTP(s)
through a wireless network. This distribution is initiated by a client application.
The private key is stored in the mobile device. As the private key is needed in generating
a digital signature, impersonation and attack on this key must be prevented. The strategy
should ensure that the private key is and only can be accessed by the application program
itself. Due to this requirement, considering the prerequisite of mobile devices and Java
ME, two strategies (File-Stored-in-JAR and Record-Stored-in-RMS) are proposed, which
are introduced in the following.
Encryption Key Generation For encryption the secret key is not allowed to be trans-
ferred over the open wireless network, because it is easily intercepted by attackers. The
secret key is stored in the program application JAR package, which is secured by the Java
file security standard. After a client registers a payment service with their bank they will
download the application package along with the encryption secret key from the mobile
banking platform server.
Key Storage
Digital Signature Key Storage After the public key and the private key are distributed
to both the server and the client, they are stored separately and securely. The public key
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is transferred to the authentication server in the mobile banking platform server, and then
it is stored in the Public Key Depository. The public key depository is a structured data
storage file. For example, a database can be used as a secured public key depository, which
is suggested in the proposed structure. The public key is stored, along with the client in-
formation (such as the account number and the mobile device tracking number) and key
expiration information. This information is used to manage the key, assisting the authen-
tication server to verify digital signatures in the mobile payment transactions. The Public
Key Depository is part of the authentication server in the bank server. The local server
security infrastructure is not within the scope of the present research.
On the client side, the private key is stored in the mobile device. The principle of
private key storage is to keep it from being revealed to an attacker. The File-Stored-in-
JAR (Figure 4.5 A) is used to store the private key in the same JAR package with the
application program. SA2pMP is designed for a Java ME enabled mobile device, and the
client application is a Java ME program. The Java ME application is packaged inside a
Java archive (JAR) which contains the application’s class and the private key. The JAR
package file is downloaded to mobile devices, along with the Java application descriptor
file. The private key, as the output of the key generation function, is exported and stored
in a dedicated folder in the JAR package. Usually a Java ME application downloaded to
mobile devices only includes class files, as well as the source files obfuscated. It is difficult
to decompile and reverse the application program. Putting the private key in JAR package
ensures the privacy of this Key and prevents direct exposure to an attacker.
Record-Stored-in-RMS (Figure 4.5 B) is another way to store the private key in the mo-
bile device. RMS is the Record Management System, which is a key subsystem of MIDP in
the Java ME standard (Giguere, 2004). With RMS, an MIDP application can use on-device
data persistence. RMS provides the structure for on-device persistent data storage. Further-
more, RMS cannot be accessed by other applications besides the one that created it. The
92
strategy of Record-Stored-in-RMS only permits the mobile payment client application to
access the private key, and thus prevents illegal attack from any other application program.
Therefore, the security of the private key is ensured.
Moible Banking MIDlet
Generation
Digital Signature
Security
Communication
(A) (B)
Figure 4.5: (A) The private key stored in JAR. (B) The private key stored in RMS.
Encryption Key Storage Although the encryption/decryption processes require that the
mobile device and the banking server share the same secret key, the two copies are stored
separately. On the banking server, the shared secret key is stored in the database, which
is assumed to be secured by other computer security strategies such as in the database
management system. In the mobile device, the secret key is stored in a JAR file or in RMS,
which is secured by the Java file security standard. Additionally, the obfuscation renames
classes, methods, and fields (Ortiz, 2009) to contribute to file security as well. Alternatively,
a tamper-resistant hardware (RSA Laboratories, 2000) might be another choice for storing
the Key. In fact, tamper-resistant hardware devices have been used extensively in financial
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and government systems (Lam et al., 2003). (RSA Laboratories (2000) offers an review of
tamper-resistant hardware devices.)
Key Renewal
Each key pair has an expiration time. The expiration time defines a period over which
the key is valid. The expiration time limits the use of keys to fixed periods, after which
the keys must be replaced. An expiration time must be chosen properly and distributed in
an authenticated network channel. The key pair renewal process is initiated in the mobile
banking platform server. The Public Key Depository records expiration information for the
public key, which is used to determine whether the key pair needs to be replaced. Once
Key Pair Renewal is decided, an alert (such as a short message) is sent to the mobile device
to signal the client to generate a new key pair, in order to continue ensuring secured mobile
payment transactions. If there is another request, such as the client requesting a renewal of
the key pair, or there is a system update requirement, these situations have higher priority
than expiration time in the key pair renewal process. The key renewal process can then be
initiated, before the expiration time.
The security architecture has been described. To simulate the performance of security,
the security architecture is implemented as part of a mobile banking application system.
4.2 Application Architecture
In this section, SA2pMP is discussed in the context of a mobile bank, and the application
architecture of mobile banking platform is described. Two parties in a mobile banking
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transaction communicates with each other via HTTP(s). The mobile banking platform
(MBP) server on the bank side is a principal entity providing the web service and infor-
mation exchange channel for the client. MBP is a subsystem of the complete banking
infrastructure, communicating with the core bank. Figure 4.6 illustrates the general mobile
banking process.
Figure 4.6: The mobile banking process.
Both MBP and the core banking system belong to the overall banking infrastructure.
They are linked to each other via an internal network. Therefore, the transaction between
MBP and the core banking system is internal. As in Figure 4.7, the mobile banking system
is divided into a mobile client and a banking server.
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Figure 4.7: The mobile banking module.
4.2.1 Mobile Client Architecture
The mobile client application is built on Java ME enabled mobile devices. Figure 4.8 (A)
illustrates the architecture of the mobile client application. Figure 4.8 (B) illustrates the
process by which the four modules cooperate with each other and work corresponding to
clients’ requests.
The mobile client system consists of four modules: the Business Logic Module (BLM),
the Security Module (SM), the Communication Module (CM) and the Key Management
Module (KMM).
• Business Logic Module: BLM is in charge of all business functions between banks
and clients. Clients can make their own business item list according to their individ-
ual requirements.
• Security Module: SM is responsible for security issues. The main security architec-
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Figure 4.8: (A) The mobile client architecture. (B) The mobile client work process.
ture of SA2pMP is realized in SM. After the client’s request is processed in BLM, an
information message is generated. This message is processed with digital signature
and encryption in SM. Following the rules of ECDSA, the private key can be read
from KMM, and be used to sign a digital signature on the original message. After
signing, the encryption is executed. The encrypted message is then sent by the CM
to the mobile banking platform server.
• Communication Module: CM is the module in charge of network communication.
HTTP(s) over wireless networks is used. CM handles information exchange between
a mobile client application and a mobile banking platform server.
• Key Management Module: KMM is in charge of key management. Since a digital
signature is employed in SA2pMP, the private key must be kept secured and confi-
dential. KMM generates the digital signature key pair which is comprised of a private
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key and a public key. It then distributes the public key to the mobile banking plat-
form server. KMM stores the private key in the record store or in the JAR package.
The private key is used for signing a digital signature. The encryption/decryption
key pair remains the same for both in the mobile client application and the mobile
banking platform server. KMM stores the encryption key in the record store or in the
JAR package. Tamper-resistant hardware is also an option. KMM is also in charge
of renewing the key pair when the mobile device receives a renewal request for the
key pair.
4.2.2 Server Architecture
The Mobile Banking Platform Server consists of the Business Logic Server (BLS), the
Authentication Server (AS), the Key Management Server (KMS), and the Business Trans-
action Log Server (BTLS). Figure 4.9 illustrates the architecture of the mobile banking
platform server.
• Key Management Server: KMS in the mobile banking platform server is in charge
of the storage of the public key, and initializing renewal process of a key pair. If
the clients decide to use a mobile banking service, the first step is to invoke KMS
module in the mobile client to generate the key pair in addition to installing the client
application software. Distributing the key is a separate procedure from business op-
erations. For the key pair of the digital signature, the public key is sent from the
mobile client to the mobile banking platform server while the private key is stored in
the mobile client. After receiving the public key, KMS stores it, as well as the client
personal information. During the payment transaction, when key verification proce-
dures ask for a public key, it is provided by KMS. KMS is responsible for generating
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Figure 4.9: The mobile banking platform server’s architecture.
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the encryption and decryption public key, saving one copy in the server and sending
the other one to the mobile device. The key pair has a life cycle. When the key pair
needs renewing, KMS is responsible for sending a command to initiate a renewal
procedure in the mobile client application.
• Authentication Server: AS provides the authentication service for the mobile banking
platform server. The following security duties are operated in AS:
1. Checking for username/password legality during log on,
2. Verification of the digital signature, and
3. Decryption of message(s).
Any message passing through the AS is a legal business message, so it can be sent to
BLS for processing.
• Business Logic Server: BLS handles all legal business requests. BLS interacts with
the regular bank to process business logic and to exchange business information.
When BLS has finished processing a business job, it responds by sending the result-
ing information to the client’s mobile device.
• Business Transaction Log Server: BTLS is the component realizing the distributed
transaction log strategy, which contributes to maintain non-repudiation. It creates and
maintains the log files for transactions. BTLS is indicated by a broken line boundary
in Figure 4.9, as BTLS is located in the mobile banking platform server logically
rather than physically. The transaction log is physically positioned on the wireless
network gateway. As shown in Figure 4.1, the network gateway is a physical facility
maintained by the mobile network operator.
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SA2pMP is an architecture proposed in this thesis for protecting the security for two-
party mobile payment transactions. To evaluate SA2pMP’s performance in security and
practicality, a series of simulations are conducted. In the next chapter, details for system
simulation are introduced.
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Chapter 5
System Simulation
In this chapter the system simulation is explained. A mobile bank is employed as a scenario
for system simulation. The proposed architecture, SA2pMP is implemented to facilitate a
“money transfer” banking transaction. The hardware and the software environments for
system simulation are described in Section 5.1, followed by an introduction of the specific
implementation in Section 5.2. Finally, the evaluation of the system simulation is described
in section 5.3.
5.1 Simulation Environment
In this section, the computer environment for simulating SA2pMP is described.
As illustrated in Table 5.1, the present simulation is operated on an IBM IntelliStation M
Pro PC, with Pentium 4 CPU 2.80 GHz and 2 GB RAM. The operating system is Windows
XP Professional SP3.
Since the goal of the implementation is to enable SA2pMP to run on a typical Java ME
enabled mobile device, three mobile device emulators were chosen for the simulation. All
three support Java ME. These mobile device emulators are the Nokia S60 Emulator (Nokia,
2009), the Sony Ericsson Emulator (Sony Ericsson, n.d.), and the Sun WTK 2.5.2 CLDC
simulator (Sun Microsystems, 2009). The simulators support the Device Configuration of
CLDC-1.1 and the Device Profile of MIDP-2.0. For the simulated banking server, a Java
Platform, Enterprise Edition (Java EE) application is implemented on an Apache HTTP
Server 2.2, cooperating with Tomcat 5.0. A MySQL Server 5.1 serves as the database
server.
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Table 5.1: The simulation environment.
Item Requirements
Hardware IBM IntelliStation M Pro:
Pentium 4 CPU 2.80GHz
RAM 2.00GB
Operating System Windows XP Professional SP3
Banking Server Apache HTTP Server 2.2
Tomcat 5.0
MySQL Server 5.1
Mobile Client Nokia S60 Emulator and
Sony Ericsson Emulator and
Sun Java Wireless Toolkit 2.5 for CLDC Simulator:
Device Configuration as CLDC-1.1
Device Profile as MIDP-2.0
Development Tools NetBeans 6.0
Eclipse 3.4.1
BouncyCastle 1.41
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The simulation system was developed on NetBeans IDE 6.01 and Eclipse SDK 3.4.12.
NetBeans IDE 6.0 was used as it integrates well with the emulators. In addition, the visual
MIDlet designer in NetBeans IDE 6.0 enables developers to design a business logical pro-
cess easily. The implementation of cryptography algorithms (AES, SHA-1 and ECDSA)
was done with help from the third party cryptography API provider Bouncy Castle3. Sub-
section 5.1.1 gives a brief introduction to Bouncy Castle.
5.1.1 Bouncy Castle
Sun Microsystems provides cryptography support through the Java Cryptography Architec-
ture (JCA) and the Java Cryptography Extension (JCE). However, JCA and JCE are some-
times too heavyweight for an MIDP application (S. Li & Knudsen, 2005). The Bouncy
Castle cryptography API provider is an appropriate choice for providing lightweight cryp-
tography for Java ME.
Bouncy Castle is an open-source collection of lightweight cryptography APIs. It pro-
vides APIs for both the Java and the C# programming languages. One of the original design
considerations for Bouncy Castle came from one of the developers who are active in Java
ME development, and as a result there are two distinct library sets. At this time, the newest
versions are Java version 1.43 and C# version 1.4. As the security architecture outlined
in this thesis is designed for Java ME enabled mobile device, the discussion is focused on
Java version of Bounce Castle API.
The Bouncy Castle Java ME supported package contains the implementation of the
Bouncy Castle lightweight API, as well as two core Java classes which are not supported in
1http://www.netbeans.org/
2http://www.eclipse.org/
3http://www.bouncycastle.org
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Java ME/CLDC: java.math.BigInteger and java.security.SecureRandom (Rittinghouse &
Ransome, 2004). These two classes have the same names as the core classes in Java SE but
function differently to the core Java classes in Java SE. A collision will occur when JDK is
used to compile the code importing these two classes. To avoid this collision, one method
is to employ some software such as Proguard4 to make an obfuscation on the code. The
compiler is able to find the target classes without confusing the different classes with the
same name, then avoids the conflict that occurred.
In developing SA2pMP, the Bouncy Castle Cryptography with version of 1.42 was
employed. The implementation of cryptography algorithms makes use of the Java ME
lightweight API package in Bouncy Castle. Proguard is employed in the development as
indicated above. Proguard 4.0 has already been bundled in NetBeans IDE, so this was an
easy choice.
5.2 Simulation Implementation
A mobile bank is employed as a scenario for system simulation. The banking transaction
of money transfer is assumed to describe how the system works. Readers should notice that
in the following:
• “−>” means a data transfer process.
• “+” means a data combination operation. In this implementation, most + operations
denotes simple concatenation of the strings.
4http://proguard.sourceforge.net/
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5.2.1 Business Work Flow
The work flow in a money transfer transaction is explained in this subsection. Figure 5.1
illustrates the work flow. The notation can be referred to in Subsection 4.1.1.
As both encryption key and public key pairs are needed for the cryptography calcula-
tion, they must be generated and distributed before initiating a specific transaction.
1. Bank generates a secret key for AES algorithm encrypting or decrypting a message,
then stores one copy locally and sends one copy to ClientDevice, where the encryp-
tion key is stored. The process distributing the encryption key must be kept secure
from eavesdropping. (The distribution method of the encryption key is suggested in
Subsubsection 4.1.6.) The encryption key’s distribution process is explained in 4.1.6.
Bank : Generate(KE),StoreServer(KE) (5.1)
Bank−>ClientDevice : KE (5.2)
ClientDevice : StoreClient(KE) (5.3)
2. ClientDevice generates a public key pair for the ECDSA algorithm. The private key
is stored locally by ClientDevice for signing a digital signature, while the public key
is distributed to and stored by the Bank for verifying the digital signature. The public
key can be distributed in a public wireless network environment.
ClientDevice : Generate([RKS,PKS]),StoreClient(RKS) (5.4)
ClientDevice−> Bank : PKS (5.5)
Bank : StoreServer(PKS) (5.6)
Figure 5.1 illustrates the steps for carrying out a transfer transaction. These steps are
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Figure 5.1: The secured work flow between the mobile client and the bank server.
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described as follows:
1. To initiate a banking transaction, Client uses ClientDevice to send the authentication
information to Bank. All information must be encrypted.5
ClientDevice : msgAuth = Encrypt(ACCID,PWD, IDC) (5.7)
ClientDevice−> Bank : msgAuth (5.8)
2. Bank performs an authentication verification to decide whether it will allow ClientDevice
to perform the transaction or not.
Bank : (ACCID,PWD, IDC) = Decrypt(msgAuth) (5.9)
Bank : Veri f y(ACCID,PWD, IDC) (5.10)
3. Bank responds with an authentication confirmation to ClientDevice. The autho-
rized transaction list (Bizlist) is downloaded by ClientDevice if the access is au-
thorized. Meanwhile, an HTTP communication session is set up between Bank and
ClientDevice. The IDC along with a time stamp, TimeStamp, is inserted into Session
as a session key. This session key is used to identify that a transaction is processed
between Bank and ClientDevice at a specific time.
Bank−>ClientDevice : (AuthCon f irm,Bizlist) (5.11)
Session : (IDC,TimeStamp) (5.12)
4. Client provides the money transfer transaction information and input it into ClientDevice.
5Readers should notice that ACCID is also referred in IDC (refer to Equation 4.2). To access to Bank,
ACCID and PWD are necessary for authentication. IDC is an added identifier to keep the information of
ACCID and PWD is sent from the registerred ClientDevice through the pre-defined network environment.
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ClientDevice generates a string-based message containing the transaction informa-
tion.
ClientDevice : msg <−T D (5.13)
5. The transaction message is hashed with SHA-1 to generate a message digest h(msg),
which is then signed with a digital signature using an ECDSA private key, along with
IDC.
ClientDevice : DS = DSign(IDC,h(msg),RKS) (5.14)
6. The transaction message and the digital signature are encrypted with an AES secret
key.
ClientDevice : crypto msg = Encrypt(DS+msg,KE) (5.15)
7. The encrypted message is sent from ClientDevice to Bank.
ClientDevice−> Bank : crypto msg (5.16)
8. Bank decrypts the encrypted message sent from ClientDevice. As a symmetric-key
cryptography algorithm is utilized, Bank decrypts the message with the same secret
key.
Bank : DS+msg = Decrypt(crypto msg,KE) (5.17)
9. Bank processes the decrypted message, separating the digital signature and the trans-
action message. The public key for the digital signature algorithm is employed in
verification. The transaction message is hashed in Bank to get the message digest,
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which is used to compare with the digital signature verification’s product.
Bank : Yes/No = DVeri f y(DS,h(msg),PKS) (5.18)
10. If the verification process in formula 5.18 responds with “TRUE”, it means the mes-
sage is valid, as it is sent from the identified ClientDevice. Afterwards, Bank pro-
cesses the money transfer transaction as requested by ClientDevice.
Bank : BizTransaction (5.19)
11. Once the bank transaction processing is finished, Bank sends back a confirmation of
transaction completion. At the same time, the transaction log is recorded physically
on the wireless Gateway:
Bank−>ClientDevice : BizCon f irm (5.20)
Gateway : T Log (5.21)
After ClientDevice finishes all the transactions, Client must log out from Bank applica-
tion. ClientDevice disconnects the communication with Bank, and the Session is released.
5.2.2 Data Transformation
Corresponding to the money transfer transaction work flow, several business parameters,
as the examples shown in Table 5.2, are defined for the use of security and business logic.
Figure 5.2 illustrates the variable transformation process crossing the signature layer and
the encryption layer in the lightweight cryptography scheme (refer to subsection 4.1.3 for
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details of the lightweight cryptography scheme for SA2pMP). In this subsection, the process
of the data transformation is described along with the process that ClientDevice uses send
to the transaction information to Bank.
Table 5.2 describes a business record in a money transfer transaction. In the money
transfer transaction, the following information needs to be recorded.
• F Acc ID denotes the ID number of the bank account from which the money will be
transferred.
• T Acc ID denotes the ID number of bank account to which the money is transferred.
• Amount denotes the amount of money transferred.
• Time denotes the time when money transfer transaction is initiated.
Table 5.2: Business Record in Transaction.
Business Record
F Acc ID = 123456789
T Acc ID = 987654321 Digital
Amount = 500 Signature
Time = 200906061220
After ClientDevice submits a business record containing the transaction information,
the variable of RawText is employed to connect all business record parts to a string. Each
variable is linked with the symbol of “&”.
RawText = F Acc ID+T Acc ID+Amount +Time (5.22)
Next, RawText is added with IDC, which is used to identify the given mobile device and
a specific bank account.
PlainText = RawText + IDC (5.23)
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F_Acc_ID
=123456789
T_Acc_ID
=987654321 Amount
=500 Time
=20090606132020
RawText = 
“F_Acc_ID=123456789&T_Acc_ID=987654321&Amount=500&Time=20090606132020”
ADD_ID=4033601234
PlainText = “4033601234” +
“F_Acc_ID=123456789&T_Acc_ID=987654321&Amount=500&Time=20090606132020”
DSignature = [Lcl;@c5c7331”
EnText=
Y ?j? YyyUrOW r,? ?6?nv ~ VD Zv S6 ?
TempText =                 PlainText              + DSignature
H(PlainText)
Figure 5.2: The variables’ transformation process.
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The digital signature is produced by PlainText and the private key for digital signature.
PlainText needs to be hashed to a message digest, which is used to create a digital signature
with the private key. In the present simulation, SHA-1 is employed to hash PlainText to
generate a message digest. Then, ECDSA on prime integer with the key size of 192 bits
(ECDSAprime192), is used to calculate the digital signature.
TempText = PlainText +DSign(h(PlainText),RKS) (5.24)
The signed message TempText is next encrypted using a symmetric encryption opera-
tion. AES256 is employed as the symmetric-key cryptography algorithm in the implemen-
tation.
EnText = Encrypt(TempText,KE) (5.25)
The EnText is finally sent to Bank via HTTP(s) through the wireless network.
5.2.3 Cryptography Simulation
SA2pMP employs a lightweight cryptography scheme, in which a lightweight digital signa-
ture algorithm is combined with a symmetric key encryption algorithm in accordance with
the rule of “Sign-and-Encrypt”. Table 5.3 describes the specific parameters for cryptogra-
phy algorithms implemented in SA2pMP. AES256 is the AES algorithm with the key size
of 256 bits. It is used to provide encryption and decryption functions. SHA-1 is employed
to generate a message digest for the plain text message. The message digest is used to gen-
erate a digital signature. Signing and verifying the digital signature makes use of ECDSA
algorithm over prime curves with the key size of 192 bits, namely ECDSAprime192. For
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background on the cryptography algorithms, refer Section 2.7.
Table 5.3: Cryptography Implementation.
Algorithm Type Key Length
AES256 Encryption 256 bits
SHA-1 Message Digest
ECDSAprime192 Digital Signature 192 bits
The performance of the cryptography implementation is evaluated on three different
emulator platforms: the Sun Java Wireless Toolkit 2.5.2 for CLDC, the Sony Ericsson
SDK 2.5.0.3 for the Java ME Platform, and the Nokia S60 3rd Edition FP1 SDK for MIDP.
Table 5.4 summarizes the information for the emulator devices, the configurations, and the
profile.
Table 5.4: The mobile device emulators.
Emulator Platform Device Configuration Profile
Sun WTK
2.5.2 QwertyDevice CLDC-1.1 MIDP-2.0
Nokia
S60 3rd S60Emulator CLDC-1.1 MIDP-2.0
Sony Ericsson Sony Ericsson
SDK 2.5.0.3 Z800 CLDC-1.1 MIDP-2.0
As defined in MIDP-2.0 and CLDC-1.1, these mobile devices must possess a minimum
base memory of 192 KB and a 16/32 bit processor with a speed of 8-32 MHz. In the
real world, Sony Ericsson Z800 has 6 MB phone memory and 1 GB Memory Stick support
(Sony Ericsson, n.d.). There are currently several models of mobile devices using the Nokia
S60 3rd platform. Nokia N80/N91 are S60 series mobile devices.
The same MIDlet was run in three emulator platforms in order to measure the time delay
caused by cryptography operation. In developing a money transfer transaction, PlainText
with 312-bit length was used.
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5.3 Simulation Evaluation
The practicality of SA2pMP was evaluated based on the processing time delay caused by
the cryptography operations and the code size of the MIDlet suite in a mobile device. The
evaluation of the time delay shows whether the architecture performs efficiently enough to
receive wide acceptance, while the evaluation on the code size determines if the architecture
can be implemented in limited storage in mobile devices.
5.3.1 Time Delay Evaluation
In this subsection, the results from the simulation in three emulator platforms are analyzed.
The time delay criteria is discussed, the method employed in evaluation is described, and
finally, the evaluation process and results are explained.
Time Delay Criteria
If the extra time delay caused by protecting security takes too long, frustration with the
system results. What “too long” means depends on the participants’ experience of a given
situation and on the type of application.
Miller (1968) proposed a 2-second rule based on the theory of limitations in human
short-term memory. According to the rule, short-term memory plays a critical role in hu-
man information processing. An individual becomes aware of the wait period after approx-
imately 2 seconds. Thus, to maintain uninterrupted information processing, the 2-second
rule is recommended (Nah, 2004). Specifically, there are several rules regarding the time
limitations in computer and mobile facility response.
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The Criteria of Nielsen (1995) Based on Miller’s argument, Nielsen (1995) suggested
a 10-second rule for computer response. This 10-second rule is widely used in industry
when a performance or a user interface is required. Nielsen’s criteria can be categorized as
follows:
• 100 milliseconds is the time limit for people to feel that the system is reacting instan-
taneously;
• 1,000 milliseconds is the time limit for people to think that the system stayed unin-
terrupted. Normally, no special feedback is necessary during delays of longer than
100 but shorter than 1000 milliseconds;
• 10,000 milliseconds is the time limit for keeping the client’s attention focused. If
there are longer delays than 10,000 milliseconds, people want to perform other tasks
while waiting for the computer to finish.
The Criteria of Roto and Oulasvirta (2005) According to Nielsen (1995), people usu-
ally wait 10 seconds for a response in a laboratory environment, after which they turn to
other tasks. However, there was still an open question how soon the attention typically
shifted in a mobile environment.
Roto and Oulasvirta (2005) conducted a user study with 27 participants to discover
the point at which visual feedback stops reaching the user in a mobile context. The re-
searchers examined the participants’ attention during page loading to the phone and the
environment in several different everyday mobility contexts, and made a comparison be-
tween these practical contexts to the laboratory context. Summarizing from the experiment,
Roto and Oulasvirta (2005) argued that:
• People rarely move their focus of attention away from the dialogue within the first
2,000 milliseconds, so non-visual feedback is not required for a short time delay.
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• Visual attention switched away from the mobile browser normally between 4,000
milliseconds and 8,000 milliseconds in the mobile context. Multi-modal feedback is
recommended for delays of more than 4,000 milliseconds in mobile applications.
In the following, the practicality of the system and the reaction of users are evaluated
based on the 10-second rule (Nielsen, 1995) and the study (Roto & Oulasvirta, 2005) on
mobile Human Computer Interaction (HCI).
Time Delay Evaluation Method
Regarding with a mobile payment system implementing SA2pMP architecture, the total
time delay T can be calculated as the following equation.
T = TCBiz+TCSec+TCom+TSSec+TSBiz (5.26)
TCBiz denotes the time delay caused by the business computation on ClientDevice. TCSec
denotes the time delay caused by the security computation on ClientDevice. Most of this
time delay is caused by cryptography computations, including signing a digital signature
and performing the encryption on ClientDevice. TCom denotes the time delay caused by
HTTP(s) communication via wireless networks. TSSec denotes the time delay caused by
the secure verification process and the decryption process on Bank. TSBiz denotes the time
delay caused by the specific business processing computation on Bank. Since Bank is
built on a resource-rich computer server platform, there is a high computational speed.
Furthermore, the distributed transaction log is written simultaneously. Considering these
issues, the operation on Bank is assumed to be instantaneous. As the time delays of TCBiz
and TCom are not caused by the security modules, they can be excluded from extra time
delay caused by providing security. For these reasons, the extra time delay due to security is
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focused on the delay caused by protecting security on ClientDevice, namely TCSec. Coupled
with equation 5.24 and equation 5.25, TCSec can be calculated as follows:
TCSec = Timeencrypt(DSign(msg)+msg) (5.27)
= Tencrypt +TDSign+T+ (5.28)
In equation 5.27, Tencrypt is the time delay for the encryption process or the decryption
process, while TDSign represents the time delay caused by signing or verifying a digital
signature, and T+ denotes a set of operations for formatting the string-based message. For
example, when a mobile device begins a transaction, which is sending the message from
a mobile device to a server, the operations related to security include formatting a new
message string, signing a digital signature, and encrypting a plain text message. The entire
time delay for security (TCSec) is described by these three parameters.
Time Delay Evaluation
In SA2pMP, AES256 is employed for encryption and decryption, while ECDSAprime192
is used for signing a digital signature. In ten practical system simulations (refer to 5.2.3) on
three different emulators, the time delays of both the AES256 encryption and decryption
are less than 1 millisecond. Based on this experimental result, the encryption is considered
to be instantaneous (Tencrypt ≈ 0). The time delay of T+ is caused by a string formatting
operation. In the simulation, this part of time delay was less than 1 ms. As T+ ≈ 0, the
formatting operation was considered to be instantaneous as well.
Therefore, the operation for digital signature consumes almost all time delay for secu-
rity on the mobile client device. Thus, TDSign is considered to be the significant factor of
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the time delay for security. Another reason for using TDSign to represent the entire security
time delay is for the convenience in comparing the implementation of the digital signature
to other work. The time delay comparison can be found in section 6.3.
Based on the evaluation method explained above, the simulation and evaluation results
can be described in the following.
Figures 5.3 - 5.5 illustrate the time delay measured on the Nokia S60 emulator plat-
form, the Sony Ericsson Z800 emulator platform, and the Sun WTK 2.5.2 QwertyDevice
emulator platform.
Time Delay: Nokia S60 Emulator
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Figure 5.3: The time delay on Nokia S60 Emulator Platform (ms).
Table 5.5 shows the calculation of the average time delay on these three different em-
ulator platforms. The simulation on Nokia S60 is the most positive. The average time
delay of signing on the Nokia S60 is 524.1 ms, which is much better than the data on the
Sony Ericsson Z800 (3080.3 ms) or the Sun WTK QwertyDevice (3178.5 ms). The same
situation occurs with the verification process: the average time delay for verification on the
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Time Delay: Sony Ericsson Z800 Emulator
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Figure 5.4: The time delay on Sony Ericsson Z800 Emulator Platform (ms).
Time Delay: Sun WTK Emulator
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Nokia S60 is 702 ms, which is much better than on either the Sony Ericsson Z800 (4024.8
ms) or the Sun WTK QwertyDevice (4185.1 ms).
Table 5.5: The average time delay (ms).
Nokia S60 Sony Ericsson Z800 Sun WTK QwertyDevice
Sign 524.1 3080.3 3178.5
Verify 702 4024.8 4185.1
The criteria of Nielsen (1995) and the criteria of Roto and Oulasvirta (2005) are used
to evaluate the average time delay in the simulation. Figure 5.6 illustrates the evaluation
results based on the criteria of Nielsen (1995). In Figure 5.6, the lowest area shows the
time delay is less than 100 milliseconds, while the middle area indicates the time delay
is between 100 milliseconds and 1,000 milliseconds, and the top area indicates the time
delay is between 1,000 milliseconds and 10,000 milliseconds. The time delay on the Nokia
S60 is between 100 milliseconds and 1,000 milliseconds, which means the system seems
uninterrupted to clients and no special feedback is necessary based on the criteria of Nielsen
(1995). The time delay on the Sony Ericsson Z800 or the WTK QwertyDevice is between
1,000 milliseconds and 10,000 milliseconds, which means the system still keeps clients’
attention focused.
Figure 5.7 illustrates the evaluation result based on the criteria of Roto and Oulasvirta
(2005). The lowest area indicates the time delay is less than 2,000 milliseconds, while the
middle area indicates the time delay is between 2,000 milliseconds and 4,000 milliseconds,
and the top area indicates the time delay is more than 4,000 milliseconds. Based on the
criteria of Roto and Oulasvirta (2005), the time delay for the Nokia S60 is less than 2,000
milliseconds, which means the system maintain focus by client and non-visual feedback is
unnecessary. The time delay caused by the signing operation on the Sony Ericsson Z800
or the WTK QwertyDevice is between 2,000 milliseconds and 4,000 milliseconds, which
means the system needs some visual feedback to maintain client attention. The time delay
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caused by verifying operation on the Sony Ericsson Z800 or the WTK QwertyDevice is
above 4,000 milliseconds, which means that the clients’ visual attention wanders from the
mobile screen.
Time Delay evaluated on Nielsen Criteria
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Figure 5.6: The time delay evaluated based on Nielsen Criteria.
Although the software application architecture is designed for a standard JVM, differ-
ent mobile devices have different implementations for efficiency and optimization. This is
shown in the simulation. The Symbian-based Nokia S60 has a more efficient implementa-
tion than the Sony Ericsson Z800.
In summary, evaluating the extra time delay based on the measurements respectively
offered by Nielsen and Roto, SA2pMP is practical for implementing on mobile devices,
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Figure 5.7: The time delay evaluated based on Roto and Oulasvirta Criteria.
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although some visual or multi-modal feedback needs to be considered.
5.3.2 Code Size Evaluation
Another perspective evaluation for practicality is based on the code size. Currently the
Java ME MIDP (2.0, 2.1) standard does not allow sharing of libraries among different
MIDlet suites. Each MIDlet suite should have its own library. A MIDlet suite with an API
library implementation normally has a large JAR-file. Mobile devices usually have their
own size limitation for implementing MIDlet suites. For example, CLDC-1.0 specifies that
the minimum base memory available for the Java platform is 160 KB, while CLDC-1.1
defines that the minimum base memory available for the Java platform is 192 KB (Java
Community Process, n.d.-b). When the code size or the file stored in the mobile device is
larger than the memory size, there will be problems. Furthermore, because the code needs
to be loaded into memory to start a program, the size of code in the MIDlet may cause the
program to have slower initiation. Thirdly, a large JAR-file also increases the download
time if the application is installed over-the-air (OTA).
The Bouncy Castle API library, which is employed in developing the proposed archi-
tecture, contains different code used for different cryptography algorithms. The size of
the completed API library is too large to be stored in some mobile devices. For example,
cldc classes.zip in Bouncy Castle 1.4.2 Java API package is 939 KB in size. As imple-
menting SA2pMP only relates to the digital signature and the symmetric-key cryptography
algorithm, the JAR-file size will shrink if the unused code of the Bouncy Castle API library
is not contained in MIDlet suites.
Code obfuscation is the process of “obscuring” Java classes with the purpose of making
reverse-engineering more difficult. Obfuscation typically entails renaming classes, meth-
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ods, and fields to use shorter names, effectively reducing the size of the Java class (Ortiz,
2009). Proguard was utilized as an obfuscator in the present simulation.
In the simulation, the mobile client application, MoBankClient.jar is 130 KB in size,
which is quite feasible for a CLDC-1.1 platform. Only a small part of the security package
is added in this JAR-file. That means the API library designed in this research meets the
requirement for code size, and the implementation on CLDC-1.1 mobile devices can be in
practice.
In this chapter, the system simulation, and the evaluation for both time delay and code
size are provide. In the following chapter, SA2pMP is compared to related work from the
aspects of the architecture and time delay.
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Chapter 6
System Comparison
In this chapter, SA2pMP is compared to some existing mobile payment architectures in
terms of security and practicality. To make this comparison, other works are first introduced
in section 6.1, followed by an architecture comparison in section 6.2. Finally, the time delay
comparison is made in section 6.3.
6.1 Other Works
Mobile payments can be viewed as an extension of electronic payments. Existing secured
architectures have been used to support electronic payments over Internet, such as E-cash
for electronic cash (A. Ghosh, 1998), eCheck for electronic cheque (Anderson, 1998),
and Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) for credit card payments (VISA and MasterCard,
1997). SET-based protocols are secure but not convenient because SET was originally de-
signed for electronic payments over a wired network, and intermediary agents are required.
E-cash, eCheck, and SET are standards for Internet payment protocols; they cannot be
directly adopted for mobile payments as they do not address the limited resources of the
mobile devices such as lower power, lower transmission rate, and less memory.
This section provides an investigation of other architectures proposed for ensuring se-
curity for mobile payment applications. These architectures are JASA, LSM, SET, and
iKP.
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6.1.1 J2ME application-layer end-to-end security architec-
ture
A J2ME application-layer security architecture called JASA, a security architecture based
on the Java 2 Platform, Micro Edition (J2ME) was developed by Itani and Kayssi (2004).
to ensure end-to-end security for m-commerce. JASA uses pure Java components to pro-
vide end-to-end security between a wireless J2ME-based client and J2EE-based servers.
The architecture can be implemented with the available limited resources of a Java MIDP
device. As SA2pMP, JASA was designed for the application layer, so it does not require
any modification of the underlying protocols or infrastructure.
JASA consists of a client application and a server. The client application complies with
the MIDP 1.0 specification. The architecture can be employed in the current wireless net-
work environment via HTTP because MIDP on top of CLDC provides an HttpConnection
interface (for more details about MIDP and CLDC, refer to section 2.5).
Encryption and decryption operations and services in JASA are based on the AES al-
gorithm. The SHA-1 algorithm performs the hashing operations to ensure integrity of data
during transportation over the network. At the client end, the MIDP application is pack-
aged inside a JAR file which contains the application class and resource files. The JAR file
can be downloaded to the mobile device, along with the JAD file. The server application,
specified with J2EE, is packaged in a web archive (WAR) file and deployed on the J2EE
application server. As JASA employs AES, a symmetric ciphering algorithm, the server
and the client application share the same key for encryption and decryption.
The performance of JASA was measured on the Sony Ericsson P800 Java phone, while
the server application was tested using the J2EE server version 1.3.1 running with Windows
2000. A GPRS connection was utilized to perform the HTTP interactions between the
client and the server. Itani and Kayssi (2004) claimed that the AES encryption operation
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runs at over 165 Kbits/s on the Java phone, and the AES decryption operation runs at over
105 Kbits/s on the Java phone.
One limitation of JASA is that AES is a symmetric ciphering algorithm, meaning that
the server and the client share the same key. Thus JASA can provide good end-to-end
client authentication, data confidentiality, and integrity. However, the employment of AES
is not able to guarantee non-repudiation in the transaction between the two parties, as AES
is a symmetric-key cryptography algorithm. For background knowledge of AES, refer to
Subsubsection 2.7.2.
6.1.2 Lightweight security for mobile commerce transactions
Lam et al. (2003) proposed a lightweight security mechanism (LSM) for protecting elec-
tronic transactions over handheld devices. In their research, the wireless network over
which the mobile commerce transactions take place is the mobile phone network. The
concept of a wireless protocol gateway was introduced in their proposal. A wireless pro-
tocol gateway serves as a wired agent for the handheld devices. As illustrated in Figure
6.1, handheld devices are connected to the application sever though the wireless protocol
gateway. In other words, they are connected to the gateway via the mobile phone network
and the gateway is connected to the application server via a fixed line network.
To overcome intensive computation on resource-limited mobile devices, LSM utilized a
wireless protocol gateway. LSM is located on the layer above the Transport Layer Security
protocol (TLS) and it presumes that the mobile handheld device supports plug-in or applet
implementations in an Internet browser environment. Catering to the limited resources of
mobile devices, LSM employs the Wireless Transport Layer Security protocol (WTLS) as
defined by WAP Forum (The Open Mobile Alliance Ltd, n.d.). As illustrated in Figure
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Figure 6.1: The system architecture adopted from the LSM (Lam et al., 2003).
6.1, the WAP Gateway plays an agent role to “translate WTLS-protected traffic to TLS-
protected traffic”(Lam et al., 2003).
According to Lam et al. (2003), LSM is divided into two parts. For communications be-
tween the handheld device and the wireless protocol gateway, LSM uses an authentication
protocol that requires sharing a symmetric secret key. This protocol intends to guarantee
a secure connection between the handheld device and the wireless protocol gateway. The
wired network communication between the wireless protocol gateway and the application
server requires more complex transaction protocols. LSM employs a combination of a
public-key cryptography mechanism and a simple password authentication solution. Lam
et al. (2003) suggested the use of some tamper-resistant hardware device in order to ensure
non-repudiation.
LSM meets the security requirements of mobile commerce in authentication, confiden-
tiality, integrity and non-repudiation. The combination of the wireless protocol gateway
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and the end-to-end security mechanism plays a role as an effective balance between high
computational requirements and good security protection. However, there are still some
limitations in this proposal.
One requirement of LSM is that the wireless protocol gateway shares many cryptogra-
phy calculation duties with mobile devices. The wireless protocol gateway is responsible
for maintaining a network communication channel, and an agent between the wired and
wireless networks. More importantly, the wireless protocol gateway can be viewed as a
part of mobile devices, with extensive computational capability. Much cryptography com-
putation is performed in the wireless protocol gateway. This approach leads to a limitation
for LSM that a security gap can exist in the wireless protocol gateway. The wireless gate-
way receives the traffic from handheld devices, decrypts the traffic with the symmetric key
and encrypts them again using public-key cryptography, then sends the data to the applica-
tion server. This can result in the exposure of the data at the wireless protocol gateway.
Another limitation is caused by the approach in which the mobile transaction is imple-
mented on the mobile phone network. The mobile phone network is provided by mobile
network operators, while mobile application services are offered by application providers.
Financial service providers may not want mobile network operators to be excessively in-
volved in their security strategy. However, LSM employs the wireless protocol gateway as
a rich resource for performing intensive cryptography computations. This approach cannot
avoid a high involvement of a third party, which undoubtedly increases the difficulties of a
suitable collaboration among enterprise systems.
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6.1.3 Internet Keyed Payment Protocols
Internet Keyed Payment Protocols (iKP) is a group of secure payment protocols developed
by IBM Research Division (Janson, 2007; Bellare et al., 2000). All iKP protocols are based
on RSA Public-key cryptography. The number of public keys, which is referred to as (i),
varies according to the participants in a specific business requirement. The i is mirrored in
the name of the individual protocols: 1KP, 2KP, and 3KP. The simplest protocol, 1KP, only
asks for the acquirer to hold one public key (Janson, 2007). The main reason for designing
these three variants was to enable gradual deployment.
Originally iKP was designed to suit any browser, server and platform. Now it is com-
patible with the existing card-based business models and payment system infrastructures.
There are several participants involved in iKP:
• Buyer, who makes the actual payment,
• Merchant, who will receive the payment, and
• Acquirer Gateway, which plays a role as an intermediary between the electronic
payment world and the existing payment infrastructure, and authorizes transactions
using the latter.
Initially, iKP was designed for implementation in software. Now all iKP protocols can
be implemented in either software or hardware. In fact, in 1KP and 2KP the buyer does
not even need a personalized payment device: only credit card data and a PIN (if present)
must be entered to complete a payment. However, to fulfill the increased requirement for
security, it is obviously desirable to use a tamper-resistant device to protect the PIN and the
secret key of the buyer (Bellare et al., 2000).
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6.1.4 Secure Electronic Transaction protocol
The Secure Electronic Transaction protocol (SET) specification is an open encryption and
security specification designed to protect credit card transactions on Internet. SET’s devel-
opment was led by VISA1 and MasterCard2. Various well-known companies were involved
in the development of SET, including IBM3, Microsoft4, Netscape5, RSA6, and VeriSign7.
Currently the major supporters are VISA and MasterCard. As a standard protocol SET
has been primarily defined to ensure the security of credit card payments on Internet, al-
though the transaction flow and implementation of security can also be applied to wireless
networks.
SET is very similar to iKP, especially the 3KP variant. The buyer, the merchant and
the acquirer are all involved in the payment transactions. SET is not actually a payment
system itself, but a set of security protocols enabling users to employ the existing credit
card payment infrastructure on an open network, like Internet, in a secure environment. In
general, SET includes three services:
1. providing a secure communications channel among all parties involved in a transac-
tion;
2. ensuring trust through the use of the digital certificates; and
3. ensuring privacy because the information is only available to parties in a transaction
when and where necessary.
There are several key components of the SET protocol (VISA and MasterCard, 1997).
1http://www.visa.com/
2http://www.mastercard.com/
3http://www.ibm.com/
4http://www.microsoft.com
5Netscape became a holding company of AOL in 1998
6RSA is the security division of EMC, http://www.rsa.com/
7http://www.verisign.com/
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• The Cardholder Application, also referred to as a digital wallet, is held by an online
consumer and packages a digital signature and credit card information that ensures
the identity and safeguards the financial information through an encryption system.
• The Merchant Server component is the verification product held by the merchant to
process the online card payment.
• The Payment Gateway component is supported by an acquiring bank or other trusted
third party who can process the merchant’s verification and the client’s payment in-
formation and filters them to their appropriate financial institutions.
• The Certificate Authority component, run by a financial institution, is the trusted
agent that issues the digital certificates and is responsible for ensuring that all users
of digital certificates are in fact secure and trustworthy clients.
Details of the SET specification can be referred to (VISA and MasterCard, 1997).
Both SET (VISA and MasterCard, 1997) and iKP (Janson, 2007) are credit-card pay-
ment protocols that were designed originally for electronic commerce. Although they have
been successfully implemented for e-commerce on wired networks, they are too heavy-
loaded to operate on resource limited mobile devices and network environments such as
mobile devices and wireless networks. SET and iKP are comprehensive architectures, not
specifically designed for two-party payment transactions; this makes SET and iKP too com-
plex for efficient and realistic implementations of two-party mobile payment transactions.
6.2 Architecture Comparison
A comparison of SA2pMP with the other existing security architectures for mobile pay-
ment is provided in this section. JASA proposed by Itani and Kayssi (2004) provides
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end-to-end client authentication, and data confidentiality and integrity; however, it cannot
guarantee non-repudiation during transactions. SET (VISA and MasterCard, 1997) and
iKP (Janson, 2007) are two practical credit-card payment protocols, which were designed
originally for electronic commerce. Although they have been successfully implemented
for e-commerce on a wired network, their computations are too heavyweight to operate
in a resource-limited environment. Lam et al. (2003) proposed LSM, which made use of
a wireless protocol gateway to maintain a security for mobile commerce. However, the
transaction data are possibly exposed to intruders at the wireless protocol gateway, as the
data are decrypted and then re-encrypted there. Additionally, the intensive computation at
the wireless protocol gateway, which is maintained by the mobile network operator, leads
to an excessive involvement of the third party for a two-party (such as client and bank)
payment transaction.
The proposed architecture, SA2pMP, is compared to JASA (Itani & Kayssi, 2004), LSM
(Lam et al., 2003), SET and iKP (VISA and MasterCard, 1997; Janson, 2007) in eight di-
mensions in Table 6.1. “Targeted to M-Payment” evaluates if the architecture is designed
for payment transactions over a mobile environment; “Targeted to 2-Party” shows if the
architecture is proposed for a transaction in which only two parties are involved; “Cryptog-
raphy Algorithm” compares which cryptography algorithm(s) are employed in the archi-
tecture; “Authentication Strategy” shows whether the architecture realizes a single-factor
authentication or a multi-factor authentication; “Non-repudiation” indicates if the architec-
ture addresses the problem of false denial or repudiation; “Java ME Enabled” describes
the implementation approach; “Computational Requirements” indicates whether the archi-
tecture’s computational requirement can be handled in a resource-limited mobile device;
and “3rd-Party involvement” evaluates the level to which the architecture requires the third
party to be involved.
As illustrated in Table 6.1, the comparison can be explained as follows:
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Table 6.1: Architecture Comparison.
XXXXXXXXXXXXFields
Architecture
JASA SET and iKP LSM SA2pMP
Targeted to M-Payment
√
No
√ √
Targeted to 2-Party
√
(1)KP
√ √
Cryptography AES RSA RSA ECDSA
Algorithm AES
Authentication SFA SFA SFA MFA
Strategy
Non-Repudiation No
√ √ √
Java ME Enabled
√
- -
√
Computational Light- Heavy- Light- Light-
Requirements weight weight weight weight
The 3rd-Party Low High High Medium
Involvement
1 SFA: Single-factor Authentication;
2 MFA: Multi-factor Authentication;
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• In comparing the employment of cryptography algorithms, JASA utilizes AES, while
LSM, SET and iKP employ RSA as the cryptography algorithm. AES is a Symmetric-
key cryptography algorithm. Although AES has a better computational speed than
Public-key cryptography algorithms (such as RSA), it is difficult to ensure non-
repudiation for systems which employ it. RSA, as a Public-key cryptography al-
gorithm, is able to fulfill the security requirements for authentication, integrity, con-
fidentiality, and non-repudiation. However, RSA is too computationally heavyweight
to be implemented in a resource-limited mobile device. SA2pMP introduces an inte-
grated scheme combining both AES and ECDSA.
• Comparing authentication strategy, JASA, LSM, SET and iKP all utilize single-factor
authentication, which is not enough to secure a financial application, but SA2pMP
implements a multi-factor authentication strategy. The multiple factors are consti-
tuted by the technical properties in possession of a mobile device, in the knowledge
of the personal identifier of the mobile device, and in the business transaction’s ac-
count information. The combination of these multiple factors provides a strong au-
thentication strategy. Additionally, the digital signature contributes to maintaining
authentication in SA2pMP.
• From the perspective of computational requirements, JASA has the advantage in
computational speed and resource requirement over AES; therefore, JASA can be
viewed as lightweight in computational requirement. LSM utilizes the wireless pro-
tocol gateway as the agent of the mobile device. Therefore, it changes the wireless
network to the wired network and changes the resource-limited mobile devices to
resource-rich ones. The intensive computing is translocated from mobile devices to
the wireless protocol gateway. The real computational requirement for mobile de-
vices is not high. Therefore LSM is also lightweight in computational requirements.
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SET and iKP were not originally designed for mobile commerce; the computational
requirement is high. For this reason, SET and iKP are too heavyweight for the mobile
payment activities. SA2pMP balances the security and the computational complexity
and requirements, AES is chosen to realize a symmetric-key cryptography algorithm,
which is faster and computationally lighter compared to the public-key cryptogra-
phy algorithm. ECDSA is a digital signature algorithm based on the elliptic curve.
ECDSA is believed to be more suitable for resource-limited mobile devices, as it pro-
vides equal security level with the shorter key size. Hence, SA2pMP is lightweight
in computational requirements, without losing assurance in security.
• The design of each architecture has its target. JASA and LSM were designed for
transactions in which only two participants are involved. SET is not designed for
two-party payment transactions.The buyer, the merchant, and the financial services
are all involved. iKP includes a series of protocols, in which 1KP is able to be applied
for a two-party transaction. SA2pMP aims to maintain comprehensive security for
two-party mobile payments. Although the network gateway is physically involved in
SA2pMP, only two parties (client and financial service) participate in business trans-
actions. Moreover, JASA, LSM, and SA2pMP are designed for payment transaction
on mobile devices and over wireless networks, while SET and iKP were originally
developed for electronic commerce over PCs and wired networks.
• Non-repudiation is a key requirement for comprehensive security. In all architec-
tures listed in Table 6.1, only JASA did not suggest approaches to solve the false
repudiation problem. LSM, SET and iKP made use of cryptography algorithms to
maintain non-repudiation. Besides the employment of digital signature, SA2pMP uti-
lizes a distributed transaction log strategy to provide a defensive approach to ensure
non-repudiation.
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• A mobile payment transaction have to cross different enterprises. An inter-enterprise
transaction should not only support efficient collaboration, but also respect each en-
terprise protecting self-determination and privacy (Biennier & Favrel, 2005). In the
mobile payment transaction, the financial service cooperates with the other support-
ing services, such as the mobile network operator. The models of the inter-enterprise
business collaboration employed in these architectures are not same. In the case
in this research, the collaboration between the financial service and the third party
(such as the mobile network operator or TTP) is evaluated based on the third party’s
involvement. LSM stores its cryptography key pair in the network protocol gateway.
One limitation is that this approach leads to an excessive involvement of the third
party (the mobile network operator). The key pairs are essential to a cryptography
strategy. Positioning key pairs with a third party rather than with one of the two
participants of a transaction makes this third party important in the system. This
excessive involvement of the third party will cause an excessive dependence on the
third party. SET and iKP require high third-party involvement, as they rely on TTP to
offer the key pairs. As JASA did not employ any third party in its architecture, it has
low third-party involvement. SA2pMP utilizes the network gateway in its distributed
transaction log strategy. The point is that SA2pMP treats the network gateway as the
third trusted party for monitoring or auditing payment transactions. This approach
avoids the third party’s excessive involvement, but it still contributes to ensuring non-
repudiation.
• Regarding the implementation, both JASA and SA2pMP mainly make use of Java
ME to develop a software architecture. LSM, SET and iKP were designed to be
suitable to any browser, server and platform. The development of LSM, SET and
iKP can be with software, hardware, or a combination of software and hardware.
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6.3 Time Delay Comparison
In this section a comparison from the implementation perspective is provided. The time
delay during the cryptography computation is compared, and it is shown that SA2pMP has
the advantage in operating feasibly on resource-limited mobile devices.
As SA2pMP employs the lightweight cryptography scheme combining ECDSA and
AES, the computational time delay of AES is compared with JASA (Itani & Kayssi, 2004),
then the computational time delay of ECDSA is compared with the result provided by
Kilas (2009) (we use Kilas to represent the Kilas work). Kilas evaluated the practicality
of digital signatures on Near Field Communication (NFC) tags in a Java-powered mobile
phone. Although SA2pMP has different goal than does Kilas, it is possible to compare the
time delay as both employed an ECDSA implementation.
Comparison the related works in terms of time delay is difficult. First, the simulation in
this thesis is on PCs, while JASA and Kilas are based on actual devices. Second different
brands or series of mobile devices were employed in the experiment. Table 6.2 depicts
the models and technical specifications of the various mobile devices employed. Although
mobile device manufacturers support unified standards such as MIDP and CLDC, they add
unique features and functions that support their own branded mobile devices more effi-
ciently. Therefore, different models may function differently, and cause further difficulty
in the comparison.
Table 6.2: The mobile device models employed in JASA, Kilas, and SA2pMP.
Model Technical Specifications
JASA Sony Ericsson P800 MIDP-1.0, CLDC-1.0
Kilas Nokia 6131 NFC MIDP-2.0, CLDC-1.0
Sony Ericsson Z750 trial MIDP-2.0, CLDC-1.1
SA2pMP Nokia S60 Emulator MIDP-2.0
Sony Ericsson Z800 Emulator MIDP-2.0, CLDC-1.1
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Although it is impossible to make use of current data comparing SA2pMP with the other
two related works, a rough evaluation of time delay is made.
If the AES implementation in JASA is examined, the AES encryption operation with
key size of 128 bits ran at over 165 Kbits/s on the Java phone, and the decryption operation
with key size of 128 bits ran at over 105 Kbits/s (Itani & Kayssi, 2004). In SA2pMP, AES
encryption and decryption, both with the key size of 256 bits, cost less than 1 millisecond.
As the plaintext is of 312-bit length (refer to subsection 5.2.3), the encryption speed can be
roughly evaluated as:
Speed(Encrypt) = Length(plaintext)/Tencrypt > 312Kbits/s (6.1)
Based on Formula 6.1, SA2pMP encryption speed (> 312Kbits/s) is clearly higher
than JASA (165Kbits/s). With the same evaluation method, the decryption speed (>
312Kbits/s) of SA2pMP is also higher than JASA (105Kbits/s).
There are several different Java ME implementations for ECDSA designed by e.g.
Tillich and Großschadl (2004); Zheng, Shao, Huang, and Yu (2008); Kilas (2009). As
the platforms in which ECDSA is implemented are not the same, a strict comparison is
difficult to make. Tillich and Großschadl (2004) and Zheng et al. (2008) suggested that
ECDSA could be performed faster, while the emulation data provided by Kilas (2009) are
less efficient than the data in the simulation of SA2pMP on the Nokia S60 emulator. A
comparison of ECDSA’s implementation is made between Kilas and SA2pMP. Both Kilas
and SA2pMP employ a 192-bit key for signing and verification. As both Kilas and SA2pMP
used SHA-1 to generate the message digest before the operation of signing and verification,
they sign or verify a digital signature for the same sized message. The average time delay
on different emulators is compared in Table 6.3.
As depicted in Table 6.3, the simulation on the Nokia S60 Emulator had the best per-
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Table 6.3: The time delay caused by ECDSA implementation: Kilas and SA2pMP.
Kilas SA2pMP
Emulator Nokia S60 Sony Ericsson Z800 Sun WTK
Emulator Emulator Emulator
Signing 1088 524.1 3080.3 3178.5
Verification 2603 702 4024.8 4185.1
formance in all experimental implementations, when examining with both signing and
verification calculations. The data from Kilas are better than SA2pMP according to the
experiments on Sony Ericsson Z800 Emulator and Sun WTK 2.5.2 Emulator.
Although a strict comparison of time delay cannot be made due to the restrictions of
experimental facility and environment, the result still shows some interesting information.
Java ME allows developers to create an application compatible over numerous devices with
the same piece of code. However, it varies in performance in that the application performs
particular tasks differently on different platforms. The reason lies in the wide deviation of
processor platforms, virtual machine (VM) implementations, and device memory capabili-
ties (Yi, Reddy, & Ang, 2002). Table 6.3 reflects different mobile device manufacturers add
characteristic functions and contribute different optimization to their own branded mobile
devices. Clearly, Nokia S60 has the most positive performance in supporting the cryptog-
raphy computation based on Table 6.3.
In this chapter, a comprehensive comparison of SA2pMP to the related approaches is
provided. In combination with the result from the evaluation in Chapter 5, the thesis sup-
ports the belief that SA2pMP has it own advantages in security and practicality as an im-
plementation for a two-party mobile payment. The thesis is concluded in the next chapter.
141
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
With the evolution of technologies in wireless networks and mobile devices, an increasing
number of people are becoming users of mobile applications, on account of the advantages
in convenience and portability. Mobile payment, as an important mobile application in the
financial field, is attracting wide attention from researchers, developers, bankers, merchan-
disers, and clients. However, it has not yet become a mainstream approach for making
payments. Non-secured mobile payments are simply not acceptable.
The goal of mobile payment research to enable payment transactions to operate on mo-
bile devices and wireless networks. Although the technologies in these two fields have
improved and are experiencing a significant development, mobile devices and wireless net-
works are still “resource-limited” compared to PCs and fixed-line networks. The difficulty
in building mobile payment systems lies in how to provide payment transactions with se-
curity and practicality.
In this respect, the focus of this research is mobile transaction security. The goal is
to design a security architecture for two-party mobile payment transactions. A wide in-
vestigation of security issues on mobile transactions is provided, particularly focusing on
mobile payments. The Four-layer mobile payment participant model on the basis of the
model suggested by Karnouskos (2004) clarifies how participants are involved in mobile
payments. Based on the Onion Layer Framework, a security map is proposed to guide
the present research analysis activities. Finally a new security architecture for two-party
mobile payment referred to as SA2pMP is proposed.
SA2pMP operates on Java-enabled mobile devices with Internet browser capability. The
participants in a logical payment transaction only include the financial sector and the client.
As the mobile payment runs over a mobile phone network, the mobile network operator is
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physically employed to provide a network communication channel. SA2pMP is built on the
application layer, which means that it does not make any modification to current network
protocols and wireless network infrastructures. Since the mobile bank is a typical two-party
mobile payment, it is used as a scenario for describing system design and implementation.
SA2pMP employs a combination of technologies to provide comprehensive security for
mobile payments. It fulfills the four basic security requirements of authentication, integrity,
confidentiality, and non-repudiation. Some of the highlights of SA2pMP are as follows:
• A lightweight cryptography scheme is implemented, which combines a symmetric-
key cryptography algorithm (AES) along with a digital signature algorithm (ECDSA).
ECDSA is a lightweight digital signature algorithm for better operating on resource-
limited mobile devices. It contributes to ensuring the properties of authentication,
integrity, and non-repudiation. AES is a popular symmetric key algorithm which has
the benefit of running faster on mobile devices, as compared to a public key algo-
rithm. It is employed to ensure confidentiality during a payment transaction. The
ease of using a simple “Sign-and-Encrypt” approach avoids high computational re-
quirements on resource-limited mobile devices.
• A multi-factor authentication strategy is proposed, which employs the inherent fac-
tors of mobile devices, bank account, and networks to provide a strong authentication
for a mobile transaction.
• A distributed transaction log strategy is suggested to partly maintain non-repudiation.
The distributed transaction log strategy makes use of the “cooperator and monitor”
business model between financial sectors and mobile network operators. The mo-
bile network operator is viewed as a third party auditor for monitoring the business
transaction. It is responsible for maintaining a transaction log.
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Additionally, the security API package created in implementing SA2pMP can be reused
as the security library for developing other mobile security applications. Designed origi-
nally for two-party mobile payments, SA2pMP can potentially be extended to ensure secu-
rity for other two-party mobile applications.
The simulation is performed on an IBM IntelliStation M Pro PC, with Pentium 4 CPU
2.80 GHz and 2 GB RAM. The operation system is Windows XP Professional SP3. Three
emulators (the Nokia S60 Emulator, the Sony Ericsson Emulator, and the Sun WTK CLDC
simulator) were employed in the system simulation. The evaluation of both time delay
and code size shows that SA2pMP is practical and efficient for implementation on mobile
devices.
Compared to some related works such as JASA (Itani & Kayssi, 2004), SET and iKP
(VISA and MasterCard, 1997; Janson, 2007), and LSM (Lam et al., 2003), SA2pMP has the
advantage of more lightweight computation, more comprehensive security, and less third
party involvement.
Future work could focus on the following areas:
• Currently, due to limitations of hardware environments, the present experiment in this
thesis were operated on a PC. Three emulators were used to simulate mobile devices.
In future work, the actual device will be employed in experiment and evaluation.
• A good cryptography approach needs a good key management strategy. SA2pMP em-
ploys paralleled key management for the key pair of digital signature, and the sym-
metric key pair of encryption and decryption. Although some options are suggested
for key storage and distribution, especially for the symmetric-key cryptography al-
gorithm, these candidates need to be evaluated in the context of a practical mobile
payment system.
• The distributed transaction log strategy employed in SA2pMP makes use of the mo-
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bile network operators’ role as a monitor to audit business transactions that take place
between the client and the financial sector. Although it successfully contributes a
technical strategy to solve the problem that lies in business repudiation, it still needs
analysis on a case-by-case basis in real applications. The role that the mobile net-
work operator eventually plays will be dependent on what is allowed by the specific
business contract or the relevant legislation. For example, current legislation in Fin-
land does not allow Mobile Network Operators to charge for services exceeding a
certain amount of money. This example means that the operator may need to found
subsidiary companies in order to act as a trusted third party and/or to acquire licenses
for a bank (Tsalgatidou & Veijalainen, 2000). Another issue that must be concerned
is the client privacy. A business transaction log contains some sensitive information
of the clients. Allowing mobile network operators to maintain the business log does
possible business-sensitive information among these three parties (clients, financial
sectors, and the mobile network operators) to be leak. How to ensure client privacy
in this approach is worth consideration. Future work in the distributed transaction
log strategy needs further analysis than simply basing on technological practicality.
• Adequate security architecture is the most important measure to protect mobile pay-
ment systems. The security architecture can be viewed as the front line for prevention
of attacks. However, it is almost impossible to implement a completely secure sys-
tem. It is inevitable to have bugs and mistakes during the implementation process.
A number of security vulnerabilities and incident reports have been issued by, for
example, the CERT Coordination Center (Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering
Institute, 2004). The fraud detection system (FDS) is in place to detect attempted
and completed frauds; therefore, it can act as the second line of defense for protec-
tion of systems (Barse, 2004). The fraud detection is not in the research scope in
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this thesis. However, the transaction log data could be employed in fraud detection
research in the future.
Clearly wireless networks and mobile device technologies are still in rapid develop-
ment. The growth of 3G/4G network technology and the Smartphone brings more and
more opportunities to mobile applications. SA2pMP, as a lightweight architecture, can be
feasibly implemented on mobile devices to provide a comprehensive security for two party
mobile payments. The financial sector in two-party mobile payments might be represented
not only by the traditional commercial banks but by stock traders, or even by Internet pay-
ment agents, for example, PayPal. Furthermore, the implementation of SA2pMP is low
cost and can also be easily integrated into the other end-to-end mobile applications. We
expect SA2pMP to provide a lightweight security architecture for ensuring comprehensive
security; meanwhile, it can be practically implemented in a resource-limited environment.
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Glossary
ACCID Denotes the Client’s bank account number, or
ACCount IDentifier
Amount Denotes the amount of money transferred
Bank Denotes a server computer held by the financial
service participant in the transaction
Client Denotes the person using a mobile device on the
client side of the transaction
ClientDevice Denotes the mobile device used by the client to
carry out their mobile banking transaction
DS Denotes the digital signature
DSign Denotes the signing process for the digital signa-
ture
DVeri f y Denotes the verification process for the digital
signature
Decrypt Denotes the decryption process for the
symmetric-key cryptography algorithm
Encrypt Denotes the encryption process for the
symmetric-key cryptography algorithm
F Acc ID Denotes the ID number of the bank account from
which the money is transferred
Gateway Denotes the wireless gateway offered by a mobile
network operator
IDC Denotes the identity information of the client.
IDC = (SIM + PHID + ACCID)
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KE Denotes the secret key for the symmetric-key
cryptography algorithm
PHID Denotes PHone IDentifier, such as the mobile
phone serial number
PIN Denotes the Client’s Personal Identifier Number
in the mobile device
PKS Denotes X’s public key which is used to verify
the digital signature in the transaction
PWD Denotes the password of Client, which is known
only to Client and is verifiable by Bank. For ex-
ample, the debit card has its password.
RKS Denotes X’s private key which is used to gener-
ate the digital signature and to sign the data trans-
ferred in the transaction
SIM Denotes the Subscriber Identifier Module num-
ber of ClientDevice
Session Denotes the HTTP communication session set up
between Bank and ClientDevice
T D Denotes the transaction data transferred in a
transaction
T Log Denotes the transaction log
T Acc ID Denotes the ID number of bank account to which
the money is transferred
T+ Denotes a set of operations for formatting the
string-based message
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TCBiz Denotes the time delay caused by the business
computation on ClientDevice
TCSec Denotes the time delay caused by the security
computation on ClientDevice
TCom Denotes the time delay caused by the HTTP(s)
communication
TDSign Denotes the time delay caused by signing or ver-
ifying a digital signature
TSBiz Denotes the time delay caused by the specific
business processing computation on Bank
TSSec Denotes the time delay caused by the secure ver-
ification process and the decryption process on
Bank
Tencrypt Denotes the time delay caused by the encryption
process or the decryption process
Time Denotes the time when money transfer transac-
tion is initiated
TimeStamp Denotes a time stamp
Veri f y Denotes the process for verifying the transac-
tion’s authentication
X Denotes any participant involved in a mobile
payment transaction
Yes/No Denotes the transaction’s status: approved or re-
jected
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[RKS,PKS] Denotes a digital signature key pair including a
private key and a public key
added identi f ier Denotes the identity information of the client,
formulated by IDC. The added identi f ier is a
combination of the SIM, PHID, and ACCID
h(msg) Denotes a one-way hash function for the message
msg Denotes a message
3GPP The Third Generation Partnership Project
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AES256 The AES algorithm with the key size of 256 bits
Android A set of software for mobile devices: an operat-
ing system, middleware and key mobile applica-
tions (Open Handset Alliance, n.d.)
APIs Application Programming Interfaces
AS Authentication Server
ATM Automated Teller Machine
Authentication Ensuing that the communicating entity is who
they are claiming to be (Stallings, 2006)
BlackBerry OS The proprietary operating system made by a
Canadian wireless device company, Research In
Motion, for BlackBerry Smartphones
BLM Business Logic Module
BLS Business Logic Server
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Bouncy Castle An open-source collection of lightweight cryp-
tography APIs
BTLS Business Transaction Log Server
CDC Connected Device Profile
CDMA Code Division Multiple Access
CLDC Connected Limited Device Configuration
CM Communication Module
Confidentiality Ensuring the operation in private
Cryptography The art and science of securing messages so un-
intended audiences cannot read, understand, or
alter that message (Tipton & Krause, 2003)
DES Data Encryption Standard
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
DSS Digital Signature Standard
ECC The Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDSA The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ECDSAprime192 The ECDSA algorithm on prime integer with the
key size of 192 bits
ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Insti-
tute
FDS Fraud Detection System
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FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
FORTRAN A programming language that is especially suited
to the numeric computation and the scientific
computing
GPRS General Packet Radio Service
GSM Global System for Mobile Communication
HCI Human Computer Interaction
HTTPs Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
iKP Internet Keyed Payment Protocols
IMT-2000 The International Mobile Telecommunications
2000
Integrity The information and systems must be guaranteed
against corruption by outside parties
iPhone OS The operating system developed by Apple Inc.
for the iPhone and iPod Touch
ITU International Telecommunication Union
J2EE Java 2 Platform, Enterprise Edition
J2ME Java 2 Platform, Micro Edition
JAD Java Application Descriptor
JAR Java ARchive file
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JASA A J2ME application-layer security architecture
proposed in (Itani & Kayssi, 2004)
Java EE Java Platform, Enterprise Edition, which was for-
merly known as Java 2 Platform, Enterprise Edi-
tion (J2ME)
Java EE Java Platform, Enterprise Edition
Java ME Java Platform, Micro Edition, which was for-
merly known as Java 2 Platform, Micro Edition
(J2ME)
JCA Java Cryptography Architecture
JCE Java Cryptography Extension
JCP Java Community Process
JSR Java Specification Request
JVM Java Virtual Machine
KMM Key Management Module
KMS Key Management Server
LAN Local Area Network
Linux A Unix-like computer operating system, which
can be implemented in the mobile device
LSM The lightweight security mechanism proposed by
Lam et al. (2003)
MBP Mobile Banking Platform
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MFA Multi-Factor Authentication
MIDlet The MIDP application
MIDP Mobile Information Device Profile
Mobile Device a handheld devices with functions such as GPRS
connectivity, Internet browsing, and basic com-
putational capabilities
MPN Mobile Phone Network
NFC Near Field Communication
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
Nokia S60 A Symbian OS for Nokia mobile phones
Non-repudiation Ensuring that the originator cannot falsely repute
or deny a transaction
Onion Layer Framework A security framework adopted from Onion Ring
Framework (Wei et al., 2006)
Onion Ring Framework An m-commerce security framework proposed
by Wei et al. (2006)
Palm An embedded operating system for PDAs
PAP Password Authentication Protocol
PDAs Personal Digital Assistants
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Pocket PCs The handheld devices that enable users to store
and retrieve e-mail, contacts, appointments,
tasks, play multimedia files, games, exchange
text messages with Windows Live Messenger
(formerly known as MSN Messenger), browse
the Web, and more
POS Point of Sale
Proguard An obfuscation software
Public-key Cryptography The cryptography based on that the sender and
the receiver hold the different keys
RIM Research In Motion, a Canadian wireless device
company.
RMS Record Management System in MIDP
RSA The Rivest-Shamir-Adleman algorithm
RTOS real-time operating system
SA2pMP The security architecture for two-party mobile
payment
SDK Software Development Kit
Security Component A potential secured technology employed in a se-
cured system
Security Map A security solution analysis mode based on the
Onion Layer Framework
SET Secure Electronic Transaction
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SFA Single-Factor Authentication
SHA The Secure Hash Algorithm
SHA-1 A Secure Hash Standard
SM Security Module
Smartphone The powerful, multi-function cell phones that in-
corporate a number of PDA functionality (Yang,
Zheng, & Ni, 2007)
SMS Short Messaging Service
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
Symbian A proprietary operating system for mobile de-
vices
Symmetric-key Cryptography The cryptography based on that the same key is
shared among the sender and the receiver
TAP Third Auditor Party
TDD/CDMA Time Division Duplex/Code Division Multiple
Access
The strong authentication The layered authentication approach relying on
two or more authenticators to establish the iden-
tity of an originator or receiver of information
(The United States Federal Government, 2006)
TTP Trusted Third Party
UIQ User Interface Quartz
UMTS Universal Mobile Telephone System
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Unisys Security Index The Unisys Security Index presents a social indi-
cator regarding how safe consumers feel on key
areas of security. Conducted twice a year the
Unisys Security Index provides a regular, statisti-
cal measure of concerns about four areas of secu-
rity: national, financial, Internet and the personal
safety.(http://www.unisyssecurityindex.com/)
VM Virtual Machine
W-CDMA Wideband Code Division Multiple Access
WAP Wireless Application Protocol
WAR Web ARchive file
Windows Mobile A light version operating system combined with
a suite of basic applications for mobile devices
based on the Microsoft Win32 API
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network
WML Wireless Markup Language
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Appendix
Part of Client Simulation Code
MoBankMIDlet Operating Flow
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MoBankMIDlet.java
1 / *
2 * MobSurveyMIDlet . j a v a
3 *
4 * C r e a t e d on 15−Nov−2007 , 1 0 : 3 7 : 5 4 AM
5 *
6 * To change t h i s t e m p l a t e , choose Too l s ∣ Templa t e s
7 * and open t h e t e m p l a t e i n t h e e d i t o r .
8 * /
9 package com . uleth . mobank ;
10
11 import com . uleth . mobank . connection . NetConnection ;
12 import java . io . IOException ;
13
14 import javax . microedition . midlet . * ;
15 import javax . microedition . lcdui . * ;
16 import javax . microedition . lcdui . Display ;
17 import org . netbeans . microedition . lcdui . LoginScreen ;
18 import org . netbeans . microedition . lcdui . WaitScreen ;
19 import org . netbeans . microedition . util . SimpleCancellableTask ;
20
21 / * *
22 * @author zhuyp
23 * /
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24 public class MoBankMIDlet extends MIDlet implements ↩
CommandListener , ItemCommandListener {
25
26 private boolean midletPaused = false ;
27 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
F i e l d s ”> / /GEN−BEGIN : ∣ f i e l d s ∣ 0 ∣
28 private Alert alert ;
29 private LoginScreen loginScreen ;
30 private WaitScreen ds_waitScrn ;
31 private WaitScreen http_waitScrn ;
32 private WaitScreen encrypt_waitScrn ;
33 private Form loginForm ;
34 private TextField textAccound ;
35 private TextField textPassword ;
36 private Form payForm ;
37 private TextField payAmount ;
38 private DateField dateFieldPayment ;
39 private ChoiceGroup groupPayto ;
40 private ChoiceGroup groupPayFrom ;
41 private Form bizForm ;
42 private ImageItem imageItem ;
43 private ImageItem imageItem1 ;
44 private ImageItem imageItem2 ;
45 private Form sucForm ;
46 private ImageItem imageItem_Success ;
47 private Command exitCommand ;
48 private Command cancelCommand ;
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49 private Command okCmdLogin ;
50 private Command okCmd_payForm ;
51 private Command backCmd_payForm ;
52 private Command okCmd_BizForm ;
53 private Command back_biz_Cmd ;
54 private Image image1 ;
55 private Image image2 ;
56 private Ticker ticker ;
57 private Font font ;
58 private Image image4 ;
59 private Image image5 ;
60 private Image image3 ;
61 private SimpleCancellableTask task ;
62 private SimpleCancellableTask task1 ;
63 private SimpleCancellableTask task2 ;
64 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END : ∣ f i e l d s ∣ 0 ∣
65 private String answer = " S , " ; / / t h e answer s u b m i t t e d
66 private String alert_notes ; / / t h e s t r i n g f o r a l e r t some ↩
e r r o r
67 private static final String CHANNEL1 = " WEB " ;
68 private static final String CHANNEL2 = " HANDHELD " ;
69 NetConnection nc = new NetConnection ( ) ;
70
71 / * *
72 * @return R e t u r n s t h e a l e r t n o t e s .
73 * /
74 public String getAlert_notes ( ) {
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75 return alert_notes ;
76 }
77
78 / * *
79 * @param a l e r t n o t e s The a l e r t n o t e s t o s e t .
80 * /
81 public void setAlert_notes ( String alert_notes ) {
82 this . alert_notes = alert_notes ;
83 }
84
85 / * *
86 * g e t t h e S t r i n g of t h e answer
87 * /
88 private String getAnswer ( String title , String subanswer ) {
89 answer = answer + title + " _ " + subanswer + " , " ;
90 System . out . println ( " answer : " + answer ) ;
91 return answer ;
92 }
93
94 / * *
95 * d e l a y some t ime
96 * /
97 private void TimeDelay ( ) {
98 for (int i = 0 ; i < 5000 ; i ++) {
99 System . out . println ( " I love this game " ) ;
100 }
101 }
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102
103 / * *
104 * HTTP SUBMIT
105 * /
106 private void httpSubmit ( ) {
107
108 httpSubmitThread hst = new httpSubmitThread ( ) ;
109 hst . start ( ) ;
110 }
111
112 / * *
113 * Thread i n c h a r g e o f h t t p su bmi t
114 * /
115 private class httpSubmitThread extends Thread {
116
117 public void run ( ) {
118 try {
119
120 / / h t t p c o n n e c t i n g t o s e r v e r wi th p o s t method
121 nc . postViaHttpConnection ( ) ;
122
123 } catch ( IOException e ) {
124 e . printStackTrace ( ) ;
125 }
126 }
127 }
128
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129 / * *
130 * The MoBankMIDlet c o n s t r u c t o r .
131 * /
132 public MoBankMIDlet ( ) {
133 }
134 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
Methods ”> / /GEN−BEGIN : ∣ methods ∣ 0 ∣
135 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END : ∣ methods ∣ 0 ∣
136
137 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
Method : i n i t i a l i z e ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣0− i n i t i a l i z e ∣0 ∣0− ↩
p r e I n i t i a l i z e
138 / * *
139 * I n i t i l i z e s t h e a p p l i c a t i o n .
140 * I t i s c a l l e d on ly once when t h e MIDlet i s s t a r t e d . The ↩
method i s c a l l e d b e f o r e t h e <code>s t a r t M I D l e t </ code> ↩
method .
141 * /
142 private void initialize ( ) { / / GEN−END: ∣0− i n i t i a l i z e ∣0 ∣0− ↩
p r e I n i t i a l i z e
143 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t i a l i z e u s e r code h e r e
144 / / GEN−LINE: ∣0− i n i t i a l i z e ∣1 ∣0− p o s t I n i t i a l i z e
145 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t i a l i z e u s e r code h e r e
146 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣0− i n i t i a l i z e ∣ 2 ∣
147 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣0− i n i t i a l i z e ∣ 2 ∣
148
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149 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
Method : s t a r t M I D l e t ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣3− s t a r t M I D l e t ∣0 ∣3− ↩
p r e A c t i o n
150 / * *
151 * P e r f o r m s an a c t i o n a s s i g n e d t o t h e Mobile Device − MIDlet ↩
S t a r t e d p o i n t .
152 * /
153 public void startMIDlet ( ) { / / GEN−END: ∣3− s t a r t M I D l e t ∣0 ∣3− ↩
p r e A c t i o n
154 / / w r i t e pre−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
155 switchDisplayable (null , getLoginScreen ( ) ) ; / / GEN−LINE: ∣3− ↩
s t a r t M I D l e t ∣1 ∣3− p o s t A c t i o n
156 / / w r i t e pos t−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
157 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣3− s t a r t M I D l e t ∣ 2 ∣
158 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣3− s t a r t M I D l e t ∣ 2 ∣
159
160 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
Method : resumeMIDlet ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣4− resumeMIDlet ∣0 ∣4− ↩
p r e A c t i o n
161 / * *
162 * P e r f o r m s an a c t i o n a s s i g n e d t o t h e Mobile Device − MIDlet ↩
Resumed p o i n t .
163 * /
164 public void resumeMIDlet ( ) { / / GEN−END: ∣4− resumeMIDlet ∣0 ∣4− ↩
p r e A c t i o n
165 / / w r i t e pre−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
166 / / GEN−LINE: ∣4− resumeMIDlet ∣1 ∣4− p o s t A c t i o n
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167 / / w r i t e pos t−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
168 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣4− resumeMIDlet ∣ 2 ∣
169 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣4− resumeMIDlet ∣ 2 ∣
170
171 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
Method : s w i t c h D i s p l a y a b l e ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣5− ↩
s w i t c h D i s p l a y a b l e ∣0 ∣5− p r e S w i t c h
172 / * *
173 * S w i t c h e s a c u r r e n t d i s p l a y a b l e i n a d i s p l a y . The <code> ↩
d i s p l a y </ code> i n s t a n c e i s t a k e n from <code>g e t D i s p l a y </ ↩
code> method . Th i s method i s used by a l l a c t i o n s i n t h e ↩
d e s i g n f o r s w i t c h i n g d i s p l a y a b l e .
174 * @param a l e r t t h e A l e r t which i s t e m p o r a r i l y s e t t o t h e ↩
d i s p l a y ; i f <code>n u l l </ code > , t h e n <code> ↩
n e x t D i s p l a y a b l e </ code> i s s e t i m m e d i a t e l y
175 * @param n e x t D i s p l a y a b l e t h e D i s p l a y a b l e t o be s e t
176 * /
177 public void switchDisplayable ( Alert alert , Displayable ↩
nextDisplayable ) { / / GEN−END: ∣5− s w i t c h D i s p l a y a b l e ∣0 ∣5− ↩
p r e S w i t c h
178 / / w r i t e pre−s w i t c h u s e r code h e r e
179
180 Display display = getDisplay ( ) ; / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣5− ↩
s w i t c h D i s p l a y a b l e ∣1 ∣5− p o s t S w i t c h
181 if ( alert == null ) {
182 display . setCurrent ( nextDisplayable ) ;
183 } else {
178
184 display . setCurrent ( alert , nextDisplayable ) ;
185 } / / GEN−END: ∣5− s w i t c h D i s p l a y a b l e ∣1 ∣5− p o s t S w i t c h
186 System . out . println ( " Display to : " + display . getCurrent ( ) .↩
getTitle ( ) ) ;
187 / / w r i t e pos t−s w i t c h u s e r code h e r e
188 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣5− s w i t c h D i s p l a y a b l e ∣ 2 ∣
189 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣5− s w i t c h D i s p l a y a b l e ∣ 2 ∣
190 / / w r i t e pre−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
191
192 / / w r i t e pre−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
193 / / w r i t e pre−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
194 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : t i c k e r ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣14− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣14− p r e I n i t
195 / * *
196 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f t i c k e r component .
197 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
198 * /
199 public Ticker getTicker ( ) {
200 if ( ticker == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣14− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣14− p r e I n i t
201 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
202 ticker = new Ticker ( " Welcome to MoBank " ) ; / / GEN−LINE ↩
: ∣14− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣14− p o s t I n i t
203 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
204 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣14− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
205 return ticker ;
206 }
207 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣14− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
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208 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : exitCommand ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣66− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣66− p r e I n i t
209 / * *
210 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f exitCommand component .
211 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
212 * /
213 public Command getExitCommand ( ) {
214 if ( exitCommand == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣66− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣66− ↩
p r e I n i t
215 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
216 exitCommand = new Command ( " Exit " , Command . EXIT , 0 ) ; ↩
/ / GEN−LINE: ∣66− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣66− p o s t I n i t
217 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
218 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣66− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
219 return exitCommand ;
220 }
221 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣66− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
222
223 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : log inForm ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣68− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣68− p r e I n i t
224 / * *
225 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f log inForm component .
226 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
227 * /
228 public Form getLoginForm ( ) {
229 if ( loginForm == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣68− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣68− ↩
p r e I n i t
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230 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
231 loginForm = new Form ( " Bank Login " , new Item [ ] { ↩
getTextAccound ( ) , getTextPassword ( ) } ) ; / / GEN− ↩
BEGIN: ∣68− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣68− p o s t I n i t
232 loginForm . setTicker ( getTicker ( ) ) ;
233 loginForm . addCommand ( getExitCommand ( ) ) ;
234 loginForm . addCommand ( getOkCmdLogin ( ) ) ;
235 loginForm . addCommand ( getCancelCommand ( ) ) ;
236 loginForm . setCommandListener (this ) ; / / GEN−END: ∣68− ↩
g e t t e r ∣1 ∣68− p o s t I n i t
237 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
238 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣68− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
239 return loginForm ;
240 }
241 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣68− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
242
243 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : t ex tAccound ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣69− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣69− p r e I n i t
244 / * *
245 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f t ex tAccound component .
246 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
247 * /
248 public TextField getTextAccound ( ) {
249 if ( textAccound == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣69− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣69− ↩
p r e I n i t
250 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
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251 textAccound = new TextField ( " MoBank Account ID " , ↩
null , 32 , TextField . ANY ) ; / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣69− g e t t e r ↩
∣1 ∣69− p o s t I n i t
252 textAccound . setLayout ( ImageItem . LAYOUT_CENTER ∣ Item ↩
. LAYOUT_TOP ∣ Item . LAYOUT_BOTTOM ∣ Item . ↩
LAYOUT_VCENTER ) ; / / GEN−END: ∣69− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣69− ↩
p o s t I n i t
253 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
254 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣69− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
255 return textAccound ;
256 }
257 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣69− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
258
259 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : t e x t P a s s w o r d ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣70− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣70− ↩
p r e I n i t
260 / * *
261 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f t e x t P a s s w o r d component ↩
.
262 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
263 * /
264 public TextField getTextPassword ( ) {
265 if ( textPassword == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣70− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣70− ↩
p r e I n i t
266 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
267 textPassword = new TextField ( " MoBank Password " , null ↩
, 32 , TextField . ANY ∣ TextField . PASSWORD ) ; / / GEN− ↩
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BEGIN: ∣70− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣70− p o s t I n i t
268 textPassword . setLayout ( ImageItem . LAYOUT_DEFAULT ) ; / /↩
GEN−END: ∣70− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣70− p o s t I n i t
269 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
270 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣70− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
271 return textPassword ;
272 }
273 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣70− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
274
275 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
Method : commandAction f o r D i s p l a y a b l e s ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣7− ↩
commandAction ∣0 ∣7− preCommandAction
276 / * *
277 * C a l l e d by a sys tem t o i n d i c a t e d t h a t a command has been ↩
i nvoked on a p a r t i c u l a r d i s p l a y a b l e .
278 * @param command t h e Command t h a t was invoked
279 * @param d i s p l a y a b l e t h e D i s p l a y a b l e where t h e command was ↩
i nvoked
280 * /
281 public void commandAction ( Command command , Displayable ↩
displayable ) { / / GEN−END: ∣7− commandAction ∣0 ∣7− ↩
preCommandAction
282 / / w r i t e pre−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
283 if ( displayable == ds_waitScrn ) { / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣7− ↩
commandAction ∣1 ∣161− p r e A c t i o n
284 if ( command == WaitScreen . FAILURE_COMMAND ) { / / GEN− ↩
END: ∣7− commandAction ∣1 ∣161− p r e A c t i o n
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285 / / w r i t e pre−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
286 switchDisplayable (null , getPayForm ( ) ) ; / / GEN−LINE↩
: ∣7− commandAction ∣2 ∣161− p o s t A c t i o n
287 / / w r i t e pos t−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
288 } else if ( command == WaitScreen . SUCCESS_COMMAND ) { ↩
/ / GEN−LINE: ∣7− commandAction ∣3 ∣160− p r e A c t i o n
289 / / w r i t e pre−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
290 switchDisplayable (null , getEncrypt_waitScrn ( ) ) ; ↩
/ / GEN−LINE: ∣7− commandAction ∣4 ∣160− p o s t A c t i o n
291 / / w r i t e pos t−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
292 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣7− commandAction ∣5 ∣165− p r e A c t i o n
293 } else if ( displayable == encrypt_waitScrn ) {
294 if ( command == WaitScreen . FAILURE_COMMAND ) { / / GEN− ↩
END: ∣7− commandAction ∣5 ∣165− p r e A c t i o n
295 / / w r i t e pre−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
296 switchDisplayable (null , getPayForm ( ) ) ; / / GEN−LINE ↩
: ∣7− commandAction ∣6 ∣165− p o s t A c t i o n
297 / / w r i t e pos t−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
298 } else if ( command == WaitScreen . SUCCESS_COMMAND ) { ↩
/ / GEN−LINE: ∣7− commandAction ∣7 ∣164− p r e A c t i o n
299 / / w r i t e pre−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
300 switchDisplayable (null , getHttp_waitScrn ( ) ) ; / / ↩
GEN−LINE: ∣7− commandAction ∣8 ∣164− p o s t A c t i o n
301 / / w r i t e pos t−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
302 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣7− commandAction ∣9 ∣150− p r e A c t i o n
303 } else if ( displayable == http_waitScrn ) {
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304 if ( command == WaitScreen . FAILURE_COMMAND ) { / / GEN−↩
END: ∣7− commandAction ∣9 ∣150− p r e A c t i o n
305 / / w r i t e pre−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
306 switchDisplayable (null , getPayForm ( ) ) ; / / GEN−LINE ↩
: ∣7− commandAction ∣10 ∣150− p o s t A c t i o n
307 / / w r i t e pos t−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
308 } else if ( command == WaitScreen . SUCCESS_COMMAND ) { ↩
/ / GEN−LINE: ∣7− commandAction ∣11 ∣149− p r e A c t i o n
309 / / w r i t e pre−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
310 switchDisplayable (null , getSucForm ( ) ) ; / / GEN−LINE ↩
: ∣7− commandAction ∣12 ∣149− p o s t A c t i o n
311 / / w r i t e pos t−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
312 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣7− commandAction ∣13 ∣77− p r e A c t i o n
313 } else if ( displayable == loginForm ) {
314 if ( command == cancelCommand ) { / / GEN−END: ∣7− ↩
commandAction ∣13 ∣77− p r e A c t i o n
315 / / w r i t e pre−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
316
317 / / GEN−LINE: ∣7− commandAction ∣14 ∣77− p o s t A c t i o n
318 / / w r i t e pos t−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
319 } else if ( command == exitCommand ) { / / GEN−LINE: ∣7− ↩
commandAction ∣15 ∣73− p r e A c t i o n
320 / / w r i t e pre−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
321 / / GEN−LINE: ∣7− commandAction ∣16 ∣73− p o s t A c t i o n
322 / / w r i t e pos t−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
323 } else if ( command == okCmdLogin ) { / / GEN−LINE: ∣7− ↩
commandAction ∣17 ∣75− p r e A c t i o n
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324 / / w r i t e pre−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
325 / / GEN−LINE: ∣7− commandAction ∣18 ∣75− p o s t A c t i o n
326 / / w r i t e pos t−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
327 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣7− commandAction ∣19 ∣135− p r e A c t i o n
328 } else if ( displayable == loginScreen ) {
329 if ( command == LoginScreen . LOGIN_COMMAND ) { / / GEN−END↩
: ∣7− commandAction ∣19 ∣135− p r e A c t i o n
330 / / w r i t e pre−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
331 switchDisplayable (null , getBizForm ( ) ) ; / / GEN−LINE ↩
: ∣7− commandAction ∣20 ∣135− p o s t A c t i o n
332 / / w r i t e pos t−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
333 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣7− commandAction ∣21 ∣84− p r e A c t i o n
334 } else if ( displayable == payForm ) {
335 if ( command == backCmd_payForm ) { / / GEN−END: ∣7− ↩
commandAction ∣21 ∣84− p r e A c t i o n
336 / / w r i t e pre−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
337 switchDisplayable (null , getBizForm ( ) ) ; / / GEN−LINE ↩
: ∣7− commandAction ∣22 ∣84− p o s t A c t i o n
338 / / w r i t e pos t−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
339 } else if ( command == okCmd_payForm ) { / / GEN−LINE: ∣7− ↩
commandAction ∣23 ∣86− p r e A c t i o n
340 / / w r i t e pre−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
341 switchDisplayable (null , getDs_waitScrn ( ) ) ; / / GEN− ↩
LINE: ∣7− commandAction ∣24 ∣86− p o s t A c t i o n
342 / / w r i t e pos t−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
343 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣7− commandAction ∣25 ∣117− p r e A c t i o n
344 } else if ( displayable == sucForm ) {
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345 if ( command == back_biz_Cmd ) { / / GEN−END: ∣7−↩
commandAction ∣25 ∣117− p r e A c t i o n
346 / / w r i t e pre−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
347 switchDisplayable (null , getBizForm ( ) ) ; / / GEN−LINE ↩
: ∣7− commandAction ∣26 ∣117− p o s t A c t i o n
348 / / w r i t e pos t−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
349 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣7− commandAction ∣27 ∣7− postCommandAction
350 } / / GEN−END: ∣7− commandAction ∣27 ∣7− postCommandAction
351 / / w r i t e pos t−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
352 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣7− commandAction ∣ 2 8 ∣
353 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣7− commandAction ∣ 2 8 ∣
354 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : okCmdLogin ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣74− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣74− p r e I n i t
355 / * *
356 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f okCmdLogin component .
357 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
358 * /
359 public Command getOkCmdLogin ( ) {
360 if ( okCmdLogin == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣74− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣74− ↩
p r e I n i t
361 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
362 okCmdLogin = new Command ( " Ok " , Command . OK , 0 ) ; / / GEN− ↩
LINE: ∣74− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣74− p o s t I n i t
363 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
364 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣74− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
365 return okCmdLogin ;
366 }
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367 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣74− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
368
369 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : cancelCommand ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣76− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣76− ↩
p r e I n i t
370 / * *
371 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f cancelCommand ↩
component .
372 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
373 * /
374 public Command getCancelCommand ( ) {
375 if ( cancelCommand == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣76− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣76− ↩
p r e I n i t
376 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
377 cancelCommand = new Command ( " Cancel " , Command . CANCEL ↩
, 0 ) ; / / GEN−LINE: ∣76− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣76− p o s t I n i t
378 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
379 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣76− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
380 return cancelCommand ;
381 }
382 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣76− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
383 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : payForm ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣82− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣82− p r e I n i t
384 / * *
385 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f payForm component .
386 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
387 * /
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388 public Form getPayForm ( ) {
389 if ( payForm == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣82− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣82− p r e I n i t
390 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
391 payForm = new Form ( " Money Transfer " , new Item [ ] { ↩
getGroupPayto ( ) , getGroupPayFrom ( ) , getPayAmount ↩
( ) , getDateFieldPayment ( ) } ) ; / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣82− ↩
g e t t e r ∣1 ∣82− p o s t I n i t
392 payForm . addCommand ( getBackCmd_payForm ( ) ) ;
393 payForm . addCommand ( getOkCmd_payForm ( ) ) ;
394 payForm . setCommandListener (this ) ; / / GEN−END: ∣82− ↩
g e t t e r ∣1 ∣82− p o s t I n i t
395 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
396 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣82− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
397 return payForm ;
398 }
399 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣82− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
400
401 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : g r o u p P a y t o ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣88− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣88− p r e I n i t
402 / * *
403 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f g r o u p P a y t o component .
404 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
405 * /
406 public ChoiceGroup getGroupPayto ( ) {
407 if ( groupPayto == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣88− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣88− ↩
p r e I n i t
408 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
189
409 groupPayto = new ChoiceGroup ( " Pay To " , Choice . POPUP )↩
; / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣88− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣88− p o s t I n i t
410 groupPayto . append ( " VISA123456789 " , null ) ;
411 groupPayto . append ( " PHONEBILL123 " , null ) ;
412 groupPayto . setSelectedFlags (new boolean [ ] { false , ↩
false } ) ;
413 groupPayto . setFont ( 0 , getFont ( ) ) ;
414 groupPayto . setFont ( 1 , getFont ( ) ) ; / / GEN−END: ∣88− ↩
g e t t e r ∣1 ∣88− p o s t I n i t
415 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
416 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣88− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
417 return groupPayto ;
418 }
419 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣88− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
420
421 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : groupPayFrom ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣91− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣91− ↩
p r e I n i t
422 / * *
423 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f groupPayFrom component ↩
.
424 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
425 * /
426 public ChoiceGroup getGroupPayFrom ( ) {
427 if ( groupPayFrom == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣91− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣91− ↩
p r e I n i t
428 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
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429 groupPayFrom = new ChoiceGroup ( " Pay From " , Choice .↩
EXCLUSIVE ) ; / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣91− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣91− p o s t I n i t
430 groupPayFrom . append ( " Account2831 " , null ) ;
431 groupPayFrom . setSelectedFlags (new boolean [ ] { false ↩
} ) ;
432 groupPayFrom . setFont ( 0 , getFont ( ) ) ; / / GEN−END: ∣91− ↩
g e t t e r ∣1 ∣91− p o s t I n i t
433 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
434 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣91− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
435 return groupPayFrom ;
436 }
437 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣91− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
438
439 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : d a t e F i e l d P a y m e n t ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣93− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣93− ↩
p r e I n i t
440 / * *
441 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f d a t e F i e l d P a y m e n t ↩
component .
442 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
443 * /
444 public DateField getDateFieldPayment ( ) {
445 if ( dateFieldPayment == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣93− g e t t e r ↩
∣0 ∣93− p r e I n i t
446 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
447 dateFieldPayment = new DateField ( " Payment Date " , ↩
DateField . DATE , java . util . TimeZone . getTimeZone ( " ↩
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America / Edmonton " ) ) ; / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣93− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣93−↩
p o s t I n i t
448 dateFieldPayment . setDate (new java . util . Date ( System . ↩
currentTimeMillis ( ) ) ) ; / / GEN−END: ∣93− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣93− ↩
p o s t I n i t
449 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
450 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣93− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
451 return dateFieldPayment ;
452 }
453 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣93− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
454
455 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : backCmd payForm ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣83− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣83− ↩
p r e I n i t
456 / * *
457 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f backCmd payForm ↩
component .
458 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
459 * /
460 public Command getBackCmd_payForm ( ) {
461 if ( backCmd_payForm == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣83− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣83− ↩
p r e I n i t
462 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
463 backCmd_payForm = new Command ( " Exit " , Command . BACK , ↩
0) ; / / GEN−LINE: ∣83− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣83− p o s t I n i t
464 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
465 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣83− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
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466 return backCmd_payForm ;
467 }
468 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣83− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
469
470 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : okCmd payForm ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣85− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣85− ↩
p r e I n i t
471 / * *
472 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f okCmd payForm ↩
component .
473 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
474 * /
475 public Command getOkCmd_payForm ( ) {
476 if ( okCmd_payForm == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣85− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣85− ↩
p r e I n i t
477 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
478 okCmd_payForm = new Command ( " Ok " , Command . OK , 0 ) ; / / ↩
GEN−LINE: ∣85− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣85− p o s t I n i t
479 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
480 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣85− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
481 return okCmd_payForm ;
482 }
483 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣85− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
484
485 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : bizForm ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣94− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣94− p r e I n i t
486 / * *
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487 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f bizForm component .
488 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
489 * /
490 public Form getBizForm ( ) {
491 if ( bizForm == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣94− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣94− p r e I n i t
492 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
493 bizForm = new Form ( " Business List " , new Item [ ] { ↩
getImageItem ( ) , getImageItem1 ( ) , getImageItem2 ( ) ↩
} ) ; / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣94− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣94− p o s t I n i t
494 bizForm . setCommandListener (this ) ; / / GEN−END: ∣94− ↩
g e t t e r ∣1 ∣94− p o s t I n i t
495 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
496 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣94− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
497 return bizForm ;
498 }
499 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣94− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
500 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : okCmd BizForm ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣101− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣101− ↩
p r e I n i t
501 / * *
502 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f okCmd BizForm ↩
component .
503 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
504 * /
505 public Command getOkCmd_BizForm ( ) {
506 if ( okCmd_BizForm == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣101− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣101− ↩
p r e I n i t
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507 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
508 okCmd_BizForm = new Command ( " Ok " , Command . OK , 0 ) ; / /↩
GEN−LINE: ∣101− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣101− p o s t I n i t
509 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
510 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣101− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
511 return okCmd_BizForm ;
512 }
513 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣101− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
514
515 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : sucForm ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣104− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣104− p r e I n i t
516 / * *
517 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f sucForm component .
518 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
519 * /
520 public Form getSucForm ( ) {
521 if ( sucForm == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣104− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣104− ↩
p r e I n i t
522 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
523 sucForm = new Form ( " Transaction Success " , new Item [ ] ↩
{ getImageItem_Success ( ) } ) ; / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣104− ↩
g e t t e r ∣1 ∣104− p o s t I n i t
524 sucForm . addCommand ( getBack_biz_Cmd ( ) ) ;
525 sucForm . setCommandListener (this ) ; / / GEN−END: ∣104− ↩
g e t t e r ∣1 ∣104− p o s t I n i t
526 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
527 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣104− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
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528 return sucForm ;
529 }
530 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣104− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
531 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : back biz Cmd ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣116− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣116− ↩
p r e I n i t
532 / * *
533 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f back biz Cmd component ↩
.
534 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
535 * /
536 public Command getBack_biz_Cmd ( ) {
537 if ( back_biz_Cmd == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣116− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣116− ↩
p r e I n i t
538 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
539 back_biz_Cmd = new Command ( " Back " , Command . BACK , 0 ) ; ↩
/ / GEN−LINE: ∣116− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣116− p o s t I n i t
540 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
541 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣116− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
542 return back_biz_Cmd ;
543 }
544 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣116− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
545 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : a l e r t ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣131− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣131− p r e I n i t
546 / * *
547 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f a l e r t component .
548 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
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549 * /
550 public Alert getAlert ( ) {
551 if ( alert == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣131− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣131− p r e I n i t
552 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
553 alert = new Alert ( " alert " , " The Transaction is ↩
failed ! Please consult with your admin ! " , ↩
getImage4 ( ) , null ) ; / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣131− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣131− ↩
p o s t I n i t
554 alert . setTimeout ( Alert . FOREVER ) ; / / GEN−END: ∣131− ↩
g e t t e r ∣1 ∣131− p o s t I n i t
555 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
556 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣131− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
557 return alert ;
558 }
559 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣131− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
560
561 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : l o g i n S c r e e n ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣133− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣133− ↩
p r e I n i t
562 / * *
563 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f l o g i n S c r e e n component .
564 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
565 * /
566 public LoginScreen getLoginScreen ( ) {
567 if ( loginScreen == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣133− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣133− ↩
p r e I n i t
568 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
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569 loginScreen = new LoginScreen ( getDisplay ( ) ) ; / / GEN−↩
BEGIN: ∣133− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣133− p o s t I n i t
570 loginScreen . setLabelTexts ( " MoBank ID " , " Password " ) ;
571 loginScreen . setTitle ( " Login MoBank " ) ;
572 loginScreen . setTicker ( getTicker ( ) ) ;
573 loginScreen . addCommand ( LoginScreen . LOGIN_COMMAND ) ;
574 loginScreen . setCommandListener (this ) ;
575 loginScreen . setBGColor (−3355444) ;
576 loginScreen . setFGColor ( 0 ) ;
577 loginScreen . setUseLoginButton (true ) ;
578 loginScreen . setLoginButtonText ( " Login " ) ; / / GEN−END ↩
: ∣133− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣133− p o s t I n i t
579 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
580 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣133− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
581 return loginScreen ;
582 }
583 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣133− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
584 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : imageI tem ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣138− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣138− p r e I n i t
585 / * *
586 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f imageI tem component .
587 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
588 * /
589 public ImageItem getImageItem ( ) {
590 if ( imageItem == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣138− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣138− ↩
p r e I n i t
591 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
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592 imageItem = new ImageItem ( " Statement " , getImage1 ( ) , ↩
ImageItem . LAYOUT_DEFAULT , " Balance Statement " ) ; / / ↩
GEN−LINE: ∣138− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣138− p o s t I n i t
593 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
594 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣138− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
595 return imageItem ;
596 }
597 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣138− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
598
599 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : image1 ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣139− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣139− p r e I n i t
600 / * *
601 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f image1 component .
602 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
603 * /
604 public Image getImage1 ( ) {
605 if ( image1 == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣139− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣139− p r e I n i t
606 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
607 try { / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣139− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣139−@java . i o . ↩
IOExcep t ion
608 image1 = Image . createImage ( " / bs . png " ) ;
609 } catch ( java . io . IOException e ) { / / GEN−END: ∣139− ↩
g e t t e r ∣1 ∣139−@java . i o . IOExcep t ion
610 e . printStackTrace ( ) ;
611 } / / GEN−LINE: ∣139− g e t t e r ∣2 ∣139− p o s t I n i t
612 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
613 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣139− g e t t e r ∣ 3 ∣
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614 return image1 ;
615 }
616 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣139− g e t t e r ∣ 3 ∣
617
618 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : imageI tem1 ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣141− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣141− ↩
p r e I n i t
619 / * *
620 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f imageI tem1 component .
621 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
622 * /
623 public ImageItem getImageItem1 ( ) {
624 if ( imageItem1 == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣141− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣141− ↩
p r e I n i t
625 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
626 imageItem1 = new ImageItem ( " Transfer " , getImage2 ( ) , ↩
ImageItem . LAYOUT_DEFAULT , " Money Transfer " , Item . ↩
PLAIN ) ; / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣141− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣141− p o s t I n i t
627 imageItem1 . addCommand ( getOkCmd_BizForm ( ) ) ;
628 imageItem1 . setItemCommandListener (this ) ;
629 imageItem1 . setDefaultCommand ( getOkCmd_BizForm ( ) ) ; / / ↩
GEN−END: ∣141− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣141− p o s t I n i t
630 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
631 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣141− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
632 return imageItem1 ;
633 }
634 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣141− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
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635
636 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : imageI tem2 ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣143− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣143− ↩
p r e I n i t
637 / * *
638 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f imageI tem2 component .
639 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
640 * /
641 public ImageItem getImageItem2 ( ) {
642 if ( imageItem2 == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣143− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣143− ↩
p r e I n i t
643 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
644 imageItem2 = new ImageItem ( " Payment " , getImage3 ( ) , ↩
ImageItem . LAYOUT_DEFAULT , " < Missing Image > " ) ; / / ↩
GEN−LINE: ∣143− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣143− p o s t I n i t
645 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
646 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣143− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
647 return imageItem2 ;
648 }
649 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣143− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
650
651 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : image2 ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣142− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣142− p r e I n i t
652 / * *
653 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f image2 component .
654 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
655 * /
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656 public Image getImage2 ( ) {
657 if ( image2 == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣142− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣142− p r e I n i t
658 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
659 try { / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣142− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣142−@java . i o .↩
IOExcep t ion
660 image2 = Image . createImage ( " / mt . png " ) ;
661 } catch ( java . io . IOException e ) { / / GEN−END: ∣142− ↩
g e t t e r ∣1 ∣142−@java . i o . IOExcep t ion
662 e . printStackTrace ( ) ;
663 } / / GEN−LINE: ∣142− g e t t e r ∣2 ∣142− p o s t I n i t
664 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
665 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣142− g e t t e r ∣ 3 ∣
666 return image2 ;
667 }
668 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣142− g e t t e r ∣ 3 ∣
669
670 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : image3 ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣144− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣144− p r e I n i t
671 / * *
672 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f image3 component .
673 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
674 * /
675 public Image getImage3 ( ) {
676 if ( image3 == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣144− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣144− p r e I n i t
677 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
678 try { / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣144− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣144−@java . i o . ↩
IOExcep t ion
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679 image3 = Image . createImage ( " / pm . png " ) ;
680 } catch ( java . io . IOException e ) { / / GEN−END: ∣144−↩
g e t t e r ∣1 ∣144−@java . i o . IOExcep t ion
681 e . printStackTrace ( ) ;
682 } / / GEN−LINE: ∣144− g e t t e r ∣2 ∣144− p o s t I n i t
683 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
684 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣144− g e t t e r ∣ 3 ∣
685 return image3 ;
686 }
687 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣144− g e t t e r ∣ 3 ∣
688
689 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
Method : commandAction f o r I t e m s ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣8− ↩
i temCommandAction ∣0 ∣8− preItemCommandAction
690 / * *
691 * C a l l e d by a sys tem t o i n d i c a t e d t h a t a command has been ↩
i nvoked on a p a r t i c u l a r i t em .
692 * @param command t h e Command t h a t was invoked
693 * @param d i s p l a y a b l e t h e I tem where t h e command was invoked
694 * /
695 public void commandAction ( Command command , Item item ) { / / GEN ↩
−END: ∣8− i temCommandAction ∣0 ∣8− preItemCommandAction
696 / / w r i t e pre−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
697 if ( item == imageItem1 ) { / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣8− ↩
i temCommandAction ∣1 ∣146− p r e A c t i o n
698 if ( command == okCmd_BizForm ) { / / GEN−END: ∣8− ↩
i temCommandAction ∣1 ∣146− p r e A c t i o n
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699 / / w r i t e pre−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
700 switchDisplayable (null , getPayForm ( ) ) ; / / GEN−LINE↩
: ∣8− i temCommandAction ∣2 ∣146− p o s t A c t i o n
701 / / w r i t e pos t−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
702 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣8− i temCommandAction ∣3 ∣8− ↩
postI temCommandAction
703 } / / GEN−END: ∣8− i temCommandAction ∣3 ∣8− ↩
postI temCommandAction
704 / / w r i t e pos t−a c t i o n u s e r code h e r e
705 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣8− i temCommandAction ∣ 4 ∣
706 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣8− i temCommandAction ∣ 4 ∣
707
708 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : h t t p w a i t S c r n ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣148− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣148− ↩
p r e I n i t
709 / * *
710 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f h t t p w a i t S c r n ↩
component .
711 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
712 * /
713 public WaitScreen getHttp_waitScrn ( ) {
714 if ( http_waitScrn == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣148− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣148− ↩
p r e I n i t
715 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
716 http_waitScrn = new WaitScreen ( getDisplay ( ) ) ; / / GEN− ↩
BEGIN: ∣148− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣148− p o s t I n i t
717 http_waitScrn . setTitle ( " Processing " ) ;
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718 http_waitScrn . setCommandListener (this ) ;
719 http_waitScrn . setFullScreenMode (true ) ;
720 http_waitScrn . setImage ( getImage4 ( ) ) ;
721 http_waitScrn . setText ( " Transaction processing ... ↩
... " ) ;
722 http_waitScrn . setTextFont ( getFont ( ) ) ;
723 http_waitScrn . setTask ( getTask ( ) ) ; / / GEN−END: ∣148− ↩
g e t t e r ∣1 ∣148− p o s t I n i t
724 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
725 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣148− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
726 return http_waitScrn ;
727 }
728 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣148− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
729
730 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : t a s k ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣151− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣151− p r e I n i t
731 / * *
732 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f t a s k component .
733 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
734 * /
735 public SimpleCancellableTask getTask ( ) {
736 if ( task == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣151− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣151− p r e I n i t
737 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
738 task = new SimpleCancellableTask ( ) ; / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣151− ↩
g e t t e r ∣1 ∣151− e x e c u t e
739 task . setExecutable (new org . netbeans . microedition . ↩
util . Executable ( ) {
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740 public void execute ( ) throws Exception { / / GEN−↩
END: ∣151− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣151− e x e c u t e
741 / / w r i t e t a s k−e x e c u t i o n u s e r code h e r e
742
743 TimeDelay ( ) ;
744
745 / / h t t p S u b m i t ( ) ;
746
747 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣151− g e t t e r ∣2 ∣151− p o s t I n i t
748 } ) ; / / GEN−END: ∣151− g e t t e r ∣2 ∣151− p o s t I n i t
749 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
750 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣151− g e t t e r ∣ 3 ∣
751 return task ;
752 }
753 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣151− g e t t e r ∣ 3 ∣
754
755 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : f o n t ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣155− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣155− p r e I n i t
756 / * *
757 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f f o n t component .
758 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
759 * /
760 public Font getFont ( ) {
761 if ( font == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣155− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣155− p r e I n i t
762 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
763 font = Font . getFont ( Font . FACE_SYSTEM , Font . ↩
STYLE_BOLD ∣ Font . STYLE_ITALIC , Font . SIZE_LARGE ) ; ↩
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/ / GEN−LINE: ∣155− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣155− p o s t I n i t
764 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
765 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣155− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
766 return font ;
767 }
768 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣155− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
769
770 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : image4 ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣156− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣156− p r e I n i t
771 / * *
772 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f image4 component .
773 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
774 * /
775 public Image getImage4 ( ) {
776 if ( image4 == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣156− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣156− p r e I n i t
777 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
778 try { / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣156− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣156−@java . i o . ↩
IOExcep t ion
779 image4 = Image . createImage ( " / processing . png " ) ;
780 } catch ( java . io . IOException e ) { / / GEN−END: ∣156− ↩
g e t t e r ∣1 ∣156−@java . i o . IOExcep t ion
781 e . printStackTrace ( ) ;
782 } / / GEN−LINE: ∣156− g e t t e r ∣2 ∣156− p o s t I n i t
783 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
784 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣156− g e t t e r ∣ 3 ∣
785 return image4 ;
786 }
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787 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣156− g e t t e r ∣ 3 ∣
788 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : i m a g e I t e m S u c c e s s ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣157− g e t t e r ↩
∣0 ∣157− p r e I n i t
789 / * *
790 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f i m a g e I t e m S u c c e s s ↩
component .
791 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
792 * /
793 public ImageItem getImageItem_Success ( ) {
794 if ( imageItem_Success == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣157− g e t t e r ↩
∣0 ∣157− p r e I n i t
795 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
796 imageItem_Success = new ImageItem ( " Congratulations ! ↩
Transaction is succeeded ! " , getImage5 ( ) , ↩
ImageItem . LAYOUT_CENTER ∣ Item . LAYOUT_BOTTOM ∣ ↩
Item . LAYOUT_VCENTER ∣ Item . LAYOUT_SHRINK ∣ Item . ↩
LAYOUT_VSHRINK ∣ Item . LAYOUT_EXPAND ∣ Item . ↩
LAYOUT_VEXPAND , " Transaction is succeed ! " , Item . ↩
PLAIN ) ; / / GEN−LINE: ∣157− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣157− p o s t I n i t
797 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
798 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣157− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
799 return imageItem_Success ;
800 }
801 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣157− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
802
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803 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : image5 ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣158− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣158− p r e I n i t
804 / * *
805 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f image5 component .
806 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
807 * /
808 public Image getImage5 ( ) {
809 if ( image5 == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣158− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣158− p r e I n i t
810 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
811 try { / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣158− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣158−@java . i o . ↩
IOExcep t ion
812 image5 = Image . createImage ( " / success . png " ) ;
813 } catch ( java . io . IOException e ) { / / GEN−END: ∣158− ↩
g e t t e r ∣1 ∣158−@java . i o . IOExcep t ion
814 e . printStackTrace ( ) ;
815 } / / GEN−LINE: ∣158− g e t t e r ∣2 ∣158− p o s t I n i t
816 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
817 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣158− g e t t e r ∣ 3 ∣
818 return image5 ;
819 }
820 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣158− g e t t e r ∣ 3 ∣
821
822 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : d s w a i t S c r n ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣159− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣159− ↩
p r e I n i t
823 / * *
824 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f d s w a i t S c r n component .
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825 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
826 * /
827 public WaitScreen getDs_waitScrn ( ) {
828 if ( ds_waitScrn == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣159− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣159−↩
p r e I n i t
829 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
830 ds_waitScrn = new WaitScreen ( getDisplay ( ) ) ; / / GEN− ↩
BEGIN: ∣159− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣159− p o s t I n i t
831 ds_waitScrn . setTitle ( " Signing Digital Signature " ) ;
832 ds_waitScrn . setCommandListener (this ) ;
833 ds_waitScrn . setFullScreenMode (true ) ;
834 ds_waitScrn . setImage ( getImage4 ( ) ) ;
835 ds_waitScrn . setText ( " Signing Digital Signature ... ↩
... " ) ;
836 ds_waitScrn . setTextFont ( getFont ( ) ) ;
837 ds_waitScrn . setTask ( getTask1 ( ) ) ; / / GEN−END: ∣159− ↩
g e t t e r ∣1 ∣159− p o s t I n i t
838 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
839 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣159− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
840 return ds_waitScrn ;
841 }
842 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣159− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
843
844 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : t a s k 1 ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣162− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣162− p r e I n i t
845 / * *
846 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f t a s k 1 component .
210
847 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
848 * /
849 public SimpleCancellableTask getTask1 ( ) {
850 if ( task1 == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣162− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣162− p r e I n i t
851 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
852 task1 = new SimpleCancellableTask ( ) ; / / GEN−BEGIN↩
: ∣162− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣162− e x e c u t e
853 task1 . setExecutable (new org . netbeans . microedition . ↩
util . Executable ( ) {
854 public void execute ( ) throws Exception { / / GEN− ↩
END: ∣162− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣162− e x e c u t e
855 / / w r i t e t a s k−e x e c u t i o n u s e r code h e r e
856
857 TimeDelay ( ) ;
858 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣162− g e t t e r ∣2 ∣162− p o s t I n i t
859 } ) ; / / GEN−END: ∣162− g e t t e r ∣2 ∣162− p o s t I n i t
860 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
861 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣162− g e t t e r ∣ 3 ∣
862 return task1 ;
863 }
864 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣162− g e t t e r ∣ 3 ∣
865
866 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : e n c r y p t w a i t S c r n ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣163− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣163− ↩
p r e I n i t
867 / * *
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868 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f e n c r y p t w a i t S c r n ↩
component .
869 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
870 * /
871 public WaitScreen getEncrypt_waitScrn ( ) {
872 if ( encrypt_waitScrn == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣163− g e t t e r ↩
∣0 ∣163− p r e I n i t
873 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
874 encrypt_waitScrn = new WaitScreen ( getDisplay ( ) ) ; / / ↩
GEN−BEGIN: ∣163− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣163− p o s t I n i t
875 encrypt_waitScrn . setTitle ( " Encrypting Data " ) ;
876 encrypt_waitScrn . setCommandListener (this ) ;
877 encrypt_waitScrn . setFullScreenMode (true ) ;
878 encrypt_waitScrn . setImage ( getImage4 ( ) ) ;
879 encrypt_waitScrn . setText ( " Encrypting ... ... " ) ;
880 encrypt_waitScrn . setTextFont ( getFont ( ) ) ;
881 encrypt_waitScrn . setTask ( getTask2 ( ) ) ; / / GEN−END: ∣163− ↩
g e t t e r ∣1 ∣163− p o s t I n i t
882 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
883 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣163− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
884 return encrypt_waitScrn ;
885 }
886 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣163− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
887
888 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : t a s k 2 ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣166− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣166− p r e I n i t
889 / * *
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890 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f t a s k 2 component .
891 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
892 * /
893 public SimpleCancellableTask getTask2 ( ) {
894 if ( task2 == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣166− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣166− p r e I n i t
895 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
896 task2 = new SimpleCancellableTask ( ) ; / / GEN−BEGIN↩
: ∣166− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣166− e x e c u t e
897 task2 . setExecutable (new org . netbeans . microedition . ↩
util . Executable ( ) {
898 public void execute ( ) throws Exception { / / GEN− ↩
END: ∣166− g e t t e r ∣1 ∣166− e x e c u t e
899 / / w r i t e t a s k−e x e c u t i o n u s e r code h e r e
900
901 TimeDelay ( ) ;
902 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣166− g e t t e r ∣2 ∣166− p o s t I n i t
903 } ) ; / / GEN−END: ∣166− g e t t e r ∣2 ∣166− p o s t I n i t
904 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
905 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣166− g e t t e r ∣ 3 ∣
906 return task2 ;
907 }
908 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣166− g e t t e r ∣ 3 ∣
909
910 / /<e d i t o r−f o l d d e f a u l t s t a t e =” c o l l a p s e d ” desc =” G e n e r a t e d ↩
G e t t e r : payAmount ”> / /GEN−BEGIN: ∣172− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣172− p r e I n i t
911 / * *
912 * R e t u r n s an i n i t i l i a z e d i n s t a n c e o f payAmount component .
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913 * @return t h e i n i t i a l i z e d component i n s t a n c e
914 * /
915 public TextField getPayAmount ( ) {
916 if ( payAmount == null ) { / / GEN−END: ∣172− g e t t e r ∣0 ∣172−↩
p r e I n i t
917 / / w r i t e pre− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
918 payAmount = new TextField ( " Pay Amount ( USD ) " , null , ↩
32 , TextField . DECIMAL ) ; / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣172− g e t t e r ↩
∣1 ∣172− p o s t I n i t
919 payAmount . setPreferredSize (−1 , −1) ; / / GEN−END: ∣172− ↩
g e t t e r ∣1 ∣172− p o s t I n i t
920 / / w r i t e pos t− i n i t u s e r code h e r e
921 } / / GEN−BEGIN: ∣172− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
922 return payAmount ;
923 }
924 / / </ e d i t o r−f o l d > / /GEN−END: ∣172− g e t t e r ∣ 2 ∣
925 / * *
926 * R e t u r n s a d i s p l a y i n s t a n c e .
927 * @return t h e d i s p l a y i n s t a n c e .
928 * /
929 public Display getDisplay ( ) {
930 return Display . getDisplay (this ) ;
931 }
932
933 / * *
934 * E x i t s MIDlet .
935 * /
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936 public void exitMIDlet ( ) {
937 switchDisplayable (null , null ) ;
938 destroyApp (true ) ;
939 notifyDestroyed ( ) ;
940 }
941
942 / * *
943 * C a l l e d when MIDlet i s s t a r t e d .
944 * Checks whe the r t h e MIDlet have been a l r e a d y s t a r t e d and ↩
i n i t i a l i z e / s t a r t s o r resumes t h e MIDlet .
945 * /
946 public void startApp ( ) {
947 if ( midletPaused ) {
948 resumeMIDlet ( ) ;
949 } else {
950 initialize ( ) ;
951 startMIDlet ( ) ;
952 }
953 midletPaused = false ;
954 }
955
956 / * *
957 * C a l l e d when MIDlet i s paused .
958 * /
959 public void pauseApp ( ) {
960 midletPaused = true ;
961 }
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962
963 / * *
964 * C a l l e d t o s i g n a l t h e MIDlet t o t e r m i n a t e .
965 * @param u n c o n d i t i o n a l i f t r u e , t h e n t h e MIDlet has t o be ↩
u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y t e r m i n a t e d and a l l r e s o u r c e s has t o be ↩
r e l e a s e d .
966 * /
967 public void destroyApp (boolean unconditional ) {
968 }
969 }
216
NetConnection.java
1 / *
2 * To change t h i s t e m p l a t e , choose Too l s ∣ Templa t e s
3 * and open t h e t e m p l a t e i n t h e e d i t o r .
4 * /
5
6 package com . uleth . mobank . connection ;
7
8 import java . io . DataInputStream ;
9 import java . io . DataOutputStream ;
10 import java . io . IOException ;
11 import javax . microedition . io . Connector ;
12 import javax . microedition . io . HttpConnection ;
13
14 / * *
15 *
16 * @author zhuyp
17 * /
18 public class NetConnection {
19
20 private String answer = " S , " ; / / t h e answer s u b m i t t e d
21
22
23 private static final String URL = " http :// localhost :8080/ ↩
MobileBankServer / PortalDataServlet ? " ;
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24
25 / * *
26 * HTTP CONNECTION TO SERVER
27 * /
28 public void postViaHttpConnection ( ) throws IOException {
29 HttpConnection http = null ;
30 DataOutputStream dos = null ;
31 DataInputStream dis = null ;
32 int rc ;
33
34 String url = URL ;
35 String rawData = " answer = " + answer ;
36 url = url + rawData ;
37 System . out . println ( " url : " + url ) ;
38
39 try {
40 http = ( HttpConnection ) Connector . open ( url ) ;
41
42 / / S e t t h e r e q u e s t method and h e a d e r s
43 http . setRequestMethod ( HttpConnection . POST ) ;
44 http . setRequestProperty ( " User - Agent " , " Profile / MIDP ↩
-2.0 Configuration / CLDC -1.1 " ) ;
45 http . setRequestProperty ( " Content - Language " , " UTF -8 " ) ↩
;
46 http . setRequestProperty ( " Content - Length " , String . ↩
valueOf ( rawData . length ( ) ) ) ;
47
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48 / / G e t t i n g t h e o u t p u t s t r e a m may f l u s h t h e h e a d e r s
49 dos = http . openDataOutputStream ( ) ;
50 dos . write ( rawData . getBytes ( ) ) ;
51
52 / / G e t t i n g t h e r e s p o n s e code w i l l open t h e ↩
c o n n e c t i o n ,
53 / / send t h e r e q u e s t , and r e a d t h e HTTP r e s p o n s e ↩
h e a d e r s .
54 / / The h e a d e r s a r e s t o r e d u n t i l r e q u e s t e d .
55 rc = http . getResponseCode ( ) ;
56 if ( rc != HttpConnection . HTTP_OK ) {
57 throw new IOException ( " HTTP response code : " + ↩
rc ) ;
58 } else {
59
60 System . out . println ( " dis before " ) ;
61
62 dis = http . openDataInputStream ( ) ;
63 String resNotes = dis . readUTF ( ) ;
64 System . out . println ( " dis " ) ;
65 / / t h i s . ge tSucces sForm ( ) . d e l e t e A l l ( ) ;
66 System . out . println ( " deleteAll " ) ;
67 System . out . println ( " resNotes : " + resNotes ) ;
68 / / t h i s . ge tSucces sForm ( ) . append ( r e s N o t e s ) ;
69
70 System . out . println ( " HTTP DONE " ) ;
71 }
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72 } catch ( ClassCastException e ) {
73 throw new IllegalArgumentException ( " Not an HTTP URL "↩
) ;
74 } finally {
75 if ( dis != null ) {
76 dis . close ( ) ;
77 }
78 if ( dos != null ) {
79 dos . close ( ) ;
80 }
81 if ( http != null ) {
82 http . close ( ) ;
83 }
84 }
85 }
86
87
88 }
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Part of Security API Code
ECDSAPrime192Signature
package org.yunpu.crypto.ecdsa;
/**
*
* @author zhuyp
* ECDSA Digital Signature over Prime curve with 192-bit key size
*/
public class ECDSAPrime192Signature
1 / *
2 * ECDSA D i g i t a l S i g n a t u r e ove r Prime c u r v e wi th 192− b i t key ↩
s i z e
3 *
4 * /
5 package org . yunpu . crypto . ecdsa ;
6
7 import java . io . IOException ;
8 import java . io . InputStream ;
9 import java . math . BigInteger ;
10 import java . security . SecureRandom ;
11
12 import org . bouncycastle . asn1 . x9 . X962NamedCurves ;
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13 import org . bouncycastle . asn1 . x9 . X9ECParameters ;
14 import org . bouncycastle . crypto . AsymmetricCipherKeyPair ;
15 import org . bouncycastle . crypto . digests . SHA1Digest ;
16 import org . bouncycastle . crypto . generators . ECKeyPairGenerator ;
17 import org . bouncycastle . crypto . params . ECDomainParameters ;
18 import org . bouncycastle . crypto . params . ECKeyGenerationParameters ;
19 import org . bouncycastle . crypto . params . ECPrivateKeyParameters ;
20 import org . bouncycastle . crypto . params . ECPublicKeyParameters ;
21 import org . bouncycastle . crypto . params . ParametersWithRandom ;
22 import org . bouncycastle . crypto . signers . ECDSASigner ;
23 import org . yunpu . crypto . util . InputUtils ;
24
25 / * *
26 *
27 * @author zhuyp
28 * ECDSA D i g i t a l S i g n a t u r e ove r Prime c u r v e wi th 192− b i t key ↩
s i z e
29 * /
30 public class ECDSAPrime192Signature {
31
32 private ECDomainParameters params ;
33 private ECPrivateKeyParameters privateKey ;
34 private ECPublicKeyParameters publicKey ;
35 private SecureRandom random = new SecureRandom ( ) ;
36 private ParametersWithRandom privateKeyWithRandom ;
37 private byte [ ] plainText ;
38 private BigInteger r ;
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39 private BigInteger s ;
40 private ECDSASigner signer = new ECDSASigner ( ) ;
41 private SHA1Digest digest = new SHA1Digest ( ) ;
42
43 public ECDSAPrime192Signature ( ) {
44
45 }
46
47 / * *
48 *
49 * G e n e r a t e ECDSA key p a i r a s a f i l e and s t o r e i t a t ↩
K e y D e p o s i t L o c a t i o n
50 * @param K e y D e p o s i t L o c a t i o n
51 * /
52 private void ECDSAPrime192GenerateKey ( String ↩
KeyDepositLocation ) {
53
54 }
55
56 / * *
57 *
58 * @param s t r P l a i n T e x t
59 * @return a d i g i t a l s i g n a t u r e
60 * @throws j a v a . l a n g . E x c e p t i o n
61 * /
62 private BigInteger [ ] ECDSAPrime192Sign ( String strPlain_Text ) ↩
throws Exception {
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63
64
65 }
66
67
68
69 / * *
70 *
71 * @param s t r P l a i n T e x t
72 * @return b o o l e a n v e r i f y i n g t h e d i g i t a l s i g n a t u r e i s l e g a l ↩
or n o t
73 * @throws j a v a . l a n g . E x c e p t i o n
74 * /
75 private boolean ECDSAPrime192Verify ( String strPlain_Text ) ↩
throws Exception {
76
77 }
78
79 / * *
80 * T r a n s f e r d a t a i n f o r m a t i o n t o a S t r i n g based p l a i n t e x t
81 * @return S t r i n g based p l a i n t e x t
82 * /
83 public String get_PLAIN_TEXT ( ) {
84
85 }
86
87
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AES256Crypto
package org.yunpu.crypto.aes;
/**
* @author zhuyp
* AES256Crypto is to realize AES cryptography algorithm with key size
* of 256-bit
*/
public class AES256Crypto
1 / * *
2 *
3 * AES256Crypto i s t o r e a l i z e AES c r y p t o g r a p h y a l g o r i t h e m wi th ↩
key s i z e
4 * of 256− b i t
5 * /
6
7 package org . yunpu . crypto . aes ;
8
9 import java . io . IOException ;
10 import java . io . InputStream ;
11 import java . security . SecureRandom ;
12
13 import org . bouncycastle . crypto . BufferedBlockCipher ;
14 import org . bouncycastle . crypto . engines . AESFastEngine ;
15 import org . bouncycastle . crypto . modes . CBCBlockCipher ;
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16 import org . bouncycastle . crypto . paddings .↩
PaddedBufferedBlockCipher ;
17 import org . bouncycastle . crypto . params . KeyParameter ;
18 import org . bouncycastle . crypto . params . ParametersWithIV ;
19
20 / * *
21 * @author zhuyp
22 * AES256Crypto i s t o r e a l i z e AES c r y p t o g r a p h y a l g o r i t h e m wi th ↩
key s i z e
23 * of 256− b i t
24 * /
25 public class AES256Crypto {
26
27 private byte [ ] key = new byte [ 3 2 ] ;
28
29 private byte [ ] iv = new byte [ 1 6 ] ;
30
31 private byte [ ] plainText = PlainText . PLAIN_TEXT . getBytes ( ) ;
32
33 private byte [ ] cipherText ;
34
35 private BufferedBlockCipher cipher = new ↩
PaddedBufferedBlockCipher (
36 new CBCBlockCipher (new AESFastEngine ( ) ) ) ;
37
38 private ParametersWithIV piv ;
39
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40 private SecureRandom random = new SecureRandom ( ) ;
41
42
43 public AES256Crypto ( ) {
44 }
45
46
47 / * *
48 * g e n e r a t e e n c r y p t / d e c r y p t key , s t o r e i t a t ↩
K e y D e p o s i t L o c a t i o n
49 * @param byteKey
50 * @param K e y D e p o s i t L o c a t i o n
51 * /
52 private void AES256GenerateKey ( Byte [ ] byteKey , String ↩
KeyDepositLocation ) {
53
54 }
55
56
57 / * *
58 * e n c r y p t P l a i n T e x t wi th byteKey
59 * @param P l a i n T e x t
60 * @param byteKey
61 * @throws j a v a . l a n g . E x c e p t i o n
62 * /
63 private Byte [ ] AES256Encrypt ( Byte [ ] PlainText , Byte [ ] ↩
byteKey ) throws Exception {
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64
65 }
66
67 / * *
68 * d e c r y p t C i p h e r T e x t wi th byteKey
69 * @param C i p h e r T e x t
70 * @param byteKey
71 * @return P l a i n T e x t
72 * @throws j a v a . l a n g . E x c e p t i o n
73 * /
74 private byte [ ] AES256Decrypt ( Byte [ ] CipherText , Byte [ ] ↩
byteKey ) throws Exception {
75
76 }
77 }
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